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I 
SEX AND COMMUNICATION EFFECTS IN A MIXED-MOTIVE GAME 
J .... lvl.E.T. Gibbs 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the effects of restricted communication 
opportunity and the sex of the subject on co-operative responses 
made by British dyads in a 180-trial matrix version of Prisoner's 
Dilemma. 
The first experiment employed 20 male, 20 female and 20 mixed-sex 
i 
dyads who were assigned to one of four verbal communication condi-
tions: none allowed; allowed before trial l; allowed after trial 31; 
allowed throughout. No differences due to the sex of the dyad were 
demonstrated but communication allowed throughout elicited significantly 
higher levels of co-operation. 
A financial incentive was introduced into the second experiment. Two 
communication conditions were retained: none allowed; allowed after 
trial 31. 10 male and 10 female dyads took part. Communication 
opportunity elicited higher levels of co-operation, especially for 
male pairs. Subjects were more than twice as co-operative when 
offered a financial incentive. 
Both of these experiments were conducted by a female E, the author. 
When experiment 2 was replicated by a male E communicaction effects, 
but no sex effects, were observed. However, there were no effetts due 
to the sex of the subject but there was a main communication effect 
when Expts. 2 and 3 were replicated in a 8aianced sex of E.design. 
However, the female experimenter elicited higher levels of co-
operation from all subjects regardless of their sex. 
The data from Expts. 2-4 were analysed in a multiple E design. 
Communication opportunity elicited significantly higher levels of co-
operation and female Ss were less co-operative in the presence of male 
experimenters, but only as the duration of the inter-action increased. 
The experimenters themselves were found to elicit different levels of 
co-operation from subjects regardless of the sex of the player or of 
the sex of E. 
Experiment 2 was replicated by the author using 32 American students. 
American males were more co-operative than British men and both 
American and British women. No communication effects were observed. 
Experiment 2 was then repeated with E absent from the room. No 
significant main or inter-action effects were observed. 
It seems that the presence of the experimenter, whatever their sex, 
helps to define the psychological environment in which the subjects' 
strategic inter-action occurs. 
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1. 
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the development of Game Theory and research 
into experimental games. Co-ordination Games, Zero-Sum and non 
Zero-Sum Games are discussed and the essential features of the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game are noted. 
1.1 Experimental Games 
Game Theory was originally created as a new approach to economic 
problems and, as a branch of mathematics, has provided a method 
to formally investigate rational choice. Interest in Game Theory 
arose after the publication in 1944 of 'Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior' by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern which 
extended the use of mathematics to analyse outcomes of an 
individual's possible decisions when dependent on those of another 
person rather than on chance. This view was attractive to social 
psychologists who preferred to try and understand people as 
rational decision makers rather than as guided by instinctive and 
irrational drives. Traditional theories of interdependent decision 
making have tended to follow a causal, mechanistic mod~ of human 
behaviour, but these have been able to provide only a partial 
analysis of deliberate, purposeful interdependent decisions where 
participants have preferences among the available outcomes. 
Although Game Theory has made positive contributions to economics 
it has had less effect than might have been expected on the 
theoretical development of the Social Sciences. 
One difficulty is that there has been some confusion over 
terminology. Whilst activities such as chess are often referred 
2. 
to as 'games' by both the layman and the social scientist, other 
activities commonly referred to as 'games' by the layman (e.g. 
solitaire) are not amenable to Game Theory analysis. On the other 
hand, other events such as social and political conflicts, rarely 
referred to as 'games' by the layman, may be analysed in terms of 
the theory of games •. According to the theory an important 
feature of gaming situations is that each participant has partial 
control over outcomes. The goal of the theory is to find a 
solution to such games. 
According to Game Theory the decision makers have conflicting 
goals yet the outcomes are interdependent to a greater or lesser 
extent. Shubik (1964) proposed that each player is an autonomous 
decision making unit which operates towards an objective which 
will determine their choices according to the availability of 
resources. The use of these resources also depends on the rules 
of the game which prescribe certain limitations. 
The model of reality is provided by a game of strategy, defined 
by Rapoport and Chammah (1965a) as "a situation in which two or 
more 'players' make choices among available alternatives (moves). 
The totality of choices determines the outcome of the game and it 
is assumed that the rank order of preference for the outcome is 
different for different players. Thus the 'interests' of the 
players are generally in conflict. Whether these interests are 
diametrically opposed or only partly opposed depends on the type 
of game" (P.9). Such a game must therefore have a set of n players, 
each with a set of strategies, and a pay-off function for each 
player (Wiberg, 1972). 
3. 
Rapoport and Guyer (1966) have shown that there are 78 
strategically different games in which two players can rank the 
four outcomes in a 2 x 2 matrix gam~ the simplest type of game. 
There are three main categories of games:- 1) purely co-
operative (co-ordination) games; 2) purely competitive (zero-
sum) games; and 3) non zero-sum games, termed 'mixed-motive' 
games by Lues and Raiffa (1957). Rapoport and Chammah's 
definition of a game of strategy actually excludes purely co-
operative co-ordination games although they are included by 
Schelling (1960). 
1.2 Co-ordination Games 
These games are purely co-operative in nature as the interests 
of all the players coincide completely at all times. These games 
have received less attention than others partly because formal 
Game Theory cannot provide a solution as there is no conflict of 
interests. There is nothing in the formal structure of the game 
to point to a 'best' strategy. 
An example of such a game for 2 players would be calling heads or 
tails for a coin - if both players choose the same they get £1 
each. Solutions to such games may depend on tacit communication 
or non verbal cues and informal game analysis is helpful here. 
Where tacit communication is not possible players may have to use 
'telepathic' communication and guess what the other person will 
choose based, wherever possible, on a salient feature of the 
game. It can be seen that the pr6blem dissolves if overt 
communication is allowed. 
Schelling (1960) has argued that co-ordination games are not 
as psychologically simple as they might appear. Often the 
strategies are quite subtle and may involve complex processes 
such as "I guess that you guess that I guess •••••• etc." 
1.3 Zero-Sum Games 
4. 
The essential feature of zero-sum games is opposition of interests. 
They assume that when the pay-off to one player is equal to x the 
pay-off to the other player is - x, such as in poker. Thus the 
gains of one player are equal to the losses of the other. The 
rational solution, proved by Von Neumann and Morgenstern to exist 
for all zero-sum games, is to adopt the minimax strategy of 
maximising gains and minimising losses so that each player adopts 
a strategy which will guarantee him the best of the worst possible 
outcomes. Thus it is possible to identify the equilibrium points 
on the matrix where neither player (assumed to be logical) could 
regret his choice given knowledge of the other player's 
intentions. 
An example of a zero-sum game is the Matching Pennies Game, 
described by Hamburger (1979). This is a two-person game where 
player 1 is called "Matchmaker" and Player 2 is termed "Variety-
Seeker". Each player places a penny either head up or tail up 
so that the other player cannot see it. They then uncover the 
pennies simultaneously. Matchmaker gets both pennies if they 
show the same face but variety-seeker wins both pennies if they 
show one head and one tail. Thus, money is neither created nor 
destroyed and the gains of one player are equivalent to the 
losses of the other. 
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The evidence available appears to support the idea that the 
normative strategy prescribed by the theory is followed by naive 
players of zero-sum games. Lieberman (1960) using a 3 x 3 two-
person zero-sum game found that by the final ten trials of the 
game ninety per cent of players made the rational choice as 
prescribed by the theory. 
Rapoport and Chammah (1965a) identified two distinct types of 
two-person zero-sum game where the concept of rationality is an 
essential feature. One type, with a ''saddle point" has a 
strategy which is most favourable for both players. To find the 
solution on the matrix the player chooses the payoff which is 
lowest in~e row and highest in the column. This saddle point, 
named after the point on a horse's saddle which is lowest with 
respect to the horse's longitudinal plane and highest with 
respect to its vertical plane, is the rational strategy whose 
outcome cannot be improved by either player. The second type 
has no single best strategy yet there is a best mixture of 
strategies i.e. strategies are altered so that each strategy is 
chosen with a given relative frequency. Each player is then 
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assured of th~ largest pay-off he can expect given the limitations 
of the particular game. In zero-sum games the formal solution is 
unaffected by communication opportunities as bargaining is not 
advantageous for rational players. To find the best strategy it 
is simply necessary to ask oneself what the worst possible out-
come would be. 
It can be seen, then, that zero-sum games conform more to the 
prescriptive requirements of Game Theory. Most recreational games 
are zero-sum but relatively few social encounters have the 
structual property that pay-offs for each outcome add up to zero. 
In non zero-sum (mixed-motive) games the concept of rationality is 
less clear since the interests of the players are neither strictly 
coincident nor strictly opposed. 
1.4 Non Zero-Sum Gamffi 
The non zero-sum game defies complete formal analysis. The garnes 
involve two motives of co-operation and competition which co-
exist between two players whose interests are therefore partly 
coincident and partly opposed. Thus in non zero-sum games, which 
involve more realistic representations of conflict situations under 
study in the social sciences (albeit in the encapsulated 
environment of a laboratory), the gain of one player is not 
necessarily equivalent to the loss of the other and both players 
may gain or lose at the same time. In addition to the inter-
personal conflict existing in the game a player may also have 
intrapersonal conflict arising from the clash of motives. 
Formal Game Theory is unable to provide a rational solution in 
mixed-motive games since there is no way of deciding the 
'normative' strategy. Formal theory rests on the assumption 
that a player will obtain and process all the available 
information in a situation and that the response (to maximise 
gain and minimise loss) is strictly determined by this 
information. However, there is no one optimal strategy as 
compromise is possible and thus no convincing solution 
analagous to the minimax solution can be found. 
7. 
Pruitt and Kimmel(l977) suggest that experimental games are an 
'operational outgrowth' of the earlier theoretical developments 
which had limited applicability and weak predictive power. 
Earlier fields of study in social conflict and interpersonal 
relations had not fully acknowledged the interdependencies of 
the parties involved nor the influence of incentives onrocial 
·behaviour. Experimental games provided a laboratory method to 
provide a precise definition of the reward structures and of the 
way parties are dependent on one another. Since formal theory 
is inadequate, informal analysis is necessary for insights into 
the pattern of choices made by players of mixed-motive games, 
as the "best" decision is ambivalent. 
The range of possibilities in strategic interaction is immense. 
Not surprisingly, researchers have concentrated on the simplest 
of all games - the 2 x 2 game where two decision makers each 
have two options before them. Rapoport and Guyer (1966) were 
B. 
able to identify 78 strategically different 2 x 2 games and, of 
these, Rapoport(l967a) further identified twelve symmetrical 
games which have identical pay-off matrices for both players. 
Eight of these are described as ''trivial" as they possess 
optimal equilibrium poLnts i.e. the same outcome is most 
preferred byJboth players and there is therefore no conflict of 
interests. Rapoport defined four 2 x 2 non-trivial symmetrical 
games without optimal equilibria: Leader, Hero, Exploiter and 
Martyr. Each player has the same matrix and there is no single 
outcome that can be predicted by the formal theory as a conflict 
of interests exists. Rapoport (1967a) considers that each of 
these non-trivial symmetrical games bring four distinct types 
of psychological pressure to bear on the players. However, the 
four games have received unequal treatment by researchers and 
most empirical research has focused on the Martyr Game, more 
popularly known as Prisoner's Dilemma. 
1.5 Prisoner's Dilemma 
The Prisoner's Dilemma has generated much empirical research, 
largely due to its status as a genuine dilemma or paradox. 
For, as Rapoport and Chammah (1965a) state "the rational choice 
of strategy by both players leads to an outcome which is worse 
for both than if they had chosen their strategies 'irrationally' 11 
(P.l3). 
Attention was first drawn to this game by Merrill Flood in 1951 
but the interpretation normally given to the Prisoner's Dilemma(P.D.) 
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is attributed to A.W. Tucker. Two people suspected of being 
accomplices in a serious crime are arrested by the police and 
taken into custody where they are placed in separate cells, 
unable to communicate with one another. However, the prosecutor 
has insufficient evidence for a conviction without a confession 
from at least one of the prisoners. The following options are 
made known to them: 1) if one suspect confesses to the crime 
and the other suspect does not, suspect 1 is given his freedom 
for turning Queen's evidence and suspect 2 is given, say, a 10 
year prison sentence; 2) if both confess, .both suspects will 
receive a reduced prison sentence of 5 years; 3) if both 
suspects remain silent both will be convicted on a lesser charge 
and each receive prison sentences of 1 year. 
These alternatives, and pay-offs resulting from choices made 
on the basis of these, can be presented in a symmetrical 2 x 2 
matrix (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 A Prisoner's Dilemma Matrix 
Suspect 2 Pay-offs 
Don't 
Confess 
Suspect 1 
Confess 
Confess 
r=J Suspect 1 
(ITO] Suspect 2 
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The dilemma of the suspects is that it is in their individual 
interests to confess whatever the other does but it is in their 
collective interests not to, thus generating a mixture of inter-
personal and intrapersonal conflict. 
Scodel et al (1959) defined the properties that a game of 
strategy must have in order to be 'Prisoner's Dilemma'. The pay-
offs for co-operative choices (C) and competitive choices (the 
defection strategy, D) must satisfy given rules. These are 
shown below in Figure 2, where Rapoport's (1966) notation has 
been adopted. 
Figure 2 The Properties of Prisoner's Dilemma 
Player 2 
c 
Player 1 
D 
Rules 
i) 2R > S + r> 2P 
ii) T > R > P "> S 
where 
R = Reward 
S = 'Sucker's' pay-off 
T = Temptation 
P = Punishment 
The player is faced with a series of binary decisions where the 
pay-off is a function of joint action. Choosing D is the 
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individual's "best 11 or least risky strategy whilst the "best" 
strategy for maximising the pay-off for both is C. O'Connor et 
al (1972) point out that, according to Game Theory, "When faced 
with two 'risky' choices, the choice of greater pay-off, or 
utility, is always preferred" (P.21). In the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, however, the nature of rationality becomes increasingly 
ambivalent. The 0 strategy strictly dominates the C alternative 
in the sense that 0 is the best choice no matter what the other 
does. If either player chooses 0 it would be rational for the 
other player to do the same as he cannot be assured of a better 
outcome. But, paradoxically, if both players are rational in 
the game theoretic sense and always choose the alternative with 
the larger utility, (the only possible equilibrium pair DO) they 
both lose. The C alternative is more attractive only if one can 
be assured the other player will do the same. Thus, the 
minimax choice, o, may be motivated by caution, whereas the non-
minimax strategy, c, has an element of risk. 
Rapoport (1966) attempted to take into account the mutual 
perception of the other player's rationality when trying to 
account for the strategy of individual players: 
"The best outcome for both of us is (c,c). However, 
if player 2 assumes that I shall choose c, he may 
well play 0 to win the largest pay-off. To protect 
myself I will also play D. But this makes for a 
loss for both of us. 2 rational players certainly 
deserve the outcome (B,C). I am rational and, by 
the fundamental notion of Game Theory, I must 
assume that player 2 is also rational. If I 
have come to the ~onclusion that C is the 
rational choice, he too must have come to the 
same conclusion. Now, knowing that he will 
play c, what shall I play? Shall I not play 0 
to receive the greater pay-off? But if I have 
come to this conclusion, he has also probably 
done so. Again we end up with (o,o). To 
ensure that he does not come to the conclusion 
that he should play o, I had better avoid it 
also. For if I avoid it and am rational, he too 
will avoid it if he is rational. On bhe other 
hand, if rationality prescribes o, then it must 
also prescribe 0 for him. At any rate, because 
of the symmetry of the ~ame, rationality must 
prescribe the same choice to both, But if both 
choose the same, then (c,c) and (o,o) are the only 
possible outcomes. Of these, (C,C) is clearly the 
better. Therefore, I should choose C " (P.l41). 
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Luce and Raiffa (1957) maintain that the standard minimax strategy 
(o,o) is the only rational solution in a single trial version of 
P.O. They accept, however, that a tacit agreement to choose 
(c,c) may arise in multiplay P.O. but consider that this is 
unstable as unilateral defection will result in increased pay-
offs for the defector. Thus, (o,o) may still be the only 
rational solution in multiplay P.O. ~ince 11 •••••• if a 
player defects and his opponent does not, then he profits; where-
as, if he fails to defect and his opponent does, he loses more 
than if he would if they were both to defect •••••• 11 (P.97). 
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Rapoport and Chammah (1965a) distinguish betw~en co-operative 
and non-co-operative games in the theory of non zero-sum games. 
This usage of 'co-operative' and 'competitive' dates back to von 
Neumann and Morgenstern {1944) and must not be confused with the 
more popular usage above to distinguish different strategic 
structures. Prisoner's Dilemma is, b·y definition, a non-co-
operative game in this sense as a dilemma would no longer exist if 
the players could make an enfoiceable agreement to co-operate. 
However, if the agreement was not enforceable a new dilemma would 
arise as it is in the interests of each individual to break the 
agreement regardless of whether or not the other kept it. In 
this sense, Prisoner's Dilemma may be regarded as a series of 
different games. If one person failed to defect he would lose 
more if the other defected than if they both defected. Although 
the(C,C) choice is collectively more desirable it is unstable since 
each player must be both trusting ~trustworthy (Rapoport,l964). 
The paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma has led Luce and Raiffa 
{1957) to declare "There should be a law against such games! 11 (P.97). 
As a prescriptive theo~y then, Game Theory is inadequate in solving 
the conflicts· associated with mixed-motive game; it seems therefor~ 
· that the concept of rationality must be rE:r:jf,3fined .• 
One of the most reliable findings is the relatively low level of 
co-operation obtained on P.o. under most conditions (e.g. Gallo 
and McClintock, 1965). Luce and Raiffa (1957) maintained that 
whilst (o,o) is the 'rational' solution in a single trial version 
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of the game a tacit agreement will be made to play (c,c) 
even though this is inherently unstable. This does not always 
seem to be the case. Empirical research employing the P.O. 
matrix as a research tool has attempted to answer the question: 
under what conditions will players be likely to trust each other 
sufficiently to risk adopting the mutually rewarding, but 
unstable, strategy? During the last twenty years or so, 
experimental gaming has generated over 1,000 published studies 
(Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977). 
An extensive research programme in two-person games has been 
reported by Rapoport and Chammah (1965a) using seven different 
matrices conforming to the formal requirements of Prisoner's 
Dilemma. They found, as the theory predicts, that the 
distribution of choices between C and 0 alternatives varies as 
a function of the expected utilities of the alternatives. Thus, 
if the other pay-offs are held constant, the selection of the C 
alternative increases as R and S increase, and decreases as T 
and P increase. 
Rapoport and Chammah (1965a) also demonstrated a marked tendency 
for one p~ayer to imitate the other in reiterated Prisoner's 
Dilemma and they consider that any effects due to 
personality differences become masked during prolonged inter-
action. Pairs of male students (nearly all of whom were un-
acquainted) played 300 iterations of P.O. and the pattern of 
choices over time was investigated. An initial trend towards 
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increased defection was observed but, after a while, the 
frequency of co-operative choices increased, referred to as 
the 'recovery' period. Once CC is established defection is 
unlikely to be rewarded because of the 'retaliation' that 
would occur by the other player. Rapoport and Chammah 
concluded that the "steady decline of the unilateral states, 
i.e., the increasing predominance of CC and DO states, is 
evidently responsible for the fact that paired players become 
more and more like each other in repeated plays of Prisoner's 
Dilemma" (P.l02). 
It can be seen, then, that the choices in this type of mixed-
motive game have often been thought to measure the co-operative 
or competitive orientations of the players. A 'co-operative' 
choice C (see Figure 2) is thus considered indicative of a 
trusting attitude towards the other player whilst the 
'competitive' choice D indicates, in part, a distrust of the 
partner and a desire to maximise his own gains at the expense of 
the other player. This is a simplistic view and Wrightsman (1966) 
more realistically defined trusting behaviour to be evident not 
only when the subject simply chose C but when he also expected the 
other person to choose C (maximising the joint pay-off) and, 
furthermore, gave reasons such as trust, fairness or co-operation 
for doing so. In the same way, a D choice would only be 
considered as distrusting of the other player if the subject 
expected the other player to also choose D and gave concepts of 
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distrust or 'fear' as reasons for doing so. More interestingly, 
perhaps, since this aspect is often disregarded in the literature, 
Wrightsman did not classify subjects' responses such as 'safety' 
or 'equality' to be indicative of either trusting or distrusting 
behaviour. 
Ward (1972), however, argued that the concept of trust applies only 
to a subject's expectation of the other player's choices and 
that each choice in fact stems from both the expectation of the 
other player's choices and self-motivation. She suggested that 
whilst the expectations of subjects are related to attitudes 
towards others, self-motivation is related more to the personality 
dynamics of the individual. However, her 1972 study gave little 
support to this notion and a more useful approach in understanding 
choices on P.o. has been that of Messick and McClintock (1968). 
They assume three basic motivational orientations in the choices 
of any player of mixed-motive games : 1) maximising joint gain 
(related to co-operation); 2) maximising relative gain (related 
to competition); and, 3) maximising one's own pay-off 
(individualism). 
Such approaches do, at least, begin to explore the motivational 
processes involved in game analysis, but all such models of 
behaviour assume that probabilities are constant within the 
individual throughout the game and this is clearly not the case. 
In addition each player is assumed to have full knowledge of the 
game and Luce and Raiffa (1957) see this as "the real source of 
unreality in the model" (P. 55). Mack and Knight (1972) have 
investigated the effect of additional information on choices 
in Prisoner's Dilemma. Mack and Knight hypothesised that 
increased information would tend to increase rational choice 
behaviour. They found that the addition of information about 
both the nature of the game and the consequences of Ss' 
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choices resulted in a higher level of competitive behaviour. 
However, information on either the nature of the game or the 
consequences of strategy choices presented alone was insufficient 
to produce this effect. 
Terhune (1970) has pointed out that intention in conflict 
situations is seldom obvious, and whilst a C choice may, indeed, 
be co-operative it may also be attempting to lure the other 
player into making the more vulnerable C choice in order to take 
advantage of such a move with the other player receiving the 
"Sucker's pay-off'' (see Figure 2) on the next trial. Similarly, 
a 0 choice might be defensive ££ aggressive but could also be 
used as a 'threat' and (like the C choice) be used as a signal 
for establishing and co-ordinating choices which maximise the 
joint pay-off. On the other hand, Lieberman (1960), amongst 
others, has noted that subjects often vary their strategies 
simply out of boredom and one must therefore be very cautious in 
imputing intention in the results of any such interaction. Such 
effects may partly depend on the levels of incentives offered. 
However, it is clear to anyone having observed subjects play 
iterated Prisoner's Dilemma that subjects' choices indicate 
more than simply co-operation and competition or trust and 
suspicion. The author feels that it is more likely for there 
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to be large individual differences in the meanings of response 
styles at any given point of the interaction and in the 
assi~nation of probabilities. However, in the study to be 
presented he~e, the concern is for differences in response 
styles betweenl:groups and for this reason the C choice will be 
broadly defined as a 'co-operative' choice and a 0 choice as a 
'non-co-operative' choice (following Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977). 
This in no way detracts from the appreciation that in any one 
instance a whole range of complex motives may be involved both 
within and between individuals and, indeed, it is the author's 
experience that subjects themselves can usually supply plausible 
explanations for their behaviour. 
The appeal of these games for researchers is that they provide 
a simple method for investigating aspects of strategic inter-
action that have been impossible to study by other means. The 
following two chapters examine some of the experimental gaming 
studies over the last thirty years. 
CHAPTER TWO INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AFFECTING GAME 
BEHAVIOUR 
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This chapter presents a general account of investigations to 
measure the effects of various parameters on the outcome of two-
person variations of P.O. Matrix manipulations, pre-game 
instructions, incentive levels, the strategy and perception of 
the other player and communication opportunities are discussed. 
Individual differences are discussed in Chapter Three. 
2.1 Pay-off Manipulations 
Variations in the magnitude of pay-offs can occur as long as the 
ordinal rankings are maintained. In Prisoner's Dilemma this is 
when 2R;:. T + S ::::- 2P and T ==- R =v s_:::::.. P. Game Theory assumes that 
matrix variations would not affect a change in subjects' 
behaviour because the relationships amongst the pay-off utility 
values have not altered. However, whilst the rules of the P.o. 
game can be maintained,it seems that the discrepancy between S 
and T (see Figure 2) can be manipulated such that the temptation 
to defect increases. Rapoport and Orwant (1972) proposed an 
index of competitive advantage, which can be calculated by sub-
tracting the value of S from T. Minas et al (1960) found, as 
expected, that enlarging the competitive index resulted in a 
higher level of competitive (or, at least, non-co-operative) 
play. 
In their 1965 (a) study Rapoport and Chammah used seven different 
matrices which conformed to the formal requirements of P.o. 
They found that, of these, the least biased towards either choice 
was one where T = 10, R = 5, S = -10 and P = -1. Rapoport and 
Chammah actually used pairs of subjects for their research (10 
pairs played each of the games 300 times) whilst the 1966 
study by Bixenstine and Blundell systematically varied pay-
offs while the behaviour of the subjects' 'robot' opponent 
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was held constant. However, as predicted, there was a smaller 
probability of an alternative being chosen when there was a 
decrease in its expected utility. 
Other manipulations have tended to relax the rules of P.O. and 
are therefore not pertinent to the present discussion. However, 
it seems that in general subjects respond in predictable ways to 
manipulations of the pay-off matrix. 
2.2 Pre-Game Instructions 
Wrightsman et al (1967) noted that the instructions used in 
experimental games are often overlooked and it is certainly the 
case that they are seldom fully specified, Similarly, pre-game 
experience and instructions fail to be rec::orded. 
Wrightsman, Lucker et al (1972) varied the completeness of three 
sets of instructions. The highest level of co-operative responses 
was produced by a set of instructio~. which included both basic 
information and illustrated examples. Bedell and Sistrunk 
(1973) argued that instructions using concepts such as 'game' 
and 'player' tend to present an individualistic set which, they 
claim, is linked to the frequently reported finding that women 
play less co-operatively than men on Prisoner's Dilemma. 
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2.3 Effects of Incentive 
Most of the studies in this area have involved rewards in the 
form of real or imaginary money but the evidence is contradictory. 
At the time the present series of experiments were conducted 
(1975 - 1977) the level of incentive was not considered an 
important factor. One of the reasons for this may have been 
that pay-offs with real or imaginary money had been so small as 
to have had little effect on subjects' motivation. Inconsistent 
findings may also have been the result of using games which have 
different structural and conceptual properties and, moreover, few 
studies have varied the reward values within a constant experi-
mental design. 
Evans (1964) employed two incentive conditions : 1) imaginary 
money; 2) points to be added to S's examination score. He found 
no differences in the number of co-operative choices and concluded 
that generalisations could be made across situations. However, 
he used only a 6-trial P.O. game and we have seen that such a 
design is hardly likely to investigate the changing motivational 
factors which occur in multi-play P.O. The question of 
credibility also arises: do subjects really believe that their 
performance in the game will affect their examination score? 
The above study compared an academic achievement incentive with 
an imaginary financial incentive. Other investigators have 
varied the levels of one type of incentive, usually a monetary 
incentive due to the ease of specifying values. For example, 
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Gallo (1963) found that co-operative behaviour increased when 
fairly large amounts of real money were at stake compared to 
imaginary money. However, Gallo used the simulated trucker's 
game (see Deutsch and Krauss, 1962) and these effects may not be 
capable of generalisation to the traditional P.O. game. When 
Gallo (1966) used a P.O. matrix no significant effects on the 
level of co-operation were found when bhe reward values were 
varied. Unfortunately, each subject played in both of the 
treatment conditions which somewhat limits the conclusions that 
can be drawn from this study. 
In another study using real and imaginary rewards Wrightsman 
(1966) employed three incentive conditions. In one condition Ss 
were told they could keep their winnings (apparently belieyed by 
90 per cent of the subjects), in an imaginary money condition Ss 
played 'for fun' and in the third condition Ss were given no 
information. No significant differences in co-operative 
behaviour were demonstrated. However, the design was a sequential 
choice 2-trial game and generalisation to simultaneous choice 
multi-play P.O. would not be advisable. 
It may be that incentive levels interact with the motivation of 
the subject. Stahelski and Kelley (1969) using a P.O. matrix 
paired together Ss who said they would compete prior to the game. 
In a points reward system they became increasingly bompetitive' 
over 30 trials whereas self-described 'co-operators' became less 
co-operative in both a money and a points incentive condition. 
Radlow, Weidner and Hunst (1968) also used a P.O. matrix with 
an imaginary money condition and a real money condition where 
subjects were paid winnings on one randomly selected trial. 
The real moneyfon~ition had some effect on increasing co-
operative choices but the orienting instructions (e.g. whether 
Ss were given a co-operative or competitive set) were found to 
be more important. It seems, then, that incentives probably 
inter~act with other variables, yet to be fully specified, in 
determining choices on Prisoner's Dilemma. 
2.4 Strategy and Perception of Other 
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Many studies have employed a simulated 'other player' where 
each S believes he is playing another subject but is, in fact, 
playing against a pre-programmed set of responses. McClintock 
et al (1963) used random strategies of 85 per cent, 50 per cent 
and 15 per cent co-operative responses from the simulated other 
player but found nti demonstrable effect on the real subjects' 
choices. Even a 95 per cent co-operative strategy seems to be 
unable to elicit more than 50 per cent co-operative choices from 
the real subject (Bixenstine and Wilson, 1963). This tendency 
to exploit ''pacifist" strategies has been found in many other 
games. Reychler (1979) demonstrated that the level of 
exploitation may depend on other factors as well. However, the 
pattern of C choices may have more effect than simply the 
frequency of C choices. 
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Solomon (1960) found subjects to be more co-operative when 
playing against a matching strategy from the simulated other 
player than against either an unconditionally non-co-operative 
S!£_ uncon.ditiorially cq-operati ve strategy. Oskamp (1971) 
concluded that a change in programmed co-operation from low to 
high was more effective in eliciting co-operative responses 
from the subject than a change from high to low. This is 
consistent with the well-known study by Harford and Solomon 
(1967) which demonstrated that the 'reformed sinner' strategy 
of initial non-co-operation followed by unconditional co-
operation and thencconditional co-operation (where the stooge 
co-operates only if the subject co-operated in the preceding 
trial) is more effective in eliciting co-operation from a 
subject than the 'lapsed saint' strategy (an initial co-
operative strategy followed by conditional co--operation). 
The perception of the Other has been shown to influence game 
behaviour. Whilst Grant and Sermat (1969) found no ciliear link 
between status and behaviour, Mack (1976) found that status 
(where the Other's status was varied within a University setting) did 
have an effect. More non-co-operative behaviour was observed 
under conditions of equal status. 
Information concerning the Other's past game behaviour also 
influences subjects' subsequent choices. Braver and Rohrer 
(1975) found that subjects co-operated more when~the Other was 
depicted as trustworthy and co-operated less when they were 
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perceived as exploitative. Baxter (1969) found that more co-
operation occurred following information about the Other's 
co-operative, as opposed to their competitive, characteristics. 
However, the author agrees with the position taken by Vinacke 
(1969) who argues that the introduction of a simulated 'other 
player' eliminates what may be the most important feature of the 
gaming situation and that attention should instead be focused on 
the outcome of games in which social inter-action is permitted 
to occur. 
2.5 Effects of Communication Opportunities 
As noted earlier, the traditional P.o. game does not allow 
communication between the players as the theory assumes the pay-
off matrix contains all possible contingencies for each player to 
make a rational decision. However, even though communication 
opportunities are introduced, the game still remains non-co-
operative in the theoretical sense as any pacts made are not 
enforceable. Thus, a new dilemma arises as it is in the collective 
interest to keep the agreement but in the individual interest 
to break the agreement regardless of what the other player does. 
An early study by Mintz (1951) showed that the task of pulling 
cones out of a bottle which was slowly filling with water was 
facilitated by opportunities for discussion between the co-acting 
players. Common sense might well argue that opportunities for 
communication are more likely to increase the gross number of 
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co-operative choices made by players, but the effects in two-
person, non zero-sum games have not been clearly established and 
are probably related to the specific circumstances of each study. 
As has been the case with the investigation of personality 
variables, few replications have been made. Gallo and McClintock 
(1965) conclude, with reference to P.O., "Finally, opportunities 
for communication may, but do not necessarily, ameliorate the 
conflict present in the game" (P.75). For, as Terhune (1968) 
points out, the opportunities to communicate may not be used at 
all, used for the purposes of deceit or even used ineptly. 
As in other areas of P.O. research, the generalisability of 
results is hampered by the definition of the independent variable. 
Wichman (1972) notes that, "Speaking into strange apparatus, 
passing 'canned noted', writing notes spontaneously, and talking 
to each other before making a decision have all been lumped 
together under the common rubric 'communication', while the many 
important non-verbal forms of communication have been largely 
ignored" (P.l98). Wichman adds that the small numbers of trials 
often used in gaming designs do. not allow the communication 
opportunities -or, indeed, the inter-action -to fully develop 
and many of the messages are incomplete. Wichman 1 s(l972) study 
employed four communication conditions: 1) Isolation (where the 
subject cannot see or hear the other player i.e. the traditional 
P.O. game); 2) See only; 3) Hear only; and 4) See and Hear. 
He found that over 70 trials subjects who could see each other were 
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slightly more co-operative than those in the Isolation condition, 
but overall, subjects able to use the full range of communication 
(See and Hear) behaved in a more mutually co-operative, or 
socially facilitating, way. Subjects in the Hear Only condition 
reached the same high level of co-operation as the See and Hear 
group by the last block of ten trials. He concludes: 11 The 
feeling that the other person can be influenced diminishes the 
compelling nature of the competitive choice for each S11 (P.205). 
LlJrightsman, 0 1 Connor and Baker (1972) conclude that, in general, 
opportunities for communication facilitate co-operative 
responding in the Prisoner's Dilemma although fixed or limited 
opportunities may not do so. There is also the possibility that 
the timing of the communication during the inter-action is 
important in determining positive or negative effects. Becker 
and McClintock (1967), for example, concluded that communication 
between subjects prior to play on P.O. increases the level of 
mutual trust and facilitates co-operative responding, whether it 
. be due to a motive t~ maximise one's own gain or joint gain by 
such behaviour. 
Any facilitating effect on joint co-operative behaviour by 
opportunities to communicate may well be overcome if the other 
player's behaviour encourages exploitation, or if there has been 
distrust within the context of the inter-action. This latter 
notion is consistent with Komorita and Mechling's (1967) study 
which found that the number of trials before the other player 
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'betrayed' the subject influenced the time it took to 'forgive'. 
It seems obvious from Wichman's (1972) comments that more needs 
to be known about the exact nature of the communication between 
subjects. Thus, the content and the prior assumptions of the 
subjects (in terms of goals and expectations) about the nature 
of the task need to be more fully investigated. 
2.6 Conclusions 
Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) point out that the most consistent 
findings on P.O. result from manipulating situational variables 
such as the strategy of the 'other player', varying the matrix 
pay-offs and the experimental set provided by the instructions. 
They suggest that experimental games typically involve an 
unfamiliar strategic environment where subjects attempt to be as 
rational as possible towards certain goals. Each P.O. setting 
varies in the quality and quantity of interpersonal contacts 
although studies involving greater intimacy between the 
participants (e.g. Durkin, 1972) usually produce higher levels 
of co-operative behaviour. The traditional P.O. gaming paradigm 
does not allow communication as the theory assumes all 
information is known. However, informal analysis has demonstrated 
that even expectations about how the other will behave will 
influence attempts to make a rational, strategic decision. 
CHAPTER THREE INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND GAME 
BEHAVIOUR 
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This chapter examines the relationship between choices on two-
person P.O. and personality or attitudinal characteristics. 
Differenc~due to organismic variables (e.g. sex of the player) 
are also discussed. 
3.1 Personality Variables 
Findings in this area have been inconsistent or conflicting. 
Vinacke (1969) points out that people are not rational in the 
game theoretical sense nor are guided wholly by responses to 
all available information in the situation. As noted in Chapter 
One, the intentions of the players may not be obvious and it 
seems reasonable to suppose that the interpretations of another's 
choices are likely to be partly a function of predispositions to 
be, say, suspicious or trusting of others. Terhune (1970) 
considers that personality effects may be separated into behaviour 
potentials brought by the individual to the situation (which are 
likely to determine the initial encounters) and the inter-actions 
between the persohality and the situation which contribute to 
each player's personal definition of 'the game being played'. 
Amongst the most well-known studies of the effects of personality 
variables are those by Deutsch (1960) and Lutzker (1960). 
Deutsch looked at b;th 'trusting' and 'trustworthy' aspects of 
the C choice and found that scores on the California F-Scale 
(a measure of 'authoritari~~ism') tended to correlate negatively 
with co-operative behaviour in a two trial version of the P.O. 
game. Subsequently, however, Wrightsman (1966) was unable to 
establish any relationship between .authoritarianism· and 
behaviour on a version of Prisoner's Dilemma. Fry (1965), 
using a 3 x 3 co-ordination game, also found no significant 
relationship. 
Lutzker's (1960) study employed the Internationalism Scale 
(an inverse F scale correlate). He found that people having 
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high scores on Internationalism made fewer non-co-operative 
responses in a Chicken GamJ 1 ) than those who had high scores 
on Isolationism. In addition, Internationalists tended not to 
decrease co-operative responding over time, unlike the 
Isolationists. In a study by McClintock et al (1965), which 
gave one of the ~wo players a high power role with influence 
over the partner's outcome, Internationalists in the high power 
role responded more co-operatively than Isolationists to their 
simulated partner. However, conflicting results have been noted 
by, amongst others,Pilisuk et al (1965, 1968) who found no such 
differences between Internationalists and Isolationists in 
behaviour on a game designed to simulate an arms race. In a 21 -
alternative Prisoner's Dilemma game, however, Pilisuk et al 
(1965) noted that subjects high on 'Tolerance for Ambiguity' 
(related to the F-Scal~) were more likely to have a co-operative 
(1) Chicken (sometimes called 'Exploiter') differs from P.O. in 
that the protagonist must expose himself to risk of loss in order 
to threaten his opponent. Since S > P, the DO outcome has the 
lowest pay-off in the game (simulating a head-on collision) and 
punishment is always bilateral. 
orientation on the game ('doves') than subjects with low 
'Tolerance for Ambiguity' who played in a less co-operative 
way ('hawks'). 
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Inconsistent results have also been demonstrated using the 
Machiavellianism Scale (Christie and Merton, 1958). Christie 
et al (1970) found that high Mach. subjects became increasingly 
exploitative over time in a restricted Chicken Game when they 
played against an BD% co-operative 'other'. However, Wrightsman 
(1966) using a non-restricted P.o. game found no such relation-
ship between game playing behaviour and scores on the 
Machiavellianism Scale. 
Several studies have used Wrightsman's (1966) Philosophies of 
Human Nature Scale (P.H.N.). Altruism, Trustworthiness and 
Strength of Will scores were found to correlate positively with 
co-operation in a Restricted Prisoner's Dilemma Game (Uejio and 
Wrightsman, 1967). However, this significant finding only held 
when the subject knew his partner was Caucasian. There was a 
non-significant negative correlation when the Other was Japanese. 
Wrightsman et al (1972) found a significant relationship between 
scores on the Altruism Scale in only one of 4 strategy conditions. 
No significant effects were noted for any of the other sub-scales 
of the P.H.N. 
Dominance, as a personality trait, has also been investigated in 
attempts to correlate this trait with behaviour on games. Sermat 
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(1968) selected 20 high and 20 low dominance subjects who were 
matched with like and with unlike partners in a pre-game 
encounter. Subjects thought they were playing a Chicken Game 
with their partner but in fact played against a pre-determined 
strategy of 60% co-operation for 50 trials followed by 10% co-
operation for 60 trials. Sermat found that dominant subjects 
played more competitively than submissive subjects on the last 
60 trials. In addition,submissive subjects who were paired with 
similar partners prior to the game were subsequently less 
competitive than any of the other pairings. 
Moore and Mack (1972) used high dominance, low dominance and 
mixed pairs for their study which employed a 300 trial version 
of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. The measure of dominance chosen 
was based on the 1939 Allport and Allport Ascendance - Sub-
mission Reaction Study. High dominance subjects, but not low 
dominance Ss, locked in sooner than mixed pairs and showed more 
0 responses, mutual 0 responses and more lock-in mutual D 
responses than either of the other groups of subjects. In 
addition, dominant subjects initiated more 0 responses compared 
to low dominance Ss. The results confirmed Rapoport and 
Chammah's (1965a) prediction that personality variables could 
affect play on P.o. However, Moore and Mack pointed out that in 
their study the differences were only obtained "when one of the 
groups used in a comparison was such that the personality trait 
might be expected to add to the effect of the dominating 
strategy. The results, together with the failure of previous 
experimenters to find any individual correlates of behavior 
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in this game, seem to indicate the weakness of the personality 
variable, relative to the nature of the game, in influencing 
behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma 11 (P. 490). 
Various studies have investigated the relationship between the 
player's mental state and their game playing behaviour. It 
might be expected that paranoid players would be less trusting, 
and therefore less co-operative, than the other players. However, 
Harford and Solomon (1969) found that paranoid patients were 
actually more co-operative than a sample of students. Knapp and 
Podell (1968), on the other hand, found significant differences 
between the levels of co-operation on the first trial of a 
Restricted Prisoner's Dilemma game, but by the lOOth trial this 
difference had disappeared. However, their study employed a 
programmed 'other' and it was discovered that the patients were 
less affected by the differences in the strategies of the 'other' 
than the students. 
It was suggested that a sense of group identity, fostering co-
operative behaviour, emerges as part of the adjustment to 
hospital life. This view is supported by the 1969 study of 
Wallace and Rothaus who found that pairs of schizophrenic patients 
from the same ward played more co-operatively than pairs of 
subjects selected from different wards. 
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The majority of studies examining the relationship between 
personality dimensions and mixed - motive games have failed 
to identify any relationship. The reader is referred to the 
review of the main research findings on personality effects 
under taken by Ba~ter (1972) who points out that comparisons 
between studies are made difficult by the fact that different 
matrices and procedures may be employed. To make generalisations 
even more difficult few replications have been made of studies 
yielding positive results between co-operative choices and 
personality dispositions and attitudes. 
I I 
Baxter suggests, however, that need for achievement is one 
variable which does yield consistent results (e.g. Terhune (1968) 
found subjects high on thi~ measure are also the most co-operative, 
although this may depend on the set of the game) but even in this 
area various measures of the variable, in addition to differences 
in procedure, have been adopted. Dskamp (1971) demonstrated that 
situational variables interact with the type of reward structure, 
and it is therefore necessary to specify the procedure. Even in 
P.O. forms of mixed - motive games, many variables -·in ~ddition 
to the reward structure - may affect the choices. Such factors 
include the number of trials,the numbers of people involved, 
(i.e. two-person or n-person P.o.), the strategy of the 'other 
player' (if pre-programmed), the timing and knowledge of the 
pay-offs, whether choices are made simultaneously or successively, 
whether standard or expanded forms of P.O. are displayed and the 
~ 
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number of choices available. 
3.2 fersonalit~ Variab!es : Conclusions 
It seems, then, that the personality traits brought to the 
game situation do not, by themselves, determine the outcome. 
However, Terhune (1970) concluded that personality dimensions 
may be influential and suggested various ways in which 
contemporary studies could be refined. These areas included 
increased attention to incentives, improved personality 
measurement, more complex experimental situations and increased 
attention to ~e inter-action of the player's personality and 
the game situation. 
Pilisuk et al (1965) suggest it is the inter-action at each step 
of the game that will determine the effect that personality 
variables will have. Rapoport and Chammah (l965a) also concluded 
that it was the inter-action between the members of the dyad that 
was dominant rather than their predispositions t0wards co-
operative behaviour, since with continuous inter-action partners 
came to behave alike. It seems likely that some situations 
depress personality effects and it should be remembered that the 
situational factors associated with the laboratory environment 
have not yet been fully explored; caution should therefore be 
exercised in extrapolating to the world at large. 
3.3 Sex ·Differences 
The study of sex differences has received'much attention in the last 
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decade (see, for example, Maccoby and Jacklin 1975), but Mischel 
(1968) points out that global trait terms such as 'masculine', 
'feminine', 'aggressive', etc., are used to summarise what are, 
in reality, complex behaviour patterns. During socialisation it 
is reasonable to assume that many behaviours become sex-typed, 
acquiring different values and meanings for males and females, 
and many observed sex differences in adulthood may be the result 
of the sex-role appropriateness, or the social desirability, of 
a response. As many sex-typed behaviours are situation specific 
a knowledge of the environment in which behaviour occurs can 
facilitate the prediction of events. An interesting approach to 
the study of sex differences in behaviour is to attempt to 
discover the factors determining the selection of certain 
behaviours from the individual's repertoire of responses. 
Role conflict seems more likely in women, as they - as do men -
internalise the masculine values of the culture and in particular 
situations women have a lower self-esteem than men and may even 
be motivated to avoid success (Horner, 1968). Hoffman (1972) 
believes that females do not develop confidence in their ability 
to cope with the environment because of inadequate encouragement 
in their strivings for independence and exploratory play as 
children. 
How, then, do these differences between men and women affect 
choices in mixed-motive games? Some people, for example, may be 
content to choose a satisfactory alternative rather than an 
37. 
optimal one, more closely resembling compromises found in real-
life situations. Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) note that at least 68 
studies in the experimental game literature have employed the 
sex variable, possibly due to the ease of recruiting subjects. 
As in other areas of investigation, different procedures and 
matrices have been adopted and a large number of studies report 
no significant differences due to the sex of the player (e.g. 
Kanouse and Weist, 1967; Lutzker, 1961; Bixenstine, Potash and 
Wilson, 1963; Evans and Crumbauch, 1966; Wilson and Kayatani, 
1968). However, the review below will be concerned more with 
those studies that have demonstrated a sex difference. 
The most often quoted finding is that males are more co-operative 
than females (e.g. Bedell and Sistrunk, 1973; Oskamp and Perlman, 
1965; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965a; Hottes and Kahn, 1974). For 
example, Rapoport and Chammah (1965a) compared male pairs of 
subjects, female pairs and mixed-sex pairs in a multi-play P.O. 
design. They found that male pairs co-operated more than female 
pairs whilst mixed pairs, in general, had co-operation levels 
between the two. Rapoport and Chammah suggested t~at in the 
mixed-sex pairs women are 'pulled up' and men 'pulled down'. 
lue have seen that some studies have found no sex differences 
relating to co-operative behaviour, whilst a less often reported 
findin~is that some studies have found females to actually 
co-operate more than men (e.g. Tedeschi, Bonoma and Novinson, 
1970). However, the sex differences (if any) come about, as 
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suggested by Rapoport and Chammah (1965a), during the inter-
action and as a result of the experimental conditions as male 
andfemaledyads typically start a game co-operating at the 
same level. Rapoport (1970) suggests that the inconsistent 
findings may be due to the strategy of the 'other player'. He 
suggests, for example, that a programmed opponent with a non-
contingent strategy may fail to 'bring out' the females' weaker 
propensity to co-operate. However, other factors must be 
operating as Oskamp and Perlman (1965) were able to demonstrate 
sex differences (with men more co-operative than women) in a 
very short game of only 30 trials. 
Many of the studies reporting sex differences imply greater 
rationality on the part of male players than of female players. 
Halpin and Pilisuk (1970) employed a Restricted Prisoner's 
Dilemma game where subjects played against a non-contingent 
strategy (70% co-operation) of the programmed 'Other'. Males 
showed a more rapid decline than females in attempts to 
communicate through co-operative responses on trials where non 
co-operation was expected from the 'partner'. Males also 
rapidly increased exploitative use of the D choice where co-
operation was predicted from the 'partner'. Males were more 
liable to play the game as though the 'other' player was always 
going to choose c. 
This tendency of males to respond more 'competitively' when 
playing against a non-contingent strategy (where the optimal 
strategy for the player is lDD% D) has also been noted by 
Tedeschi, Bonoma and Lindskold (1970) who also found that 
females were less likely than males to take advantage of a 
threat option in the game. 
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Terhune (1970) reviewed the literature on sex differences and 
behaviour on games. Many studies have suggested that women are 
more emotional whilst men are more rational in their play, thus 
reflecting traditional sex role sterotyping. Terhune concluded 
that females react with greater retaliation when in a vulnerable 
position (e.g. Bixenstine and O'Reilly, 1966), they seek 
compromise thus avoiding competition, women are less exploitative 
of a co-operative 'other' but once crossed are less 'forgiving' and 
men tend to be more co-operative in response to a tit-for-tat 
strategy and to use it as a strategy themselves. In_ genera~, women 
are seen as being less co-operative than men in mixed-motive 
games and more likely to end up in "mutually punishing conflict 
deadlocks''• It is considered that women therefore have difficulty 
in understanding strategic situations and fail to recognise the 
11 rational 11 strategy. 
Bedell and Sistrunk (1973) argue that those studies which have 
found women to be more co-operative than men have had a 
'competitive' set, whereas an individualistic set is present when 
men are more co-operative than women. They sugg~st that women 
respond at the same level of co-operation regardless of the 
experimental variables whereas men may have been more responsive 
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to the demand characteristics of the experiment. Bedell and 
Sistrunk report data from their own (1973) study in support of 
this, adding that females were more responsive to characteristics 
of the other player and were more co-operative in mixed-sex dyads 
than in like-sex dyads. The data suggests that men are primarily 
concerned with 'winning' or, at least, achievement whereas women 
tend towards social concerns. Such an interpretation is 
consistent with traditional sex-role stereotypes and with Horner's 
(196B) findings. Kahn et al (1971) support the notion that 
different goals are pursued by members of each sex. They found 
that men respond on the basis of strategic considerations and co-
operate when playing with a partner who imitates his choices and 
'compete' with a randomly responding partner. Both of these 
strategies are optimal if the goal is to maximise earnings. 
In recent years there has been a change in traditional sex role 
stereotypy. Baefsky and Berger (1974) investigated the game 
playing behaviour of career oriented, and traditionally oriented, 
women. The former were more inclined to compete and less 
willing to opt for the self-defeating strategy. Cardi (1972) 
found that women who did not h~ve stereotyped expectations of sex 
role behaviour competed more against men than women in a Prisoner's 
Dilemma game. In contrast, traditionally oriented women competed 
more with other women than with men. This is consistent with 
Ingram and Berger's (1977) finding, using single sex dyads. 
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Hottes and Kahn (1974) concluded that male players decide on a 
co-operative strategy in order to maximise their joint gains. 
Women on the other hand, tend to be less co-operative and this 
was considered to be a defensive measure in order to avoid 
failure rather than seek success, ~onsistent with Horner's (1968) 
study of achievement motivation. It was shown in Chapter One 
that the strictly dominating minimax_ strategy, o, may be 
motivated by caution rather than competition. By. choosing o, the 
"sucker's" pay.;..off is always avoided. 
3.4 Sex Differences : Conclusions 
It is clear that the findings are in-consistent although it is 
not, in the author's opinion, acknowledged sufficiently in the 
literature. The notion of 'rational behaviour' in mixed -
motive games is difficult to define~Although the 1 0 1 strategy 
strictly dominates it will be remembered that Rapoport (1966) 
concluded that •• ••••• rationality must prescribe the same choice 
to both (players). But if both choose the same, then (c,c) and 
(o,o) are the only possible outcomes~ Of these, (c,q is clearly 
the better. Therefore, I should choose C" (P.l41). The game 
should therefore allow for expectations of the Other to be 
taken into account. In some situations females may play more 
rationally than men. Mack, Williams and Kremer (1979) found 
that men tried to "exploit" the Other knowing that it was a 
computer, whereas females took into account the assumption that 
the Other was rational. Thus, the results of research in the 
area of sex differences and behaviour on mixed - motive games 
offer a confused picture. 
Skotko et al (1974) consider that many of the sex differences 
noted on mixed - motive games are ~n experimental artifact. 
They have postulated a differential sensitivity of male and 
female subjects to aspects of the experimental set but their 
interpretation is extended to include characteristics 
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attributed to the sex of the experimenter. Using a design which 
balanced the sex of the experimenter, Skotko et al found that 
female dyads were extremely non-co-operative in the presence of 
a male experimenter. Although this finding does not explain the 
inconsistencies in the literature which have all - as far as the 
author is aware - employed male E's, the conclusion by Skotko 
et al that previously reported sex differences in choices on P.O. 
cannot be considered solely as a function of the subjects or of 
their inter-action considered in isolation seems a reasonable 
one. 
3. 5 Research findir}_gs in the U.K. 
To the author's knowledge, little research has been done in the 
U.K. on experimental games in general and even less on sex 
differences in choices on P.O. One noteworthy exception is 
David Mack, from the University of Loughborough, who has carried 
out an extensive research programme on experimental games. He 
replicated one of his studies, previously undertaken at the 
University of Minnesota, in Loughborough and found similar 
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results (Mack 1975). The subjects were playing a machine 
' previously programmed to make co-operative choices 80 per cent 
of the time. However, a television monitor showed pictures of 
students apparently preparing for the same game and subjects 
were unaware they were playing a machine. Women who thought 
they were playing women were less co-operative than men who 
thought they were playing men. However, women were more co-
operative (as in Rapoport and Chammah's 1965a study) when they 
thought they were playing against men, lending some support to 
Horner's (1968) postulation of a motive to avoid success when 
women are in direct competition with men. However, Mack also 
found that men are also more co-operative when playing against a 
member of the opposite sex. In a personal communication it was 
discovered that a male experimenter conducted the study on the 
British population, although the experimenter was not present in 
the room during play. The study by Skotko et al (1974) would 
support the idea that this factor, in itself, may partly account 
) 
for the sex differences exhibited. 
As has been the case with much of the research on P.O., Mack's 
study has eliminated the most important feature of a social 
inter-action, namely the other player, with his own goals and 
expectations of the nature of the game being played. The 
instructions used concepts such as 'game' and 'player' and 
tended to present an individualistic set; Bedell and Sistrunk 
(1973) argued that this was a factor in the common finding that 
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men are more co-operative than women. The matrix employed by 
Mack also included some negative pay-offs and it is possible that 
this introduced (psychologically) a win-lose 'competitive' 
element that differentially affects the sexes. 
In an unpublished British study of sex differences using a 
Chicken matrix (a 'dangerous' game), Gibbs (1972) suggested that 
the Experimenter-Subject and Subject-Experimenter inter-actions 
in mixed - motive situations were also worthy of investigation. 
The experimental situation is effectively changed from a dyad 
into a triad when a two-person game is carried out in the presence 
of the Experimenter as shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 Inter-actions in 2-person games in 
.t.he eresence o_f E. 
E 
Argyle (1967) noted that the introduction of a third person, even 
in the role of observer, .changes the essential nature of a dyad 
with regard to interpersonal behaviour and Gibbs (1972) suggested 
that the sex of the observer may have a further effect. This 
suggestion is supported by Skotko et al's (1974) study which 
postulated a differential sensitivity on the part of male and 
female subjects to characteristics attributed to the sex of the 
experimenter. No subject sex differences were demonstrated in 
the British study. 
The following chapter describes the aims and design of the 
present series of experiments undertaken on a British student 
population. 
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4.1 ~ 
CHAPTER FOUR : AIMS AND DESIGN OF THE 
INVESTIGATIONS 
It was demonstrated in Chapters Two and Three that more needs 
to be known about two important areas of research on gaming 
behaviour: opportunities for communication and sex differences 
in choices. Despite many investigations it is still difficult 
to predict under what conditions men and women are willing to 
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adopt the unstable but mutually rewarding (c,c) strategy. It is 
equally difficult to determine the effect that communication 
opportunity will have. Wrightsman et al (1972) concluded that 
communication opportunities probably facilitate co-operative 
responding but that limited opportunities may not. The timing 
of the communication opportunity was also considered important. 
Hottes and Kahn (1974) actually varied a limited verbal 
communication opportunity during the inter-action of male and 
female dyads on a Prisoner's Dilemma game. This American study 
demonstrated that male students were more co-operative and 
imitative of a like - sexed partner than females. Although no 
main communication effect was observed an inter-action effect was 
noted. Males became more co-operative over time following verbal 
~communication opportunity after trial 31. On the last trial 
block (trials 151 - 180) 100 per cent co-operation was demon~ 
strated by the male dyads. Men tended to discuss the task in 
hand, whereas females tended to have socially oriented 
discussions. The females' preference for the strictly dominating 
minimax strategy, D, was considered a defensive measure. 
~. 
However, this particular study raised more questions in the 
author's mind than provided answers. For one thing, could this 
finding be replicated with a British subject population? Mack's 
(1975) study replicated one of his own investigations previously 
carried out at the University of Minnesota and found similar 
results. However, Mack's study eliminated both a re~l-life 'other' 
and the presence of the experimenter. Although Gibbs'~ (1972) 
project included both of these the matrix conformed to the require-
ments of chicken and there were no opportunities for subjects to 
verbally communicat-: their intentions. Kremer (1980) also 
looked at sex differences in a British student population in play 
on "Leader'', another symmetrical mixed-motive game. He found no 
differences either in the choice of strategy or in the propensity 
to change strategy. 
Secondly, could the differences noted by Hottes and Kahn be demon-
strated when the experiment was conducted by a female E, the 
author? The study by Skotko et al (1974) suggested that sex 
differences on P.O. were an experimental artifact and the result 
of employing a male E. However,it was noted in Chapter Three that 
this factor, by itself, could not account for the conflicting 
results in the literature although it is clearly an impoTtant 
element in the inter-action of which the experimenter is a part. 
Thirdly, what other situational variables could be responsible for 
the sex differences in game behaviour noted by Hottes and Kahn? 
What features of the experimental situation make sex-role behaviour 
more salient and encourage 'defensive' choices by female 
players? For example, one such area may be the communication 
opportunity. What limiting effects does fixed communication 
opportunity have on female players and how does this affect the 
emergence of sex-typed behaviour? In addition, could female 
players be 'pulled up' by a male partner, as suggested by Rapoport 
and Chammah (1965a) and how would females make use of the 
communication opportunities if the other player was male rather 
than female? 
The aim of the present investigation is ther~fore to clarify the 
position with regard to the effects of the sex of the subject and 
communication opportunities on co-operative choices in fue iterated 
Prisoner's Dilemma. 
4.2 Design_ 
The author conducted a series of experiments with British students 
based on the Hottes and Kahn (1974) Allll'ican study. The basic design 
employed a matrix version of P.O. and pairs of subjects 
simultaneously made their choices in the presence of the Experimenter. 
Several preliminary studies were attempted by the author. One 
employed a student teacher population and another included political 
party membership as an additional variable to sex and communication 
opportunity. Both these studies had to be abandoned due to the 
very real difficulty of obtaining sufficient numbers of people 
willing to volunteer as subjects. 
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The present series of experiments employed students from Durham 
University where, again, volunteer subjects were in short supply. 
The design of the experiments requires pairs of subjects to be 
present and the insufficient numbers of volunteers, in addition 
to the many failed appointments, meant that there was insufficient 
time to run the control groups that would, in ideal circumstances, 
be necessary. 
The first experiment of the series looks at the effects of sex and 
four levels of communication opportunity on co-operation and 
imitation in male, female and mixed sex dyads. This is presented 
in Chapter Five. A financial incentive is introduced into the 
second experiment (Chapter Six) which investigates the effect of 
sex (male and female dyads) and two levels of communication 
opportunity on co-operation and imitation. The effects of a 
financial incentive are investigated using a partial design as 
there is no low incentive control group. Corresponding treatment 
groups from the first experiment are compared with those from the 
second experiment, although the author appreciates that this is 
not an ideal research design. Environmental circumstances are 
bound to vary although it seems unlikely that there would be 
dramatic variations. 
A financial incentive is retained foi subsequent experiments which 
employ only male and fema~subject dyads under two communication 
conditions (none allowed and three minutes allowed after trial 31). 
The effects on levels of co-operation, only, are investigated. 
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The effects due to the sex of the experimenter are discussed in 
Chapter Seven whilst Chapter Eight is concerned with cultural 
differences and subjects' behaviour in the absence of the 
Experimenter. 
Subjects in Experiment 2 provide data which serve 
as a baseline for partial designs in later experiments. While 
such a method may not provide . an ideal data base - in that 
compared subjects have bean tested at different times over the 
academic year - any other approach was considered to be impracticable, 
given that the subject pool diminishes over the academic year. 
It is the author's contention that the method employed - based on 
the assumption that subjects are drawn from a pool with equivalent 
replacements - is both adequate and necessary. 
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CHAPTE~ FIVE THE EFFECTS OF SEX AND 
COMMUNICATION OPPORTUNITY ON co~OPEHATION 
----·-·--pND Ii~IT ATI ON ___ _ 
5.1 Introduction 
It Luas shown in Chapters Two and Three that the effects due to 
the sex of the subject and the opportunity to communicate on the 
number of co-operative choices on two-person Prisoner's Dilemma 
are far from conclusive. It was noted that one factor which may 
contribute to the inconsistent findings concerns variations in 
design and procedure. For this reason, the first experiment was 
based on an American study by Hottes and Kahn (1974). In that 
study, pairs of male and femaleUniversity students played 180 
iterations of Prisoner's Dilemma (matrix form) under one of three 
possible verbal communication conditions (none allowed; three 
minutes allowed before trial 1; three minutes allowed after trial 
31). Subjects received a course credit for their participatio~. 
Male students were found to be more co-operative and imitative of 
each other when. playing a like-sexed partner than female students. 
Imitative play was considered to be a successful strategy in multi~ 
play P.D. (if the goal is to maximise outcomes) as it tended to be 
associated with increased co-operation from the other player. 
Although no main effect due to limited communication opportunity 
was noted male pairs, when allowed to talk to each other during the 
session, tended to discuss possible strategies whereas female dy~ds 
tended to have non-strategic, socially oriented discussions. 
Hottes and Kahn concluded that men decided on a co-operative 
strategy in order to maximise their joint gains and were, therefore, 
more oriented towards winning. The greater frequency of D 
responses by the women was considered to be a defensive measure 
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as their primary goal of social inter-action was restricted. 
Hottes and Kahn consider this interpretation to be consistent with 
Horner's (1968) study of achievement motivation which indicated 
that females' need for achievement was affected by a motive to 
avoid success. 
5.2 8im_pf the Investigation 
The investigation is designed to establish the nature of sex 
differences in the co-operative and imitative behaviour of a 
British student population. Co-operation and imitation are also 
investigated under varied conditions of communication opportunity. 
In order to examine the nature of male-female inter-action under 
varied communication conditions mixed-sex dyads are introduced 
into the Hottes and Kahn design. Unrestricted verbal communication 
availability is also introduced in order to investigate the way in 
which the different subject pairings make use of this. 
5.3 ~~potheses 
On the basis of previous research in the area (notably Hottes and 
Kahn, 1974; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965(a); Wichman, 1972) the 
following hypotheses were formulated: 
1) Male subjects will be more co-operative than female subjects in 
the game situation. 
2) Male subjects will be more imitative than female subjects in 
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the game situation. 
3) Unrestricted verbal communication will elicit a higher level 
of co-operative behaviour from all subject pairings, regard-
less of sex, than limited communication opportunities. 
4) Unrestricted verbal communication will elicit a higher level 
of imitative behaviour from all subject pairings, regard-
less of sex, than limited communication opportunities. 
5) Co-operation levels will increase with the duration of the 
interation. Although the "learning effect 11 on repeated plays 
of P.O. would suggest less co-operation as the inter-action 
progresses Hottes and Kahn (1974) found that co-operation 
actually increased with time using this particular version 
of the game. 
6) Imitative behaviour will increase with the duration of the 
inter-action. 
No specific hypotheses were formulated with respect to mixed sex 
dyads or to inter-action effec.ts. Hmuever, it was expected that 
mixed sex dyads would co-operate and imitate at an interMediate 
level, following Rapoport and Charnrnah (1965a). 
5.4 r~ethod 
a) Subjects and treatment conditions. 
One hundred and twenty volunteer undergraduate students at Durham 
University were recruited to help in the investigation. They were 
contacted either by advertisements in the students1 union or by 
letter to all new students and were paid for their participation 
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at the standard rate (then 60p per hou~. 
Twenty male pairs (MM), twenty female pairs (FF) and twenty mixed-
sex pairs (MF) of students were randomly assigned to one of four 
communication conditions such that there were five male pairs, five 
female pairs and five mixed-sex pairs in each of the four.conditions. 
~Communication opportunity' refers throughout this study to the 
availability of verbal communication between subjects). The four 
communication conditions were as follows:-
i) no opportunity to communicate (0); 
ii) opportunity to communicate for three minutes after the 
instructions but before trial 1 (1); 
iii) opportunity to communicate for three minutes after trial 
31 ( 31); 
iv) opportunity to communicate throughout (T). 
All subject pairs were previously unacquainted with each other and 
were unfamiliar with the task. They were all under the age of 25 
years. Although it has not been conclusively determined empirically, 
one could argue that friends could be more or less co-operative 
depending on their face-saving motives and the meaning of 'yielding' 
in the situation. Several studies (e.g. Dskamp and Perlman, 1965; 
Swingle, 1968) have shown that friends usually (but not always) 
choose more co-operatively than strangers. In addition, rrlarlowe, 
Gergen and Ooob (1966) have found that the level of co-operation 
is influenced by the anticipation of future inter-action (always 
a possibility with a University student population) but this effect 
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is assumed to be random in the present design. 
b) Apparatus and Procedure 
Since the experiment was based on the study by Hottes and Kahn 
(1974) the same symmetrical matrix was employed (Figure 4). 
This matrix conforms to the formal requirements of P.o. outlined 
by Scodel et al (1959). The design and procedure outlined below 
forms the basis for all the experiments in the series. The 
datawere collected at the University of Durham between 1975 and 
1977. 
fl~~~~ .: The Prisoner's Dile~tr~~ 
A 8 
0 Subject 1 
?.ubjec.t 1 l]]fi Subject 2 
8 
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Subjects were led into the experimental room by the experimenter 
and seated on either side of a partition restricting non-verbal 
comrnunicatio n to a mi nimum. Both subjects, however, could see 
and be seen by the experi menter (See Figure 5). The experimenter 
in this instance was the author. 
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The instructions were taped (see Appendix XX for a full account) 
and played to the subjects as soon as they were seated. Each 
subject was provided with a pen and a record sheet which contained 
spaces for 300 responses (Appendix 1). Each subject indicated 
his/her choices by pressing either A or B buttons (corresponding 
to choices on the matrix panel) which were relayed to the 
experimenter's panel and could only be seen by E (Figure 6). 
Fi.9.ure 6 The Experimenter's Panel 
A 1 B 1 A 2 B 2 
Subject l's choices Subject 2 1 s choices 
When both subjects had indicated their choices the experimenter 
stated which buttons had been pressed and what the pay-offs were 
after each trial. Subjects wrote down their own pay-off after 
each trial. Although this procedure was rather laborious it did 
ensure that subjects fully understood how they had obtained their 
respective pay-offs. Such a procedure was thought to be necessary 
since a small pilot study had indicated that even postgraduate 
psychology students had difficulty fully understanding the nature 
of the task until some way into the game. However, it introduced 
slightly more experimenter participation than in the original 
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Hottes and Kahn (1974) study, although the presentation was in 
standard form. A more efficient system could have been designed 
for subsequent experiments but the present method was retained to 
allow direct comparisions to be made between experiments in this 
series. 
Subjects played 180 iterations of the P.O. game, with no time 
limit for making choices. Rapoport and Dale (1966) have demonstrated 
'end' effects in iterated P.o. and suggest that this occurs as the 
participants anticipa'()e ·defection on the last trial (for even if 
tacit co-operation has occurred there is nothing to lose by such 
defection as no retaliation can occur). Subjects were therefore 
not told how many tria~ were to be played. 
Following the last trial, and before they could count their total 
score, subjects were asked to fill in a questionnaire. A copy is 
presented in Appendix 11. The subjects had to answer Questions 1 
- 5 on a 6 point scale, the values of which were alternated to 
avoid choice bias in responses. As there was no neutral point, 
subjects were 'forced' to make a decision. Subjects answering Q3 
uJere instructed that 11 communication 11 refers to both verbal and 
non-verbal methods (eg to the pattern of their choices). Questions 
6 - 10 allowed the subject to answer freely and subjects could 
take as long as they needed to fill out the questionnaires. The 
auestionnaire was based on that used in the Hottes and Kahn (1974) 
study but with two additional questions which were included to 
provide insights into Ss 1 expectations and preferences for the out-
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come of the inter-action. 
The additional questions were as follows: 
"What expectations did you have of your partner's strategy? 11 
11 How concerned were you with your partner's score? Did you 
have a preference for the outcome of the game?" 
After each session all subjects were fully de-briefed. They were 
asked not to discuss the experiment with other students who might 
be taking part in later experiments. In particular, they were 
asked not to refer to the task as a 1 game 1 and it was explained 
that future subjects might be influenced to choose differently if 
they had preconceptions about the nature of the task. There were 
many reauests for more information and E promised to send each 
subject brief details of the results as soon as they became 
available. 
The subjects' choices on P.o. were analysed for two dependent 
measures, co-operation and imitation, following Hottes and Kahn 
(1974). 
c) Instructions 
The instructions were taped to avoid any bias in describing the 
available options, and to standardise presentation as much as 
possible. The instructions, which were similar to those used by 
Rapoport and Chammah (1965a), avoid the use of the terms co-
operatimand competition. In the present study a modification was 
introduced to exclude reference to 'game', 'player', etc. Such 
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reference mig~lead subjects tot.believe that there was a 'my win, 
your loss' element such as is found in zero-sum games. The 
instructions used by Hottes and Kahn (1974) were not retained as 
it was discovered that concepts such as 'win', 'game' and 'player' 
were used. Their instructions also had an American bias which 
might not have been appropriate for use with British subjects 
whereas the instructions used by Rapoport and Chammah (1965a) 
seemed suitable for use with any subject population. The 
instructions for the present study are presented in Appendix XX. 
After the instructions were played to the subjects the experimenter 
checked orally that each subject understood the matrix. The 
experimenter then answered any queries keeping the answers in as 
standard a form as possible and retaining the wording of the 
original instructions where possible. Questions regarding the 
point of the game and the 'best' strategies which could not be 
adequately answered by ''you should try to get as many points for 
yourself as possible'' were responded to with "you should do what 
you think best". 
Non-verbal communication extraneous to the strategic considerations 
of the game was restricted by requesting subjects to remain seated. 
When verbal communication was permitted the experimenter discretely 
made notes of what was said. 
However, the Hottes and Kahn study employed an incentive over all 
treatments, namely that an additional course credit would be given 
for 300 points gained during the session. This nbviously could 
not be replicated within the constraints of an English University 
I 
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and subjects were asked simply to get as many points as possible. 
5.5 .8_nal)L_sis of results 
A. Co·::.o.e.e.r.a.tion 
Co-operation was defined as the number of A choices made per 
subject dJ..ad since the wi thin-p<;lirs' responses are not independent 
of each other, although the between-pairs' responses are (Rapoport 
1963). The 180 iterations were divided up, for the purpose of 
analysis, into 6 trial blocks of 30 trials each. Thus, for each 
trial block, the subject dyad raw scores ranged 0 to 60; these 
are presented in Appendix 111. The mean scores are shown in 
Table 1. 
Rapoport and Chammah (l965a) found in a 300 trial P.O. game, using 
male pairs only, that the initial trend was towards increased D 
responses (referred to by Rapoport and Chammah as 'defection', 
although as Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) point out this term 
implies the prior existence of an agreement to co-operate which 
was not the case). However, between trials 30 and 60, 11 recovery 11 
set in and the freouency of co-operativechoices increased. Subjects 
in their study were not permitted to communicate. Similarly, 
Wichman (19721 using a female subject population, found that the 
responses of female subjects in an Isolated condition reflected 
the general trends cited in Pruitt's (1967) review. The median 
level of co-operation on the initial trials was slightly less 
than 50 per cent. This declined over the first forty trials but 
rose to approximately the starting level by the 70th trial. 
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a) f'~ean number of f?_?-O!Jel'ati_ve. 4cho~.e.s eer_ tri_al b~lg_cku~§__§. 
function of the sex of the ~d a~~~unication 
.9.12.e9r t unity 
·-------
J?.airin9 Communication l£ial Block 
Opportunity 1 2 3 "!__ 5 
-
0 19.2 ll. 8 7.8 7.2 14.0 
f'~M 1 24.8 21.4 22.8 16.2 14.8 
31 10.4 18.4 17.8 18.4 16.6 
T 32.8 30.0 31.4 42.8 42.0 
--
1--· 
0 18.8 15.4 13.0 11.0 10.6. 
FF 1 18.8 22.4 19.8 19.6 15.8 
31 20.4. 10.6 . 6.4 3.0 6.2 
T 23.0 17.4 17.6 23.6 22.4 
I 
0 15.0 10.6 3.6 8.6 4.4 
f~F 1 15.0 13.8 9.2 9.4 19.8 
31 20.8 21.6 22.2 15.6 13.2 
T 36.6 36.6 39.8 39.6 38.4 
b) Total mean number of co-operative choices as a function of 
each treatment condition 
Pairing 
Communi catiOQ 
0 [?JJO r t u n_i_~ 
Trial Blocks 
MM 
20.95 
0 
10.86 
1 
21.30 
FF 
15.80 
1 
17.17 
2 
19.17 
-
MF 
19.80 
31 T 
-
14.96 32.42 
3 4 5 
-·-
17.78 17.92 18.18 
-- '"=--· 
-
6 
8.6 
12.4 
19.4 
41.8 
10.0 
15.6 
8.6 
27.2 
3.8 
17.4 
19.6 
40.6 
6 
f---
18.75 
. 
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Subjects in a Hear Only condition began play at a much higher 
level but with a slight general trend towards less co-operation 
over the next 60 trials increasing dramatically in the last 10 
trials. These trends can be compared with the 0 & T communication 
conditions for MM and FF dyads in the present study. Mean per 
cent co-operation scores for all treatment groups are shown 
graphically in Figure 7. 
FIGURE 7. PERCENTAGE OF COOPERATIVE CHOICES OVER TRIAL BLOCKS FOR EACH SUBJECT 
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It can be seen that for female pairs in the no communication 
condition (which is similar to Wichman's (1972) Isolation 
condition) the mean .. level of co-operation began at just above 
thirty per cent and steadily declined throughout the inter-action 
to only 17 per cent on the 6th trial block. Female pairs allowed 
to talk to each throughout (corresponding to Wichman's Hear Only 
condition)initially co-operated at nearly 40per cent, dropped to 
29 per cent on Blocks 2 and 3 but rose steadily on Blocks 4 and 5 
to reach 45 per cent on trial block 6. Thus, the 'recovery' 
trends noted by Wichman (1972) did not occur at all in the no 
communication condition and occurred later and less dramatically 
when subjects were allowed to talk throughout. 
The males in the no communication condition began co-operating 
at just above30 per cent, falling to only 12 per cent on the 4th 
trial block. There was a slight increase on the 5th trial block 
to 23 per cent but this dropped to 14 per cent by the 6th trial 
block. Thus, the steady recovery noted by Rapoport and Chammah 
(1965a) has not been demonstrated in the present study, and the 
suggestion by Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) that subjects in multi-
play P.O. shift strategies from short-range to long-range thinking, 
focusing on a goal of mutual co-operation, is not supported. 
Furthermore, the Hottes and Kahn (1974) study found that men were 
more co-operative than women, with the amount of co-operation 
increasing more rapidly over trials than for women. There was 
also a suggestion that men co~operated more over time after 
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communication was allowed as the three-way inter-action 
napproached significance" ( p <· 07). 
Examination of the means in Table 1 shows that male pairs tended 
to co-operate more than female pairs of subjects whilst mixed sex 
pairs played at an intermediate level, as suggested by Rapoport 
and Chammah (1965a). However, statistical analysis indicates that 
these differences are not significant (p>, 0.05) and could be 
due to chance factors. 
The number of A choices per subject dyad were analysed by a three-
way, fixed factor analysis of variance design. (All such data 
throughout this study was first checked by computer as to its 
suitability for use with parametric statistical methods). The 
analysis of variance summary is shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2 •.. Jina_lx_sis .9! variance s~na.ry fg_~_f}_umber of. 
E9-?eerative c~oices~r S~~~ conditions)x 
Communication 14 conditions) over Trial Blocks 
i9.--~~li tions) J1:.2Pl~U -----~--
-·-- . -~----._,.----- .. -r-----·-----r--·--------Source df Sum of squares mean souare F p 
r-~~------~--~·-----r-------r-~·-----·--------~--------~--~-----+---------BetuJeen d~ 
Sex (Bl) 
Communication(B2) 
Dl2 
Error Bl2 
~g_tb_in dyads 
Trial Blocks ( lJJl) 
Lill Bl 
lJJlB2 
\JJJ.Bl2 
Error lJllB12 
2 
3 
6 
48 
5 
10 
15 
30 
240 
1753.80 
23950.50 
5802.27 
_53564.00 
513.97 
296.73 
2081.03 
2541.60 
20592.00 
876.90 
7983.50 
967.04 
1115.92 
102.79 
29.67 
138.74 
84.72 
85.80 
--·-·-·-----------------------~------~---------------------~----
0.79 0.53 
7.15 0.0007 
0.87 0.53 
1.20 0.31 
0.35 0.97 
1.62 0.07 
1.00 o. 51 
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However, although no differences between treatment groups 
attributable to the sex factor were observed the analysis confirmed 
that communication opportunity had a significant effect (p=0.0007) 
with a suggestion that this effect increased over time (p=0.07). No 
main effect due to the duration of the inter-action was noted. Graphs 
showing the mean co-operation scores as a function of communication 
opportunity and of communication opportunity over time are shown 
below in Figures Sa and Bb respectively. An a posteriori test was 
employed to see where the differences between the communication 
treatments lay. The Tukey test was employed throughout this ~tudy 
as it is a more conservative version of the Newman Keuls test (used 
by Hottes and Kahn, 1974) based on the 'least significant difference' 
method. Computations are presented in Appendix lVa. 
It was found that communication allowed throughout was a significantly 
different treatment to the other three conditions (o, 1 and 31) and 
resulted in more co-operative choices being made by all pairings of 
subjects (~ = 0.05). This was, perhaps, to be expected from 
Wichman's (1972) study, although the mean level of co-operation in 
this condition was only just above 50 per cent. However, the Hottes 
and Kahn (1974) study, which only employed communication conditions 
o, 1 and 31, found no main effect on co-operative choices although 
they noted a three-~ay inter-action (p< 0.07) with males in treat-
m~nt 31 being more co-operative over time. On trial block 6 in this 
treatment they noted 100 per cent co-operation (i.e.~= 60), whereas 
in this~udy X= 19.4. However, the hypothesis that unrestricted 
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communication will elicit a higher level of co-operation from 
subjects, regardless of the sex of the pairing,was confirmed. 
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Becker and McClintock (1967) concluded that communication between 
s~bjects prior to playing P.O. serves to increase the level of mutual 
'trust' and facilitates co-operative responding by a motive to 
either maximise the individual or join gains. However, the results 
from this study and that of Hottes and Kahn do not appear to 
support that conclusion and the content of the verbal communication 
may be important. Hottes and Kahn noted, for example, that men were 
more attentive to the strategic considerations of the game whereas 
women's primary goal was social inter-action. 
The experimenter made brief notes of any communication that occurred 
in the present study and thi? is described below. 
B.~ 
Forty-five dyads (N =120) tuere allowed to communicate with their 
partner at a specified time during the course of the inter-action 
(viz., 1, 31 and T). In Hottes and Kahn's study all the dyads allowed 
communication engaged in it with a sex difference in the content of 
the discussion. Six out of ten dyads directly mentioned either an 
imitative or a 'play A' co-operative strategy, whereas only one 
female pair mentioned either strategy. Theyconcluded that men were 
more oriented .towards winning uJhereas women were more socially 
oriented, a factor contributing to the main sex effect in co-operative 
responding noted in their study. Although the main findings have 
not been replicated in the present study, interesting patterns 
emerged in the different groups of subject pairs allowed verbal 
communication (see Appendix Va for a more detailed account). 
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None of the dyads in any of the three pairings mentioned any 
strategy at all when verbal communication was allowed prior to 
trial 1, perhaps because they did not fully understand the nature 
of the task at this stage. The perception of strategic elements 
by females seemed to occur more in a mixed-sex pairing where four 
females agreed to the male_§.' idea to press P. and three others 
discussed alternative 'solutions', whilst only one female pair 
discussed strategies (agreeing to press A but not keeping to the 
arrangement). This finding is consistent with Rapoport and 
Chammah's (1965a) suggestion that women are 'pulled up' when 
playing with men. Although this was not the case in the traditional 
situation where no communication was allowed, Figure 7 suggests 
this may be the case when verbal communication is allowed through-
out. For males in the mixed-sex pairs, seven considered strategic 
elements of the task when communication was allowed, whereas eight 
pairs discussed strategies in the like-sex condition, five of these 
making an agreement to press A. 
Thus, there is some support for the notion that males perceive the 
strategic nature of the task more fully when given,the opportunity 
to. verbally communicate and seem more likely to suggest adopting a 
mutual AA strategy, although in the present study there were no 
differences due to the sex of the pairing in the actual number of 
co-operative choices made overall. Nor did the number of co-
operative choices increase over time, an effect noted by Hottes 
and Kahn (1974), although there was a tendency (p = D.U7) for 
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co-operative choices to increase over time when verbal communication 
was allowed. As noted earlier, in the present study where 
communication is not permitted (treatment D), the trends over time 
in the traditional P.O. task are not consistent with Rapoport and 
Chammah (i965a) and others. However, as has been noted by some 
investigators, unreciprocated responses often occured. Rapoport 
(1963) refers to these chains of responses as the 'martyr run'. 
In the present study, one male S actually chose A 100 per cent of 
the time to his partner's 100 per cent B choice, on the (incorrect) 
understanding that as only one person could get 300 points (and by 
choosing Bon Trial 1 his partner had already 'won') he might as 
well try and help him. 
The datawere also analysed with respect to imitative choices. Hottes 
and Kahn found that imitation also increased over time and that men 
imitated each other more than women, an effect which increased over 
time when communication was allowed. For males, the relationship 
between imitation and co-operation was highly positive while for 
females there was little rel~tionship, suggesting that for males the 
adoption of an imitative strategy induces co-operation (or vice 
versa). The imitation data for the present study will now be 
considered. 
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Tit-for-tat strategies in simultaneous play with a simulated 'other 
player' or confederate usually elicit fairly high levels of co-
operation (e.g. Oskamp and Perlman, 1965). Crumbaugh and Evans 
(1967) found a contingent matching strategy elicited greater co-
operation than a non-contingent strategy which had the same level 
of co-operative responses overall. Rapoport and Chammah (1965b) 
found that the choices of male players correlate positively with 
the choices of the other player on the previous trial; they 
suggested that imitation may be adopted as a strategy in order to 
maximise the player's outcomes in multi-play P.o. On the basis of 
this, Hottes and Kahn (1974) hypothesised that male dyads would 
adopt an imitative strategy sooner than female dyads and this was 
found to be the case. In the present study, imitation was initially 
defined as the correl~tion between the responses of one player with 
the immediately preceeding responses of the other player and was 
measured by the phi coefficient (Pl) following Hapoport and Chammah 
(l965b) and Hottes and Kahn (1974). 
However, various problems were encountered with the computation of 
the data. For example, using the formula for the phi coefficient 
where A AA choices 
¢ f\0 - f3C B f.\8 choices = ...,...., __ ., ___ ,__ c BA choices 
../(A'J-B)rf~o) ( l3+D) (",~+C) 0 = BB choices 
the denominator for 100 per cent AA or 88 combinations is zero. 
However, common sense would argue that such a correlation is +l.DD, 
but the author was advised by colleagues that mathematically one is 
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not justified in making this assumption and the problem is said to 
be indeterminate. There was also a problem encountered using the 
Fisher's ~ transformation with this data, following Hottes and Kahn 
(1974). + Phi coefficients of -1 were transformed by computer using 
Fisher's~, where~= 1 [loge (l+r) -loge (1-~)J, to infinity. 
Neither of these difficulties was resolved even following personal 
communications with Arnold Kahn, Joe Hottes and Anatol Rapoport, and 
the raw data was therefore converted to proportions instead (see 
Appendix Vl). 
Scores were converted to proportions by dividing the treatment total 
scores per dyad for Block 1 by 29 and for Blocks 2-6 iAclusive by 30. 
The treatment means are shown below in table 3 and presented 
graphically in Figure 9. 
!------~---· ---··--..,·-- .. .....,_.... -~ 
Pairin_g_ Communication :Q.'ial Q.lslck. 
O_QQDrtuni tv 1, 2 3 4 5 6 
"-1-·-
0 0.57 0.73 0. 77 0.84 0.81 0.83 
f'lf-1 1 0.61 0.63 0.69 0.68 0.74 0.78 
31 o. 72 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.86 0.85 
T 0.68 0.84 0.8? .. 0. 90 0.86 0.84 
0 0.64 0.75 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.83 
FF 1 0.62 0.67 o. 71 0.66 o. 72 0.76 
31 0.64 0.79 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.81 
T 0.68 0.76 0.81 0.86 0.86 0.83 
~-----
0 0.69 0.75 0.87 0.81 0.88 
r~F 1 0.67 0.76 0.81 o. 75 0.78 
1---·--
31 0.57 0.81 0.84 o. 77 0.80 
T 0.83 0.83 0.87 0.93 0.95 
-
b) Jot a~. freou~.n.c1 of _imi tati ve~.e.o_o~es as a function of 
each treatment conditioQ 
Communication 
Ol?~~tuni t_y_ 
0.89 
0.81 
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0.90 
FIGURE 9, PROPORTION OF IMITATIVE RESPONSES OVER TRIAL BLOCKS FOR EACH SUBJECT 
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In the study undertaken by Hottes and Kahn (1974) imitation 
increased more rapidly for males than females, was more affected 
by communication for males than females and increased over time. 
The data from the present study ~e~ analysed by a three-way, fixed 
factor analysis of variance design. The analysis of variance 
summary (table 4) suggests a tendency for imitation.to be affected 
by the sex of the pairing (p = 0.07) and examination of the means 
(presented graphically in Figure lOa) suggests that there is a 
tendency for mixed-sex pairs to imitate each other more than 
female pairs. Thus is confirmed by the Tukey test, Appendix lVb. 
Communication opportunity also tended to increase imitation 
(p = 0.09), with the least amount of imitation occurring in treat-
ment 1 (Figure lOb). However, the hypothesis that unrestricted 
communication opportunity would elicit higher levels of imitation 
than restricted communication ~Jas not supported. One significant 
(()(.~ 0. 05) main effect was noted, namely that imitation increased 
with the duration of the inter-action (p = O.DDODD, Figure lOc). 
FIGURE 10a, MEAN IMITATION SCORES AS A FUNCTION OF SEX OF THE DYAD 
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-·-·-...__ .... ~-----.... ""'-....__..... .. _._,.,.__,.,...,..,. ____________ .. _ ---~-
Source df sum of squares mean souare F p 
---... ·-·------.. 
_n ______ 
-----
--------~· 
Betll!~D-d:ta.cJ.~ 
sex ( Bl) 2 0.58 0.29 2. 77 0.07 
Communication (82) 3 o. 71 0.24 2.26 0.09 
812 6 0.56 0.09 0.89 0. 51 
Error 812 48 5.07 O.ll 
}d!i~h~~~ 
(WJ.) ' Trial Olocks 5 1.17 0.23 21.58 D.DDOOO 
\JilOl 10. 0.02 o.oo o. 21 0.99 
ltlll32 15 0.18 0.01 1.12 0.34 
WlB12 30 0.32 0.01 0.97 0.52 
Error WlB12 240 2.61 0.01 
______ ...,  .._.. ___ , .... __________ .,_,.,. ______ 
--·--
Thus, the present data supports only part of the Hottes and Kahn 
(1974) findings, namely that imitation increases over time. The 
hypothesis that men would imitate each other's choices more than 
women was not supported. 
Hottes and Kahn also found that for male subjects, the relation-
ship between imitation and co-operation was highly positive 
(suggesting that imitation produces co-operation or vice versa) 
whilst for female subjects there was little relationship. It has 
already been seen that several of their findings have not been 
reproduced here. The fact that the same amou~of imitation in the 
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present study occurred in communication condition 31 and T (when 
condition T elicited higher levels of co-operation than condition 
31) leads one to suspect that a similar relationship between 
levels of co-operation and imitation will not be found. 
D. f~elaq_r~D.f?..h.ie betw~en co-_l2£er.ation 13_nd imitation. 
Hottes and Kahn (1974) found a positive relationship between co-
operation and imitation for male subjects from trial Block 1 
onwards, whereas for females a significant positive relationship 
was found on trial block 1 only. In the present study, the number 
of co-operative choices and imitation scores (proportions) for 
each dyad were correlated separately by sex and trial blocks using 
the Pearson product-moment coefficient (see Appendix Vlla for the 
raw scores for each dyad). The results, tabulated in Table 5, show 
that there is no relationship at all for either mixed-sex or 
male pairs whilst for females the relationship is significant from 
trial block l to trial block 3 inclusive, but in a ~j:ive 
direction. In other words, the lower the number of co-operative 
choices (the higher the number of B choices) made by females in 
trial blocks 1 - 3, the greater the imitation of the other's 
choices. In this sense imitation would then be seen as a strategy 
inducing D£Q-co-operation (or vice versa). 
Trial Block 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
r~r~ 
0.09 
0.19 
0.04 
0.18 
0.08 
0.15 
Pairing·-·--'-----· 
FF r;lF 
-0.87 ·X· 0.14 
-0.73 '(- -0.14 
-0.92 -x- -·0.12 
-0.30 0.02 
-0.17 0.03 
-0.06 .,..o.l6 
.--!.--·-----·--~--·--
The author is unwilling to attempt an explanation in 
different goals for the sexes in this instance (even 
be done) as the use of the term 'imitation' in this 
be a misnomer. ltlhilst AB or BA matching strategies 
so. 
terms of 
if it could 
context may 
clearly 
contain an element of "I 111 give you uJhat you give met! can we be 
sure that AA or BB sequences do the same? May they not simply be 
the result of 'locking in' to these combinations, noted by 
Rapoport and Chammah (l965a) to occur frequently in multi-play 
P.D? Once AA is established defection is unlikely to be rewarded 
because of the retaliation that might occur. Similarly, once BB 
is established an A response is likely to be exploited. The fact 
that subjects choose the same is, in the author's opinion, not 
sufficient evidence for sayirc~ that the subjects irnitate each other. 
However, the fact still remains that the data frorn the present study 
do not support the findings from the 1-lottes and l<ahn study and 
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require explanation. The data from the post-experimental 
questionnaire were analysed in the hope that subjects' comments 
would provide insights. 
E. J~xeeriment<;JL questionnaire ~EE.~.ndJ:.~.ll) 
Responses to the open-ended questions were found to be difficult 
to categorise and the results for the series of experiments as 
a whole are discussed in Chapter Nine. They were, however, very 
useful in providing insights into each inter-action as many 
subjects were convinced of the 'correctness' of their responses 
and were unable to accept alternative possibilities. 
Responses to the five forced-choice questions were analysed for 
sex differences using the Mann-Whitney U test, using the 
correction for tied data (n1,n 2= 40). Only scores for like-sex 
dyads were analysed. Raw scores are presented in Appendix Vllla. 
The results are summarised in Table 6 below. 
It can be seen that Q3 tended to elicit different responses from 
male and female players (p = 0.06 for a two-tailed test), 
consistent with Hottes and Kahn's (1974) findings. Men indicated 
that communication opportunity influenced the~r choices more than 
women, although the question does not specify whether the 
communication was strategic or social in nature. However, in the 
present study, subjects' reports do not match with the actual 
number of co-operative choices made. There was also a suggestion 
that men thought they had more influence over their partner's 
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---
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2. Ho 
th 
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ke your partner 
rsonally? 
w much did the 
mmunication 
tween the two of 
u influence the 
oices you made'? 
w much influence 
d you have over 
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--
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-
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' 
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,..,_,. __ . ___ 
----
4 5 6 
---- ~--·':"""" 1---
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15 ___ ;,...,... 13 2 4.00 1~17 
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--
r-~-
6 17 __ ,JO 4.63 ~. 78 
11 19 L~ 4. LdJ 
5. Ho 
of 
to 
ne 
yo 
w much 
ten did 
or how Male 
-· try 
3 8 2 11 10 6 3.88 
- o. 28 you Female 2 7 6 12 7 6 3.83 give your part-
r what he gave 
u'? 
---
------·--·-.. _ .. _.. ______ ,.._ _ -
choices than did women (p = 0.08 for a two-tailed test), supporting 
the notion that men attend to strategic considerations more than 
women, but Hottes and Kahn did not find significant differences in 
responses to this question. Nor did they find significant differences 
in response to Question 5 which directly asks subjects whether they 
were imitating their partner. The author feels that this supports 
the idea of subjects 'locking in' on mutual AA or BB seguences rather 
p 
----~ 
0.32 
-·~·-··-
0.24 
0.06 
o.os 
0.78 
.... -.. ---
than adopting actual matching strategies. 
5. 6 .s.ummary all£_Di s.~ssio!l, __ g_L_~l§su.lt ~·~· 
a) Co--operation 
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In the present study no significant differences due to the sex 
of the dyad were demonstrated. The hypothesis that male dyads 
are more co-operative than female pairs was not supported. 
Communication opportunity had a significant effect on co-operative 
responses but this depended on when it was made available. The 
hypothesis that unrestricted communication opportunity would 
elicit higher levels of co-operation than restricted communication, 
regardless of the sex of the dyad, was confirmed. 
There was some support for the notion that men attend more to 
strategic considerations, as shown by the content of their 
discussions, but this did not influence the number of co-operative 
choices elicited. 
T~e hypothesis that co-operation would increase over time was not 
supported. 
b) 'Imitation' 
'Imitative' behaviour was found to increase with the duration of the 
inter-action thus confirming the hypothesis. 'Imitation' 
tended to vary as a function of the communication opportunity. 
There was a tendency for mixed-sex pairs to 'imitate' each other 
more than female pairs of subjects. No significant differences 
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between male and female pairs were demonstrated and the hypothesis 
that male dyads are more imitative of each other than female pairs 
was not supported. 
c) Relationship between co-operation and 'imitation' 
It was found that, for female subjects on Blocks 1 - 3, the fewer 
the number of A choices made, the greater the imitation of the 
other player's choices. However, it was argued that 'imitation' 
was actually the result of 'locking in' on a certain sequence of 
choices, in this case BB. The fact that there were no sex 
differences in sybjects' responses to Q5 (either in the present 
study or in Hottes and Kahn's 1974 study) further supports this 
conclusion. 
d) Imel_ic~Jions ..!2.f di.f!_!}rences in .t?.E.oced~ 
It is now necessary to consider the differences in procedure uJhich 
may account for the discrepancies between the findings of the 
present study and those of Hottes and Kahn's (1974) study on 
which it is based. 
One obvious difference is the sex of the experimenter. Skotko et 
al (1974) suggested that female subjects were only more non-
co-operative in the presence of a male experimenter. Although it 
was noted in Chapter Three that this\ finding could not explain the 
results from other studies which report no sex differences in the 
level of co-operation, this factor must be seriously considered. 
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It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that the original 
instructions used by Hottes and. Kahn (1974) were not retained. 
Wrightsman et al (1967) have suggested that ~e instructions to 
the subject may be one of the most overlooked variables in gaming 
research, a claim fully supported by the author especially with 
regard to the motivational set induced in a naive subject. How-
ever, the standard instructions used by Rapoport and Chammah 
(l965a) and modified here have frequently been adopted in the 
literature where sex differences have been reported. It is the 
author's contention that they induce, as do the instructions used 
by Hottes and Kahn (1974), an individualistic set. It will be 
remembered that Bedell and Sistrunk (1973) argued that those 
studies reporting sex differences in co-operation levels (with men 
being more co-operative than women) had an individualistic set. 
However, results from the present study suggest this view is too 
simplistic. 
Subject factors may also be important. It is possible that 
subjects recruited by achievement incentive (course credits) as 
Dpposed to monetary incentive (60p per hour) play differently, 
especially in view of Horner's (1968) finding that women may 
'fear' success when competing with men in achievement oriented 
situations. However, this is a difficulty which could not be over-
come in the present study. Cultural differences between subjects 
·may also be important as, to the author's knowledge, only Mack 
(1975) has studied sex differences on P.O. in this country. 
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Although he found sex differences in the expected direction 
subjects sat in isolation and played a programmed 'partner', thus 
minimising the social nature of the situation. 
In the present study, with the exception of the T condition, co-
operation was well below 50 per cent throughout the session and 
subjects often reported feeling bored and not seeing any point to 
the task. It will be remembered that Hottes and Kahn (1974) 
employed an incentive within the game (an additional course 
credit) for every 300 points accumulated. Whilst this could not 
be replicated at Durham University a mon~tary incentive could be 
adopted instead. 
The literature concerning the effects of incentive levels is 
inconclusive, as was seen in Chapter Two. However, it seemed clear 
from subjects' reports in the present study that an incentive 
should be introduced into the game in order to raise the subjects' 
interest level and, hopefully, the level of co-operation. It was 
also hoped that the design would more closely approximate that 
of Hottes and Kahn (1974). 
The following chapter describes the introduction of a financial 
incentive into the basic design of this series of experiments. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Subjects in the Hottes and Kahn (1974) study were rewarded with 
a course credit for every 300 points they accumulated during 
the course of the game. This was a factor which could not be 
replicatsd in the present study, although a financial incentive 
could be introduced in its place. 
At the time these experiments were being undertaken (1975-1977) 
it was argued by many (e.g. Gallo, 1966) that the level of 
incentive was not a crucial variable and for that reason it was 
not considered an important factor in the design of the previous 
experiment. However, subjects indicated either in answer to the 
post-experimental questionnaire or in discussion with E that they 
were often bored or thought the task pointless. Subjects' 
perceptions of having 'done well' in the context of the experiment 
varied greatly. It became clear to the author that a goal of 
achieving 300 points or more had to be related to an explicitly 
stated pay-off (in this case a financial pay-off). 
It was decided to introduce a financial incentive in the second 
experiment of the series (£1 for every 300 points obtained ). 
This was in order that the design would more closely approximate 
that of Hottes and Kahn (1974) and that subjects would not vary 
their choices simply out of boredom as suggested by Lieberman 
(1960). This is especially likely in a 180-trial P.O. game. 
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The basic instructions used in the first experiment were retained 
uJi th as few modifications cs necessary. The motivational set of 
the instructions was 'individualistic' and remained so throughout. 
The same matrix and apparatus as Experiment 1 (see Figures 4 and 
5) were retained for the second experiment which followed the same 
procedure as the previous experiment. However, it was decided to 
reduce the number of experimental treatments. This was due to the 
difficulty of obtaining subjects and the length of time required 
to undertake the earlier experiment because of the failure by 
volunteers to attend at the agreed time. 
Previous research (e.g. Marwell, Schmitt and Shotola, 1971) 
suggested that communication may elicit higher levels of co-
operation if it occurs after some experience of game playing. 
Although they referred to non-P.D. situations, other studies using 
P.o. games (e.g. Kahn et al, 1971) have found that co-operation 
increases after a low initial level around the 25th to the 30th 
trial. When communication was allowed after the 31st trial in the 
Hottes and Kahn (1974) study men tended to co-operate more over 
time than women. In the earlier experiment in the present series 
only communication opportunity allowed throughout elicited 
significantly more co-ope:rr:tion. However, it was expected that 
the introduction of a financial incentive would influence the 
strategic discussions noted in treatment 31 (see Appendix Va) 
which occur when Ss have had some experience of game-playing. 
Thus, communication conditions 0 and 31 were retained as were 
MM and FF subject pairings. 
6.2 Aim of the Investigation 
The investigation is designed to establish the nature of sex 
differences in the co-operative and imitative behaviour of a 
British student population when a financial incentive is 
introduced into the task. Co-operation and imitation are also 
investigated under two conditions of restricted communication 
opportunity. 
6.3 Hypotheses 
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On the basis of the study by Hottes and Kahn (1974), where 
significant effects due to the sex of the dyad and the duration 
of the inter-action were demonstrated, bhe following hypotheses 
were formulated: 
1. Male subjects will be more co-operative than female subjects 
in the game situation. 
2. Male subjects will imitate each other more than females in 
the game situation. 
3. Co-operation levels will increase with the duration of the 
inter-action. 
4. Imitative behaviour will increase with the duration of the 
inter-action. 
5. The presence of a financial incentive will elicit higher 
levels of co-operation from,subjects, regardless of sex and 
communication opportunity. 
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No specific hypotheses were formulated with respect to restricted 
communication opportunity or to inter-action effects. 
6.4 .!:l?thod 
a) Subjects and Treatment Conditions. 
In the second experiment of the series, forty undergraduate 
students at Durham University volunteered to help in the investi-
gation. They were recruited by advertisement in the Students' 
Union or by a letter sent to all new undergraduates. In this 
instance, however, they were informed that they might be able to 
earn £1 during the course of the experiment rather than be paid 
st the rate of 60p per hour. It was assumed that subjects were 
obtained from the same volunteer population. All subjects were 
under the age of 25 years, were paired with like-sexed strangers 
and were unfamiliar with the task. 
Ten male pairs (f'lfil) and ten female pairs (FF) luere randomly 
as~igned to one of two communication conditions. 
1) none allowed (D); 
2) verbal communication made available for three minutes after 
trial 31 ( 31). 
As in the previous experiment there were 5 dyads in~each treatment 
condition. 
b) Procedure 
Subjects were seated on either side of the partition (see Figure 
5) and provided with a pen and record sheet containing spaces for 
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300 responses (Appendix 1). Subject's choices were indicated by 
pressing A or B buttons and relayed to the experimenter's panel 
(Figure 6). As in the earlier experiment the experimenter (again 
the author) stated the choices and respective outcomes after each 
trial in as standard a manner as possible. Subjects wrote down 
their own pay-offs after each trial. 
Follow 180 iterations, and before subjects could count their 
final score, subjects were asked to fill in a questionnaire as 
before (Appendix 11). 
After each session subjects were fully de-briefed and any money 
owed to them was paid. They were asked not to discuss the task 
with other students who might be taking part in later experiments 
and E agreed to send them details of the results as soon as they 
became available. 
The raw data obtained from each inter-action were analysed for 
two dependent measures: co-operation and imitation (following 
Hottes and Kahn,l974). 
c) Instructions 
; 
As before, the instructions were taped to standardise presentation 
and1 apart from introducing a financial incentive, were similar to 
the previous experiment. They are presented in Appendix XX. 
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The experimenter checked orally that subjects understood the 
matrix and answered questions regarding procedure. The answers 
given to the subjects were in as standard a form as possible 
keeping to the wording of the instructions where appropriate. 
Questions regarding the 'best' strategies were responded to by 
saying, "You should do what you think best". 
Subjects played 180 iterations of the P.O. game although they 
were unaware of the number of trials that were to be played. 
Subjects in communication condition 31 were told after the 31st 
trial, "We'll have a break now. You can chat to each other for a 
few minutes, but not to me. Please remain seated". During this 
time the exp~rimenter discretely made notes of anything that was 
said. The task was resumed after three minutes when E requested 
the subjects to, "Press when you're ready 11 • 
6.5 Analysis of Results 
A. Co-operation 
The degree of co-operation was again defined as the number of A 
choices made per subject dyad. The scores from the 180 trials 
were divided up for the purposes of analysis into six trial 
blocks of 30 trials each. The raw scores for each subject dyad 
are presented in Appendix lX. The mean scores are shown below 
in Table 7 and presented graphically in Figure 11. 
It can be seen from these graphs that the trends for male pairs 
and female pairs in the no communication condition more closely 
approximate the findings from other studies employing the 
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traditional P.O. game. Rapoport and Chammah (1965a) noted that men 
initially made more D responses but between trials 30 and 60 they 
'recovered' to make an increasing number of co-operative choices. 
This initial decline in co-operation and subsequent 'recovery' was 
not demonstrated in the earlier experiment. However, in this 
instance the number of co-operative choices made by male pairs declined 
between trial blocks 1 and 2 (i~e. between the 31st and 60th trial) 
but increased ('recovered'~ steadily thereafter. Similarly, Wichman's 
(1972) female subjects in an Isolation condition initially co-
operated just below 50 per cent. This deblined over the first forty 
trials but rose to approximately the starting level by the 70th trial. 
It can be seen from Figure 11 that in the present study the female 
dyads' scores over time were fairly consistent, unlike the previous 
experiment where the level of co-operation declined steadily through-
out the inter-action to only 17 per cent on trial block 6. 
Both Rapoport and Chammah (1965a) and Wichman (1972) allowed 
their subjects to exchange points for money. Thus the introduction 
of a financial incentive in the present study seems to have had 
the effect of eliciting levels of co-operation that are more in 
agreement with previous American studies. Does it then have 
similar effects on sex differences in the level of co-operation? 
Figure 11 suggests that the~e is an inter-action effect between 
the sex of the subject and the communication opportunity and this is 
confirmed by statistical analysis. 
The number of A choices per subject dyad were analysed by a three-
way fixed factor analysis of variance design. The analysis of 
variance summary is shown below in Table 8. 
.. 
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~--=---.-,.,·~ ·--
_ ....... _...._..._.;o, 
"'-.. ----····-! 
Source df Sum of Sou ares r·lean F p 
·--------
___ .... __ ........ _____ -~......_,.,......., ___ 
......... ------
BetLu12.,~D-~~s 
Sex ( Bl) 1 2025.41 2025.41 2.40 0.14 
Communication(B2) 1 6645.41 6645.41 7.88 0.01 
812 1 5866.01 5866.01 6.96 0.02 
Error 1:312 16 13485.27 842.83 
l:!..:L~ 
Trial Glocks(Wl) 5 2497.98 499.60 5.38 0.0004 
WlGl 5 542.84 108.57 1.17 0.33 
WlB2 5 1263.64 252.73 2.72 0.03 
IJJ1812 5 1057.64 211.53 2.28 0.05 
Error Lu1Bl2 80 7428.73 92.86 
---- -
..__ ... .__....,..._._ ....... __ --.._,_~-~----- -~--· 
Hottes and Kahn (1974) found significant main effects due to the 
sex of the dyad and the duration of the inter-action. In the 
present study, however, the hypothesis that male subjects will be 
more co-operative than females was not supported. Co-operation 
levels did increase with the duration of the inter-action (p = 
0.0004) as can be seen from Figure 12b. Although no specific 
hypothesis was formulated with respect to limited communication 
opportunity it can be seen from Figure 12a that the number of co-
operative choices was greater when verbal communication was 
FIGURE 12. GRAPHS TO SHOW -SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS( Expt. 2) 
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FIGURE 12 CONTINUED 
d) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of the sex of the dyad and 
the communication opportunity. 
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allowed after trial 31 (p = 0.01). In addition, subjects allowed 
to talk made more co-operative choices as the duration of the 
inter-action increased (Figure 12c). This two-way inter-action 
is significant ( o<. = 0.05) from ,B.:)._ock 2 onwards following the 
three minute communication period (Tukey test, Appendix 1\/c). 
The previous study found no effects on the number of co-operative 
choices attributable to the sex of the dyad. Ho~Jever, a two-way 
inter-action between the sex of the dyad and communication 
opportunity has been demonstrated in the present study where a 
financial incentive has been introduced into the design. Men were 
very much more co-operative than women when they were allowed to 
talk to each other after the 31st trial; this inter-action effect 
is shown in Figure 12d. The three~-~Jay inter-action was also 
significant (p = 0.05) and Figure 12e shows that males made more 
co-operative choices than females over time when given the 
opportunity to communicate. 
In the Hottes and Kahn (1974) study the effect of communication 
availability for women actually decreased their co-operative 
responding, an effect which was significant on Trial Glock 4. 
This effect was not observed in the present study nor was a sex 
difference such as that described by Rapoport and Chammah (1965a) 
when subjects are not permitted to communicate. However, this 
study does support Hottes and Kahn's main assertion that male 
pairs,when given the opportunity to verbally communicate after some 
experience of game playing, will increase their level of co-operative 
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responding (Hottes and Kahn, 1974). This is in spite of the 
differences in the stu~ies noted in the discussion in Chapter 
Five. The present study was conducted by a female experimenter 
on a British subject populat~n and a financial rather than an 
academic incentive was offered (both for recruitment purposes 
and for achieving 300 points during the course of the game). 
The instructions were also different, although they present an 
individualistic set. 
The communication data was examined to see if male pairs attended 
more to strategic considerations during the course of their 
conversations than did women, as suggested by Hottes and Kahn (op. 
cit.). The previous experiment in the present series supported 
this notion although it was noted that there were no differences 
in the level of co-operation that could be attributed to it. In 
the present experiment ten dyads were allowed to communicate 
verbally with their partner during the course of the inter-action. 
This opportunity was made available for three minutes following 
trial 31. The following account summarises the way pairs of subjects 
made use of this opportunity; a more detailed account is presented 
in Appendix Vb. Of the five male pairs, four made use of this time 
to discuss possible strategies and all four mentioned 'press A' 
as being the best joint strategy. Three of these pairs made an 
agreement to press A throughout the rest of the inter-action, with 
one subject only defecting on two trials. Of the five female 
pairs, four talked to each other in the break but only two pairs 
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mentioned pressing A. Of these, one pair could not reach 
agreement whilst the other pair decided it was more fun not to 
both press A but instead to 11 try not to press B together". 
Hottes and Kahn (1974) found that six out of ten male dyads 
directly mentioned either an imitative or 'play A' strategy while 
only one out of ten female dyads did so. In the present study no 
pairs (either male or female) mentioned an imitative strategy but 
four of the five male pairs mentioned pressing A compared to two 
of the five female pairs. The number of subjects. involved here 
is, of course, too small to attempt a convincing statistical 
analysis. However, a confounding factor is that four of the five 
female dyads wondered whether it was 11 against the rules0 to talk 
about the experiment compared with only one male dyad. It may be 
that females conform more to the demand characteristics of the 
situation in their desire to please E and do the 'right thing'. 
Again, then, there is tentative support for the proposition that 
males perceive the strategic nature of the task more fully or, at 
least, make better use of communication opportunities. This results 
in a higher level of co-operative responding when there is an 
incentive to do so. 
8. 1 Imitation 1 
----~ 
The data for the second experiment were also analysed with respect 
to 'imitative' choices in spite of the author's misgivings regarding 
this concept, noted in the previous chapter. Scores were converted 
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to proportions by dividing the treatment total scores per dyad 
for Glock 1 by 29 and for Blocks 2 - 6 inclusive by 30. The 
treatment means are shown below in Table 9 and raw scores are 
presented in Appendix Xl. The data were analysed by a three-
way fixed factor analysis of variance design. 
Trial Blocks Pairing Communication 
Opportunity 
.... ....,...., ____ ... ·---- ____ .. _..,_ .'" ... _..__,_........,._ -~·----" 
2 3 4 5 6 
0.55 0.67 
0.97 0.89 
FF 0 
31 0.60 0.74 0.73 
b ) I.9.:t~'!l--~~an fJ?,E~_..E.f.~J-.21.1-l.C:t i. v e '....!.~l?...~..!l_~~as a .J' u n cti DJl 
of each treatment condition 
_.,..,....,.....,..,_,_, __ . --·---------
Pairing 
Commu.nication 
Opportunity 
Trial Blocks 
[--.. -1--"---·J 0 31 ---- _____ .... _ -~~-~~-- --~=:~--
0.67 
0.91 
0.72 
0.70 
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It will be remembered that the Hottes and Kahn (1974) study 
found that 1 imitation 1 increased more rapidly for males than 
for females, males tended to be more affected by opportunities 
for communication and 'imitation' increased over time. The 
ANOVA summary (Table 10) indicates that,as in the Hottes and 
Khan §tudy and the previous experiment, 'imitation' increased 
over time (p = 0.0003). There was a tendency for communication 
opportunity ta influence the amount of 'imitative' behaviour (p = 0.06) 
an effect which tended to increase. over time ( p = 0. 06). Again, there 
was no indication of any sex differences in 'imitative' behaviour such 
as that described by Hottes and Kahn (1974). Thus, only one of the 
hypotheses regarding 'imitative' behaviour was supported. 
I.§!:l~O. Analt:si~_oJ variance sum~mitation 1 
~~ore~J.e.~~ortions) for _Sex (2 con~~j_2Lf.~rnmunicatio!J. 
( 2 conditions 2 over .I_rial Blocks ( 6 con9_itions) li'[xQt• ~l 
_____ ,.. __ .._,_..,, ____ a,..,.-~------------ ___ .._..,...,_ ... __ _...~."'-'''--"'...-.. ... ~ ........ 
... ------·-
Source df sum of squares meah SQLfl'e F p 
-----------
___ ............ _ .. 
···----........ --=-.. ..-.. _ 
__ ...,....,......,__...,..,.., 
~~~T_,...__ __ _.,. __ • 
Between dy9._ds 
Sex (Bl) 1 0.11 0.11 0.63 0.55 
Communication(B2) 1 0.69 0.69 3.87 0.06 
Gl2 1 0.39 0.39 2.17 0.16 
Error 1312 16 2.84 0.18 
~}._it !J.~.D .. s!.L?..s!.~ 
Trial 1:3locks(Lill) 5 0.43 0.09 5.84 0.0003 
LdlBl 5 0.05 0.01 0.67 0.65 
LJJ182 5 0.17 0.03 2.26 0.06 
L1Jl812 5 0.10 0.02 1.41 0.23 
Error Wl312 80 1.17 .D.D1 
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It was argued in Chapter Five that so-called 1imitation 1 may simply 
be the result of 'locking in' to mutual AA or BB sequences. 
Although this argument is still retained, the data from the present 
study were further analysed to discover what relationship, if any, 
exists between co-operation and 'imitation' following Hottes and 
Kahn (op.cit.). It will be remembered that they found a highly 
positive relationship for male subjects whilst there was little 
relationship for females. 
C • Il~J a tt..!?.fl§.IJ..~'?..~.t w-~~ c~~l?.~r at .f.9.':: •... S!D.d. _ 1 i m:ij:_~-~-LI2.1J.' 
The number of co-operative choices and 'imitation' scores for each 
dyad were correlated separately by sex and trial blocks using the 
Pearson product-moment coefficient (see Appendix Vllb for raw 
data). The results, tabulated in Table 11 show that if 'imitative' 
strategies are indeed adopted, then this induces co-operation (or 
co-operation induces imitation) on Trial Blocks 3 and 4 for male 
pairs and on Trial Blocks 2,4,5 and 6 for female subjects. 
Thus, in the present study females appear to have shown !!l.~ 
consideration to strategic elements as suggested by 'imitative' 
play and frequency of co-operative responses. However, this did 
not result in a higher level of co-operative choices than men as 
no sex differences in the overall level of co-operation were noted 
and, indeed, males co-operated more than females when verbal 
communication was made available (Figurelid ). Thus, the general 
notion that 'imitative' play increases the likelihood of co-
operative responding (or vice versa) cannot be supported. It was 
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-------·~-~ ------~--------~---· __ ., ___ _ 
Pairing 
Trial Block 
r~f'lj FF 
-----· -·---·---=---
1 0.03 -0.57 
2 0.50 0.65 ~~-
3 0.65 ~(- 0.31 
4 0.65 ~~- 0.65 -~(-
5 0.48 0.74 7\ 
6 0.60 0.92 ·){· 
-~-----·--~ 
noted in Chapter One that various strategies are probably employed 
at different stages of each inter-action which are unique and the 
author feels the notion of 'imitative' play on 2-person P.O. is 
misleading. Subjects' own reasons for their behaviour are 
considered more reliable evidence. 
Subjects' responses to the open-ended questions are discussed in 
Chapter Nine. Their responses to the five forced-choice ouestions 
were analysed for sex differences using the Mann-Whitney U test 
(n1,n 2= 20). Raw scores are presented in Appendix Vlllb and the 
results are summarised below in Table 12 • 
.... ..,,.,..___,. _____ ,_ _ ... __ ""_ ...... ..,.. __ ....... ,_... ....... .-..-.-.._ _______ ..._ __ .... ..._. _____ , __ ... _...._ ... _______ ,......_ 
.;: p~ 0.05 
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---. ... ------···"' ........................ , ........ ~ ... -··--~ ..... ~----..,_ _______ .....,._.,,,_.,. .......... -...~ ... .._....._.,. ~·~-- ~~-·-~---~ --.,~-----·"-
Question Distribution of Scores r1ean u p 
_________ _....._.,._...""' 
··---------:------·--·-·------·----- -·--·--- --~----~-· 
1. How much did 1 2 3 lf 5 6 your 
--
"-m•-
·- ·-partner's choices Pl 0 0 1 5 tr 10 5.2 140.5 )0 .05 
affect the choices 
--· 1----- ~---~- ,_ -:-- ,..-- ·- ·-you made? F 2 1 1 2 11 3 4.4 
-~---·........._ ..... _____ ,, ___ ..,..,... 
·-----1-- ----- --- - ... ~~---· ------- --··-"'~·--
2. How much do you 1'1 1 2 5 5 7 0 3.8 186.5 )0.05 
think you lliOU1d 1--·-- ·- ---~-- -----
like your partner F 1 2 3 7 6 1 3.9 
personally? 
-------~-------- -- ---· ,_,.,.......,._ ·1--- --.-- _....,., .. -
•z Jo How much did the IVJ 4 1 0 0 
"• 
11 4.6 123.0 < 0.05 
communication ~-- r---- !--·--
--
between the ttuo F 5 4 3 3 1 4 3.2 
of you influence 
the choices you 
made'? 
--- -~-------- --·--
__ ._.__..., r--.. -
,_ _____ ,_ _______ 
'-·-··-·--· 
4. How much influence r~1 1 3 2 0 8 6 4.5 153.5 )0.05 
did you have over --~ -·-- ·--·---.. ---1---·- ·-----· -----
the points your F 1 4 1 4 8 2 4.0 
partner made? 
-
5. How much or how M 2 1 2 5 4 6 4.3 127.0 <0.05 
often did you try 
to give your F 5 3 1 7 2 2 3.2 
partner what he 
gave you? 
' 
' 
Table 13. Further analysis of subje~ts' res£9~ 
lC? ... Q.u.es_:!jon 3 ( Exet. ~-
-·---~:::~~~~·~~-~-;;--.. -···--- -·r-~z:t r i butio~~~·-~;:-:·-,-·;18 a~·· 
Condition --~--·-----·----··-~-· 
p u 
l 2 3 4 5 6 
.......... _, .. _,_,_.....,.. 
... ---------~-~ 
0 3 3 3.8 49.0 >O.U5 
F 1 2 3.7 
----...... -..... ...... ~....,..__ 
.,. ___ .... ..._~ __ ...... _ 
8 5.4 17.5 < o.us 
2 2.6 
-·-~·--
As in the earlier experiment, male subjects indicated that 
communication had influenced their choices more than female 
subjects (p< 0.05 for a 2-tailecl test). Subjects had been 
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instructed to take the term 'communication' to include patterns 
of choices in addition to any verbal communication made. A 
further analysis was made of the data for question 3 (n1 ,~ 2= 10) 
with the dyads' responses being compared for each communication 
condition. The results are summarised in Table 13 where it can 
be seen that there is a sex difference in the degree to which 
subjects believe ~bal communication affected their choices. 
Eight out of ten male subjects in treatment 31 indicated that 
communication had greatly affected their responses compared to 
only two out of ten female subjects, but there were no such 
differences in treatment D. It was seen earlier that it was in 
the former condition that male subjects were more co-operative 
than females and there is now direct evidence that it is the 
~rb~~- communication which influences the freouency of men 1 s coM 
operative responding when a financial incentive is introduced in 
to the experimental design. 
There was also a significant sox difference in answers to the 
question, nl-low much or how often did you try to give your partner 
what he gave you?H illen indicated that they attempted to irni tate 
their partner's choices more than did women. In neither the Hottes 
and Kahn (1974) study nor in the first experiment of the present 
series was a significant difference noted in responses to this 
lOB. 
question. It was argued in Chapter Five that the sequence of 
choices in 2-person multi-play P.O. is not necessarily indicative 
of an adoption of an imitative strategy, whereas a subject's 
matching (tit-for-tat) strategy of a programmed opponent is more 
likely to be so. Subjects' responses to the questionnaire, how-
ever, are considered by the author to be a more appropriate 
indication of whether imitation is adopted as an actual strategy. 
Communication 
Condition 
·-··-·1·---·-·-···~-----------.---~----··---···---·-·------~--
Distribution of scores Mean U P 
1 2 3 5 6 
2 1 1 1 3. 5 42.0 > 0.05 
0 
1 3.0 
A further analysis was made of the data for ouestion 5 (n1,n 2= 10) 
with dyads' responses compared in each communication condition 
(See Table 14). It seems that imitative behaviour (as judged by 
subjects' responses to the ~ost~experimental questionnaire) occurs 
more for male pairs than for female pairs only when the test 
conditions allow subjects to verbally communicate. Five men 
indicated strongly that they tried to give their partner what he 
gave them in this con eli tio n compared to only 1 Luoman. Three of the 
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five male pairs in this condition actually made an agreement to 
both make the same choice and press A together whereas none of the 
female pairs made such an agreement. It was in this condition 
that men also co-operated more than women (p = 0.02), suggesting 
that imitative behaviour is linked with the frequency of co-
operative choices. Here, then, is actual concurrence between the 
content of male subjects' communication, their intention (as 
judged by the questionnaire data) and their behaviour on iterated 
Prisoner's Dilemma. 
flowever, the actual measure of imitation employed in this study 
(the number of times each subject's response matched the other 
subject's previous response, per 29 or 30 trials) did not mhow 
similar trends. Indeed, when correlated with the frequency of co-
operative responses, 'imitative' responses correlated positively 
with co-operation on Blocks 3 and 4 for men and on Blocks 2, 4, 5 
and 0 for women. This suggests that although 'imitation' thus 
defined, ~l~Y be correlated ~Jith the degree of co .... operation it is 
not necessarily the case nor is it a good indicator of the overall 
level of co-operation. 
Due to the difficulties noted with the above measure of imitation 
similar analyses in future studies were not attempted. Rather, 
subjects' intentions were inferred from responses to the post-
experimental questionnaire which is considered to be a more valid 
indication of their attention, if any, to strategic considerations. 
llO, 
F. The effects of a financial incentive 
.... ~.~.-o=-r-<=o..,,.,.......,..-........_._,,...,..,. .... ..-.,.,..-...,.,_,~=-•-·••o.•"<"""'•••~·.<e"'~"-,. .. ~.,.,..,.-.-,,.__ . .,,..-..-,.,......,........,_.,..,...,.-...._~,., 
It will be remembered that although the B strategy strictly 
dominates both subjects are better off prossing A if the other 
does the same. It may seem obvious to many that an incentive, 
whether financial or academic, would provide the stimulus to take 
the task more seriously and to attempt to increase the number of 
points gained. To assess the significance of the financial 
incentive in the present study (£1 for every 300 points gained) the 
data wore compared with the same treatment conditions from the 
initial experiment where no financial incentive was offered. This 
is, of course, a partial design.~n ideal circumstances a control 
lmu incentive group should have been run at the same time. However, 
in Chapter Four the author indicated the difficulties that had 
occurred as a result of low numbers of volunteer subjects. For the 
purposes of this analysis it is assumed that all subjects are drawn 
from the same pool and that their allocation to each treatment is 
random. 
The co-operative responses thus derived were analysed by ANOVA for 
the effects of the following factors: sex (2 conditions : MM and FF), 
communication opportunity (2 bonditions : 0 and 3~ finanqial 
incentive (2 conditions : none and £1) over ttial blocks (6 conditions ~ 
blocks 1 - 6). The mean scores for these groups are shown in 
Appendix X as is the analysis of variance summary table. Tho 
significant main and intor·-action effects ( p ~ 0. 05) are expressed 
in graphical form in Figure 13. 
FIGURE 13.'GRAPHS TO SHOW SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS: POOLED DATA (Expt. 1 and Expt, 2) 
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FIGURE 13 CONTINUED 
c) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of financial incentive. 
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FIQJRE 13 CONTINUED 
f) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of sex of dyad, communication 
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Co-operative choices were made more freauently when verbal 
communication was allowed after trial 31, an effect which was 
greater for men than for wom~n (Figures 13a and 13b respectively). 
8oth of these effects were influenced by tho duration of the 
inter-action and Figures 13e and 13f show that this is in the 
direction of increased co-operation. 
More pertinent, perhaps, to the present discussion is that the 
presence of a financial incentive(£! for every 300 points gained) 
had a significant effect on the freauency of co-operative choices, 
regardless of sex or communication opportunity (Figure 13c),thus 
confirming the hypothesis. This effect increased over time 
(Figure 13g). Subjects offered a financial incentive were more 
than tluice as co··operative than in the no incentive condition 
(Experiment 1) the mean co-operation being 51.72 per cent and 
21.22 per cent respectively. This is in sharp contrast to those 
studies cited earlier which report slight or no differences 
although in this case the reward level is relatively high. Another 
possible explanation for the observed discrepancy lies in the fact 
that tho present study employed a multi-play P.O. design. Figure 
l3g shows that subjects 1nake more freouent co-~operative responses 
over time when offered a financial incentive but co-operate loss 
over time when no financial incentive is introduced. The 
eli ffe:rences betuJeen the treatment means are significant fro1n trial 
block 2 onuJSrds ("rukoy test, p,ppendix lVd~ ...(. ""0.05). In other 
words, the differences between the two groups only roach significance 
ll5. 
from about the 30th iteration onwards and aro unlikely to be tapped 
in shorter versions of P.O. 
The presence of a financial incentive was also found to have a 
greater effect on the frequency of co-operative responding when 
verbal communication ~Jas allmus:i after trial 31 (Figure 13d). The 
mean co-operation was 64.12 per cent when limited communication 
opportunity was made avalable to subjects after some experience of 
game playing - nearly three times as much as in the no communication 
treatment (21.7 per cent). Thus, the financial incentive was 
retained at this level for subsequent experiments in the series. 
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In the second experiment of the series tuhere a financial incentive 
was introduced the pattern of play overall more closely resembled 
previous studies reported in the U.S.A. Doth communication and the 
duration of the game affected co-operation and subjects in treatment 
31 became increasingly co-operative as the game progressed. 
Although there was no main effect due ~th~ sex of the dyad men in 
treatment 31 were very"much more co-operative than women in the 
same condition, an effect which increased over time. Three of the 
five male pairs (but no female pairs) in this condition made an 
agreement to both press A, an agre~ment which was not broken except 
by one subject on only two trials. Unlike the previous experiment 
thoro tuas more direct support for the suggestion that men attend 
more to strategic considerations as indicated both by their 
responses to tho post-experimental questionnaire and by the 
greater number of co-operative responses elicited when 
communication was allowed. 
Other comparisons with the first experiment (which employed 
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similar procedures and subject populations and was conducted by 
the same experimenter) allow generalisations to be made about the 
effects of a financial incentive. Subjects offered a financial 
incentive wore more than twice as co-operative than those who wore 
not with the level of co-operation increasing over time. The 
introduction of an incentive also had a greater effect when limited 
verbal communication was permitted, 
b) '.!!nitation 1 and the_relationship uJith_~oper~_ti_9D .. 
limitation' was found to increase over time and to tend to be 
affected by tho opportunity to communicate. However, no sex 
differences were demonstrated nor was a highly positive relationship 
between 'imitation' and co-operation found for men (as suggested by 
/Iottes and l<ahn, 1974). Indeed, in the present study, a positive 
relationship was found on four trial blocks for women but on only 
two trial blocks for men. This measure of 'imitation' seems to have 
little predictive value on overall levels of co-operation, however. 
Men's responses to the post-experimental questionnaire in treat-
ment 31 indicated that communication affected their choices more 
than those of women. Men also attempted to match their partner 
more than did women. It was in condition 31 that significant 
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differences in the level of co-operation were noted. 
The results from the present study which includes a financial 
incentive more closely resemble those of Hottes and Kahn (1974), 
at least with respect to co-operation. However, no main sex 
effect in the level of co-operative responses has been demanstrated 
as no differences were found in tho traditional P.O. situation 
where no talking is permitted. Although there is no reason to 
assume that such sex differences on traditional P.o. are universal 
(cultural differences are explored in Chapter Eight) an obvious 
difference between the present study and the American studies 
previously described is the sex of the experimenter. 
Skotko et al (l974),in a study which did not permit venbal 
communication between the subjects, suggested that sex differences 
in co-operation levels were a function of the sex of the 
experimenter. They demmnstrated that female dyads were more 
sensitive than males to the sex of E and were extremely non-co-
operative in the presence of a male experirnenter. It was noted 
in Chapter Three that this finding, by itself, could not explain 
the inconsistencies in the literature. However, since s~x 
differences in the rnost fre~uently reported direction were 
demonstrated in Experiment 2 when limited communication was allowed 
it might be expected that a male E running an experiment with an 
identical design and subject population would elicit lower levels 
of co-operation in females under both communication conditions 0 
and 31. This aspect is explored in Chapter Seven. 
CIIAPTE!l SEVE:N THE lTF[CTS DUE TO THE 
-··-· ··-··----~nLQ.c_ r ui..J~lC£~~-r.n.E rH..S!l_ .. _·--· ..... 
7.1 Introduction 
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The idea that an Experimenter may exert an influence on the 
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behaviour of subjects is not a new one and many experiments have 
demonstrated that certain biosocial characteristics such as the 
sex, race, age or religion of the data collector may be important 
(Rosenthal, 1966). However, little is known about the mechanism 
accounting for the differences and Rosenthal 0p.cit.) attempts to 
distinguish between active effects associated with unitentional 
eli fforences in p_f:3ha'!J.E~ and passive effects associated tuith 
appearance alone. 
There is some evidence that experimenter effects are active and may 
interact with the sex of the subject. For example, female 
experimenters tend to smile more and female subjetts tend to be 
the recipients of more smiles regardless of the sex of the 
experimenter. A number of investigations show the differential 
treatment of male and female subjects and the reader is referred to 
1\osehthal (1966) L,Jho concludes~ ;1An experiment employing male and 
female subjects is likely to be a different experiment for the 
malos and the females. Because experimenters behave differently 
to male and female subjects even while administering the same 
formally programmed procedures, male and female subjects may, 
psychologically, simply not be in the same experiment Elt all rr 
(p.56). 
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Zolditch, as early as 1955, commented on the greater 1socio-
emotional1 concern of the feminine role compared to the concern 
wit~ task accomplishment for the masculine role. In spite of the 
recent growth of the Women's MovemeQt and attempts to change the 
nature of the 'feminine role 1 studios in mixed-motive situations 
continue to draw similar conclusions. Men in the Hottes and Kahn 
(1974) study were considered to be success oriented and 
opportunistic whilst women were considered to be more socially 
oriented,playing defensively when their primary goal (that of 
social inter-action) was restricted. However, the study of Skotko 
et al (1974) suggested that the sex differences on P.O. were an 
artifact and the result of females playing non-co-operatively only 
in the presence of a male exporimenter. Bedell and Sistrunk 
(1973) concluded that females are more sensitive to characteristics 
of the other player than are males and Skotko ot al (1974) extended 
this notion to also include the characteristics of the experimenter. 
They recognised, as did Gibbs (1972), that the experimenter was a 
previously unexplored variable in mixed-motive situations and that 
the experimental situation, far frm~ being a dyadic inter-action 
as it is viewed theoretically (Rapoport, 1970), is an example of a 
social inter-action which includes both the subjects and experi-
menter. Skotko et al suggested that there may be sex differences 
in the relevant experimental field (and thus in the subjects' 
interpretation of the 'game being played') which is influenced by 
the sex of the experimenter. However, no attempt was made to 
specify what attributes (other than the gender of E) differentially 
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affect male and female subjects. It was notod in Chapter Three 
that this factor, in itSl3lf, could not explain results from those 
studies reporting no subject 88)( differences or clifferonces in 
tho opposite direction L~hich also employed male E's. 
In tho present series of experiments which have so far employed 
a female E (the author) no sex differences were noted when there 
was no financial incentive. However, when a financial incentive 
was introduced into the game men played more co-operatively than 
females but only when allowed to talk to each other for three 
minutes after Trial 31. It was discovered in a personal 
communication to Vincent Skotko that no incentive had been used 
in his study as it had not been considered an important factor. 
It would seem. from the findings of the present study that sex 
differences in elicited co-operation may also be demonstrated in 
tho presence of a .f.~!:r.!2.k E L~hon communication has been allowed 
after some e><perience of ga1ne playing and t1Jhen there is a financial 
incentivo. It was expected that a male experimenter undertaking 
an experimont with the same design as Experiment 2 of the series 
would elicit lower levels of co-operation in fema~ subjects under 
both communication conditions 0 and 31. This factor uJas 
subseouently explored in Experiment 3. 
7 • 2 .t\J:.rD .... £l_L .• t~_§_t~.Y.£E.~ t ~.9.§l.f.~~IJ._L~_,~_e!!__3.) 
The investigation is designed to establish the nature of sex 
differences in the co-operative behaviour of a 13ritish student 
population under tuJO conditions of restricted communication 
opportunity in the presence of a male experimenter. 
7 'l • J 
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On tho basis of the findings in Experiment 2 and the Skotko ot al 
(1974) study the following hpyothoses wore formulated: 
l. i:lale subjects uJiLl be more co--operative than fe1nale subjects 
in the game situation. 
2. Co-operation will increase when opportunities for communication 
are made available. 
3. Co-operation levels will increase with the duration of the inter-
action. 
4. A male exporimenter will elicit different levels of co-operation 
from female S's than a female experimenter. 
l~o speci fie hypotheses were formulated with respct to any other 
inter-action effects. 
a) Experimenter 
This experiment was intended as a replication of Experiment 2 
employing a male (rather than a female) experimenter. 
The male experimenter was an undergraduate psychology student in 
the second year of a three year course at Durham University. He 
had originally been a subject in the first experiment and had 
voluntoDred to h~::Jlp in subsequent experiments. lie was paid at the 
rate of GOp per session, the same rate at tho time as subjects 
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taking part in psychology experiments. Subjects for the 
oxporimont were recruited in the same way as before but on this 
occasion the author sent out appointment .letters to volunteers 
with tho male experimenter's name on. 
Thu author trained the volunteer experimenter to conduct the 
oxperiment in as similar a manner as possible to the previous 
experiments. Close attention in particular was paid to having the 
~inimum of inter-action with the subjects and to providing standard 
responses to subjects' aueries. The advantage was that the student 
had previously been a subj oct himself. and had experienced such 
an inter-action and beon fully de-briefed in the context of 
that inter-action. Thus he was able to appreciate the need for 
standard responses and the importance of not referring to the task 
as a 'game' in the presence of the subjects. The instructions were 
re-taped by the studont experimenter who had listened several times 
to the author's tape so that the instructions were presented in as 
uniform a way as possible. The experimenter had a practice run 
tilith hJO naive female volunteers and any problems were dealt with 
at that stage. 
b) Subjects and treatment conditions 
In the third experiment of the series, forty undergraduate student 
volunteers wore recruited from Durham University. As has been the 
case in previous experiments, student pairs were all under the age 
of 25 years and were unknown ~ each other and to both tho author 
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and volunteer experimenter. Students t~ere informed that ibey 
might be able to earn £1 during the course of the experiment. Ten 
male pairs (MN) and ten famale pairs (FF) who were previously 
unacquainted with each other and naive as to the nat8re of the task 
were randomly assigned to one of tho two communication conditions 
(no communication (0) or verbal communication restricted to three 
minutes after Trial31(31) )such that there were 5 male dyads and 5 
female dyads in each communication condition. 
c) Procedure and instructions 
- . 
Subjects were greeted by the experimenter and seated on either side 
of the partition which restricted non-verbal communication. Both 
subjects, however, could see and be seen by tho experimenter 
(Figure 5). Each subject was provided with a pen and record sheet 
which contained spaces for 300 responses (Appendix 1). Subjects' 
choices on the P.O. game (Figure 4) were again indicated by 
pressing A or 8 buttons which were rolayed to the experimenter's 
panel (Figure 6) and the experimenter stated the choices and out-
comes after each trial. Subjects kept a record of their own pay-
offs after each trial. 
The instructions were re-taped by the volunteer experimenter and 
the wording was the same as for the previous experiment where a 
financial incentive was offered (see Chapter Six). The same set 
of instructions, similar to that used by Rapoport and Chammah 
(l965a), was retained so that direct compatisons between 
experiments could be made. The experimenter checked that subjects 
/ 
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understood the matrix and answered any quories in as standard a 
1nanner as possible using the wording from the instructions where 
appropriate. Queries concerning 11 bestn strategies tuore responded 
to tuith 11 0o as you think bostn. 
subject dyads played 180 iterations of tho game although they wore 
unaware of how many trials were to be plajod. Following this, and 
before they could count their final score, subjects were asked to 
fill in a questionnaire (Appendix 11). After each session subjects 
wore informed as to the nature of tho study and were promised a 
summary of results. They were asked not to discuss tho experiment 
with other students who might take part at a later date and the 
difficulty of obtaining subjects - especially naive ones - was 
explained. 
The raw data obtained from tho inter-action were analysed for the 
number of co-operative choices. 
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The degree of co-operation was again defined as tho number of A 
choices made per subject dyad. Scores from 180 trials wore 
divided up into six trial blocks of 30 trials each. Raw scores are 
presented in Appendix Xll. The mean scores are shown below in 
Tablo 15. 
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The graph in Figure l<"r shouJS that in the traditi anal multi-play P. D. 
condition where no verbal communication was permitted males 
initially co-operated 42 per cent of the time decreasing to 30 per 
cent on trial block 2. They 1 recovered 1 from trial Block 3 onwards 
FIGURE 14, PERCENTAGE OF COOPERATIVE CHOICES OVER TRIAL BLOCKS FOR EACH SUBJECT 
PAIRING BY COMMUNICATION CONDITION (Expt. 3) 
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and were co-operating 69 per cent of the time by the final trial 
block. This pattern of play is consistent with Rapoport and 
Chammah's (1965a) study using male pairs in iterated P.O. which 
was undertaken by a male investigator. In addition, higher 
levels of co-operation were demonstrated for male pairs on later 
ttial blocks in tho second experiment of the present series which 
was conducted by a female investigator. For female subjects in 
the no talking condition the trends are less clear with the level 
of co-operation on trial block 6 being only 5 per cent higher than 
the initial level. 
When limited communication was permitted men intially co-operated 
55 per cent of the time rising to 85 per cent on trial block 2 
following communication opportunities after the 31st trial. By 
trial block 6 they were co-operating 81 per cent of the time. 
ldornen bEJgan co·-O[JEJrating 56 per cent of the time rising to 72 per 
cent on trial block 2, following communication opportunities. By 
trial block 6 the amount of co-operation had slowly decreased to 
6t'~ per cent. 
In experiment 2 of this series, conducted by a female experimenter, 
co-operative choices were greater when verbal communication between 
subjects was permittEJd after trial 31, an Dffect which increased 
OVEJr tirnEJ. There IJJas no rnain effect due to thEJ SEJX of the dyad 
although a two-way inter-action was demonstrated with men co-
opeJ~ating rnore than fEJmales when allmued to talk, an effect Lvlich 
also increased over time. It was expected that when a male E 
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conducted the experiment females would be less co--.operative 
than males under both communication conditions as was the case 
in Hottes and Kahn's (1974) study. Skotko et al 1 s (1974) 
conclusion that sex differences on P.O. were an artifact of 
experimental manipulation and the result of females being less 
co-operative than males in the presence of male experimenters 
increased such an expectation. 
However, examination of Figure 14 suggests that this expectation 
cannot be upheld. The number of A choices per subject dyad 
(the gross index of co-operation) was analysed by a three-way 
fixed factor analysis of variance design. The P.NOVi\ summary 
is shown below in Table 16. 
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The results from the third experiment of tho series which employed 
both a male experimenter and a financial incentive do not support 
either the findings of Hottes and Kahn (1974) or those of Skotko 
et al (1974). No main or inter-action effects due to time or to 
the sex of the pairing were demonstrated in the present study, 
contrary to expectations. Indeed, there was only one significant 
111ain effect (p == 0.04) t~hich l~as due to the availability of verbal 
communication. As suggested in Figure 14 the limited opportunity 
to verbally communicate after trial 31 elicited greater levels of 
co-operation from most subjects regardless of sex and the duration 
of the inter-action. 
Unfortunately, the experimenter neglected to make a brief record 
of subjects' conversations in treatment 31 and it is not known 
which pairs were attentive to the strategic considerations of the 
game. The only data thatare available is that four of the five 
male dyads and all five of the female clyacls made use of the 
opportunity to communicate. However, it seems from the results of 
Experiments 2 and 3twhich both employed monetary incentives,that 
the opportunity to communicate after some experience of game 
playing somewhat ameliorates the conflict in the game. 
D • IJJ.§l~~ e f L~Et~" . .s!.l2~.J:.~J2~-~.X..~'2.L the .§l]itJ_e r J:~e n t~.E. 
To assess the significance of tho sox of the experimenter the 
present data were compared with that from Experiment 2, although 
tho data had been collected on different occasions. 
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The co-operative responses thus derived were analysed by ANOVA 
for the effects of the following factors : sex of the subject (2 
conditions:MM and FF), communication opportunity (2 conditions:O 
and 31), sex of the experimenter (2 conditions:Male and Female) 
and trial blocks (6 conditions:blocks 1- 6). The mean scores are 
presented in Appendix Xlll as is the ANOVA summary table. The 
significant main and inter-action effects (p ~0.05) are expressed 
in graphical form in Figure 15. 
Contrary to expectations, no differences due to the sex of the 
subject or of the experimenter were observed in the balanced sex 
of E design. However, as might have been expected from the previous 
analysis, commUnication opportunity significantly affected the 
amount of co~operation elicited, acting to increase the likelihood 
of co-operative responding (Figure 15a). Co~operation overall 
was found to increase over time (Figure 15b), an effect observed 
in Experiment 2 but not Experiment 3. Co-operation also increased 
more over time when communication was allowed (Figure 15c). 
Thus, the differences between the significant findings from 
Experiment 2, Experiment 3 and the Hottes and Kahn (1974) study 
cannot be solely explained by the sex of Um experimenter. 
f1lthough there are slight procedural di fferorces behrJeen the Hottes 
and [(ahn study and the present study this cannot explain the 
differences observed in subjects' choices when Experiment 2 was 
replicated by a male experimenter. This topic will be returned to 
later in the chapter. 
FIGURE 15, GRAPHS TO SHOW SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS FOR POOLED DATA (Expts, 2 and 3) 
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Responses to the five forced-choice ouestions were analysed for 
eli ffr3rences due to the sex of the respondent using the 111ann .. 
Whitney U test (n1,n 2 = 20). Responses to the oren-ended 
ouestions are discussed in Chapter Nine. Raw scores are 
presented in Appendix Vlll and the results are summarised below 
in Table 1'7. 
CuGstion 
(See /l,ppnndix 
11) 
Distribution of Scores 11lean ·-~J·-""~"·-·r-··;-·-~~--1 
i 
5 6 
1 6 10 5.15 185.5 > 0.05 
11 7 5.10 
2 
0 3 1 8 5 3 4.20 198.0 )0.05 
F 0 1 .(t 6 7 2 
"'· 25 
3 1 2 3 4 7 4.25 183.5 > u.os 
F 3 1 2 <"r.lU 
2 1 1 6 9 4.8(] 160.5 > O.CJ5 
3 2 5 G 
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It uJill be remembered that in Experiment 2, conducted by the 
author, rnen indicated that the opportunity to communicate ([!.3) 
affected their choices more than for uJOmen and that they 
imitated their partner more than did women (Q.5). However, in 
the third experiment of the series where a male E replicated the 
previous experiment, no differences were found in subjects' 
responses that could be attributed to the sex of the dyad. 
7.6 Summary (Expt. 3) 
The hypothesis that male subjects would be more co-operative 
than female subjects in the presence of a male experimenter was 
not supported. Co-operation did not increase over time, 
contrary to expectations. This had been a significant effect in 
both Expt. 2 and in the Hottes and Kahn (1974) study. However, 
a significant main effect due to the communication availability 
was noted. Subjects allowed to talk for three minutes after 
trial 31 were more co-operative overall than subjects not 
permitted to talk. flowever, since the experimenter neglected to 
record the content of the conversations it is not possit1e to say 
how the subjects made use of this opportunity. Nor did the 
ouestionnaire data indicate any sex differences in strategies 
(e.g. imitative behaviour). 
The hypothesis that a male experimenter. would eJ:ici t di ff~rent 
levels of co-operation from female subjects than a female experimenter 
was not supported by the pooled data from Expts. 2 and 3. No 
differences due to the sex of the subject or to the sex of the 
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exiJed.menter were observed. However, the data for Experiments 2 
and 3 were collected at different times and subjects were not 
strictly allocated at random to the different experimenters. In 
this instance it l1Jas thtmfore decided to replicate Expts. 2 and 
3 in a balanced sex of E design using volunteer male and female 
student experimenters. 
'7 • ? D.~:!:r.~,__C?,f_ t ~'2~-- i I"J .. '!.~~~-t~~C@.~~i.2.Q. __ (~.~l:!_~o. .. J) 
The investigation is designed to establish the effects of the sex 
:Df. the experimenter on sex differences in the co-operative 
behaviour of a Llri tish student population under tluo conditions of 
restricted communication opportunity. 
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On the basis of the previous analysis from the pooled data (Expts. 
2 and 3) and the results from the Skotko et al (19'74) study the 
follmuing hypotheses, were formulated~ 
1. Co-operation will increase when communication is permitted. 
2. Co-operation will increase with the duration of the inter-
action. The 11 learning effect 11 of repeated P.O. ~Jould lead 
us to expect ~.l'.§. co--operation as the inter-action progresses. 
However, no effect was noted in Expt, 3 but co-operation 
increased significantly over time in the Hottes and Kahn 
(1974) study and in Expt. 2. 
3. The male experimenter will elicit lower levels of co-operation 
from female subjec~ than the female experimenter. The Hottes 
and Kahn (19'74) study indicated that in the present version of 
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P.O. male subjects are success oriented and play 
opportunistically, adhering to strategic considerations 
and oriented to maximise outcomes. Skotko et al (1974) 
demonstrated that this may be so only when male and female 
pairs interact in the presence of a male E. 
No specific hypotheses were formulated with respect to the sex of 
the subject or the sex of the experimenter (main effects) or to 
other interaction effects. 
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a) Experimenters 
The male and female volunteer experimenters were psychology 
undergraduates at Durham University. They were paid at the 
current hourly rate for subjects helping in similar projects. 
Roth students had been subjects in the first experiment of the 
series and had some und~rstanding of the Prisoner's Dilemma game 
and of the procedure in the laboratory setting. Subjects were 
recruited in tho same way as for the previous experimental 
sessions using the new experimenter's name on the appointment 
letter. Subjects were selected at random from the pool of 
volunteer Ss and allocated to either the male E or female E 
treatment. The volunteer experimenters were trained by the author 
with the emphasis on the minimum amount of inter-action with 
subjects and providing standard responses to subjects' queries. 
The instructions (Chapter Six) were re-taped by each experimenter 
and each was given a practice trial session with two naive subjects 
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so that any problems could be identified and resolved. 
b) Subjects 
In the fourth experiment of the series, forty volunteer students 
were recruited from Durham University for each E treatment. As 
has been the case throughout this study subjects were under the 
age of 25 years and unknown to both the author and to the 
volunteer experimenter. Subjects were randomly assigned to the 
treatment conditions such that there were five dyads in each 
treatment according to sex of E, sex of S and communication 
opportunity (0 and 31). In addition, neither friends nor 
accuaintances were paired together. 
c) Procedure and instructions 
Subjects were greeted by the volunteer experimenter for that 
session and seated on either side of the partition on which the 
matrix was attached (Figure 5). Although subjects' non-verbal 
communication was restricted to a minimum both subjects could see 
and be seen by the experimenter. The instructions had the same 
wording as those employed in experiments 2 and 3 and subjects again 
played 180 iterations, although the record sl1eet contained spaces 
for 300 responses (Appendix 1). Queries prior to play were 
answered in as standard a manner as possible. A post-experimental 
questionnaire was completed by subjects (see Appendix 11) before 
they could assess their total score. Following payment, if any, 
subjects were de-briefed by the author and promised a summary of 
the results when the data were analysed. They were asked not to 
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discuss the task with anyono who might participate in later 
sessions. 
7.10 
P. Co:-.SU~.Sl.~1i9_r_:!_ 
The degree of co-operation was defined as the number of A choices 
made per subject dyad. Raw scores for Experiment 4 are 
presented in Appendix XlV. Scores were divided up for the 
purposes of analysis such that there were 6 blocks of 30 trials 
each. The mean scores are shmun be1ow in Table 10. The data 
were analysed by a four-way fixed factor analysis of variance 
design (Table 19). 
Examination of the mean number of co-operative choices in Table 
18 suggests that the .f.§lQ_Q);;.~. experimenter elicited a higher level 
of co-oporation from all subjects, regardless of sex, than the 
male experimenter. There is also a suggestion that female pairs 
are less co-operative than male pairs,that communication 
opportunity elicits higher levels of co-operation from all 
subjects than no communication and that co-operation increases 
over trial blocks. However, when the datawere subjected to an 
analysis of variance (Table 19) only three of the above main 
effects uJere significant (p ~ 0.05) as there was only a slight 
tendency (p = 0.09) for female pairs to co-operate less than 
male pairs. However, this is in the same direction as would be 
expected from most other studies in this field. Two significant 
inter-action effects were observed : Trial Blocks x sex of 
' 
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Table lB. Mean Co-operation Scores for Expt. 4 
i) Mean number of co-operative choices eer trial block as a 
function of the sex of dyad and the communication dpportunity 
a) filale 
Communication Trial Blocks 
Pairing Opportunity 1 2 3 4 5 
-u -·· 33.4 29.0 26.2- .. 33.8 32.0 MIVJ 
31- 36.0 50.6 47.8 48.0 48.6 
FF 0 24.6 24.4 23.4 23.8 
- ··19.2 
3I 23.4 33.4 33.0 - 31.0 31.4 
' 
b) Female E 
Communication Trial Blocks 
Pairing: Opportunity ' I 2 3 4 5· 
I 
MM 0 34.0 36.6 46.4 44.8 46.4 
31 28.4 52.0 54.4 51.8 50.4 
FF 0 24.6 30.4 36.6 45.0 43.6 ! 
31 35.4 50.6 48. 2~ 47.8 48.6 
6 
35.8 
49.2: 
21.4 
29.8 
6 
42.6 
54.4 
49.4 
49.4 
ii) Total mean number of co-operative choices as a function of each 
treatment condition 
Sex of I M F J 
E ...... :_-3_2~.~9~~:~4~3~·=8==]: 
Communication 
Opportunity 
Trial Blocks 
0 
33.7 
1 
30.0 
Pairing 
31 I 
43.0 
2 3 
38.4 39.5 
MM FF 
42.2 34.5 
4 5 6 
40.8 40.1 41.6 
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Sciurce df Sum of squares mean square -. .F p 
Between d)!ads ' 
Sex of E (E:): 1 7183.20 7183.20 6.26 0.02 
Sex of s (S) 1 3534.34 3534.34 3.08 0.09 
Communication( C) 1 5329.84 5329.84 4.64 0.04 
ES 1 1475.10 1475.10 1.29 0.27 
EC 1 203.50 203.50 0.18 0.68 
sc 1 127.60 127.60' 0.11 0.74 
ESC 1 310.54 310.54 0.27 0.61 
Error 32 36731.93 1147.87 ! 
Within d)! ads 
! 
Trial Blocks (T) 5 3598.07 719.61 7.00 o.oooo 
TE 5 1435.37 287.07 2.79 0.02 
TS 5 46.64 9.33 0.09 0.99 
TC 5 .1256. 34 251.27 2.44 0.04 
TES 5 409.87 81.97 0.80 0.55 
TEC 5 296.87 59.37 0.58 o. 72 
TSC 5 315.77 63.15 0.61 0.69 
TESC 5 337.84 67.57 0.66 0.66 
Error 160 16450.07 102.81 
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Experimenter and Trial Blocks x Communication. The graphs in 
Figure 16 indicate clearly that co-operation increases over time 
when communication is allowed and that it also increases over 
tinw in the presence of a .f.§D!?..·!.~, E><perimEJnter. Thus, no 
convincing di fferencr-3s Luhich could be attributed to the sex of 
the dyad or to a sex of S >< Sex of E inter-action wore demonstrated. 
This is in contrast to Hottes and Kahn's (1974)study which,like many 
other studies e><ploying a P.O. matrix, found men to be moro co-
operative than women. These findings also conflict with Skotko 
ot a1 1 s (197L~) suggestion that sex differences on PJJ. are due to 
females becoming ~creasinglynon-co-operative when playing in 
the presence of a malo experimentor. However, from tho author's 
point of view, a more interesting observation is that the above 
findings are also discrepant with the results from tho previous 
single E design and the pooled analysis in the present study where 
no differences due to the sex of experimenter were noted. The 
only effect which has so far been noted in all the analyses is a 
main communication effect. It is not possible to invoke the now 
forniliar suggestion that discrepant findin~JS may be the result of 
differences in structural properties or procedural aspects of the 
game. For all the e><periments presented here which have employed 
a financial incontive have had identical apparatus and,procedure 
with the exception,of course, of the experimenter. This aspect 
will be returned to later in the chapter. 
FIGURE 16. GRAPHS TO SHOW SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS (Expt. 41 
a) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of the sex of the experimenter, 
c: 
0 
.,., 
...., 
~ 
OJ 
D. 
0 
0 
t.J 
c: 
"' ~ 2 
Male E 
p 0.02 
Sex of Experimenter 
Female E 
b) Mean Number of cooperative choices as a function of the commuAication opportunity. 
c: 
0 
.,., 
...., 
~ 
OJ 
D. 
0 
0 
t.J 
c: 
"' OJ 
:!: 10 
0 
p 0,04 
Communication 
31 opportunity 
141. 
FIGURE 16 CONTINUED 
c) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of the duration of the 
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• 
B. Communication Data 
Both experimenters made brief notes of any communication that 
occurred between. subject dyads in treatment 31. All ten dyads 
permitted to talk after the 31st trial made use of the opportunity 
when the male experimenter was present whereas only four male 
pairs and three female pairs verbally communicated when the 
female E was present. In the former case three of the male pairs 
and two of the female pairs mentioned pressing A as being a 
possible 'solution•, but no differences in the overall number of 
co-operative choices were demonstrated. When the female E 
conducted the experiment all the pairs who spoke to each other 
mentioned pressing A although one pair reported feeling distrustful 
of their partner whilst another pair reported feeling antagonistic. 
This supports the notion that communication may not necessarily 
be advantageous. None of the pairs in either experiment 
suggested an imitative strategy and in neither experiment were any 
differences in choices demonstrated that could be attributed to 
the sex of the pairing br to the communication availability. A 
more detailed account of the communication data is reported in 
Appendix \l. 
The results contrast with those of Hottes and Kahn (1974) who 
reported that six out of ten male dyads and only one out of ten 
female dyads discussed either a 'play A' or an imitative 
strategy. In Experiment 2 of this series four of the five male 
pairs discussed a 'play A' strategy whilst only two female pairs 
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did so. There was tentative support for the proposition 
that males perceive the strategic nature of the task more 
fully or, at least, make better use of the communication 
opportunities. In Experiment 2 this resulted in a higher level 
of co-operative responding by male dyads following opportunities 
for verbal communication, but such an effect was not demonstrated 
in Experiment 4 above. 
c. The post-experimental questionnaire 
Responses to the five forced-choice questions for Expt. 4 were 
analysed for differences due to the sex of the respondent using 
the Mann-Whitney U test •. As has been the case with the previous 
experimental data the responses to the open-ended questions are 
discussed in Chapter Nine. Raw scores are presented in 
Appendix Vlll and the results are summarised below in Table 20. 
It can be seen from Table 20 that three of the subjects' 
responses in Expt. 4a and six of the subjects' responses in 
Expt. 4b had to be discarded as questions 1 - 5 had not been 
completed as ·instructe.d.,. · The volunteer experimenters 
reported that they had not checked that subjects understood what 
was required and it was not immediately obvious to some Ss. 
Unfortunately, the author did not check that the questionnaires 
had been correctly completed at the debriefing session. 
Table 20. Summary of questionnaire data for 
Qs. 1 - 5 (Expt. 4) 
a)Expt. 4a Male E 
Question Distribution of Scores 
(See Appendix 1 2 3 4 5 11) 
1 M 1 0 1 1 5 
F 1 2 1 2 9 
2 M 1 2 1 5 9 
F 0 3 6 7 2 
3 M 3 0 2 2 4 
F 7 3 
--
0 2 1 
' 
I 
4 M ~ 3 ~ 2 5 
F I 3 3 3 1 5 ' 
I : 
M ! 0 2 0 1 6 5 I I 
F 2 3 !) 3 2 
b) Expt. 4b : Female E 
Question Di stri but ion of Scores 
(see Appendix 
11) 1 2 3 4 5 
1 M 0 0 0 3 6 
F 0 1 0 1 5 
2 M 0 3 3 5 4 
F 0 2 5 4 5 
3 M 3 0 1 0 6 
' - -· 
F 3 1 1 6 0 
M 2 0 3 4 3 
4 
F 1 3 0 3 7 
5 M 3 0 3 3 2 
F 0 0 3 2 7 
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Mean u p 
6 
10 5.17 231.5 )0.05 
4 4.47 
0 4.06 117.5 > 0.05 
1 3.58 
7 4.39 127.5 > 0.05 
6 3.26 
4 3.9.4 161.0 > 0.05 
4 3.74 
: 
9 5.11 86.5 < 0.05 
4 3.63 
Mean u p 
6 
',6 5.20 109.5 )0.05 
12 5.4;2 
0 3.67 115.5 > o.os 
3 4.11 
5 4~40 135.0 ) o.os 
8 4.21 
3 4.00 > o.os 116.0 
5 4.42 
4 3.87 95.5 )o.os 
7 4.95 
However, there were no sex differences in subjects' responses to 
any of the five questions in Experiment 4b (female E) but a sex 
difference in the response to Q.5 was demonstrated in Experiment 
4a (mele E). This question directly asks S how much he imitated 
his partner by asking "How much or how often did you try to give 
your partner what he gave you?" Men reported that they attempted 
to imitate their partner more often than did wome8. The suggestion 
by Hottes and Kahn (1974) that the adoption of an imitative 
strategy induces co-operation {or vice versa) was not upheld, how-
ever, as men did not show higher levels of co-operative responding 
than women in the presence of the male E. Tbe only other significant 
sex differences ( p ~ 0.05 for a 2-tailed test) in subjects 1 
responses to Qs. 1 - 5 in Experiments 2 - 4 inclusive were in 
response to Q.3 and Q.5 in Experiment 2 where men repotted more often 
than women that communication affected their choices and that they 
attempted to imitate their partner. It was in that experiment that 
men were also more co-operative when allowed verbal communication 
but this effect has not been replicated in the later studies. 
7.11 Summary (Expt. 4) 
The hypotheses that co-operation will increase with the duration of 
the inter-action and when communication is allowed were confirmed. 
It was not possible to uphold the third major hypothesis as no main 
or inter-action effects attributable to the sex of the subjects 
were observed. However, the sex of the experimenter did make a 
difference to the overall amount of co-operation elicited, with the 
female experimenter eliciting more than the male experimenter, 
an effect which increased over time. 
The above data do not, for the most part, confirm the most often 
reported findings on sex diff~rence~;; in Prisoner's Dilemma. The 
possibility that the sex differences in choices demonstrated in 
mixed-motive ~gm£A~- situations are an artifact of the experimental 
situation has to be considered, although it may not be due solely 
to the~ of E as suggested by Skotko et al (1974). Such a pro-
position would explain both the anomalies in the literature and the 
discrepant findings of the present study with regard to the sex of 
the subject pairing. 
The pooled data from Experiments 2 - 4 inclusive were subsequently 
analysed for the effects, if any, of the experimenter within a 
multiple balanced sex of E design. 
7.12 Analysis of pooled data (Expts. 2 - 4) 
Experiments 2 - 4 used the same apparatus, procedure, incentive 
condition, treatment conditions and subject population and differ 
only with respect to the person conducting the experiment. The 
availability of verbal communication has indicated consistent 
results in that its presence ameliorates the conflict in the game. 
Inconsistent results have been demonstrated regarding effects due 
to the duration of the inter-action and a variety of results have 
been obtained with respect to the sex of the subject, the sex of 
the experimenter and any inter-action effects. 
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A. Aims of the analysis 
It was therefore decided to pool the available data to see if any 
trends emerged. The data for the three experiments were not 
collected at the same time and consequently subjects were not 
strictly allocated at random to different experimenters. However, 
it was felt that pooling the data together {as has been done in 
previous analyses in this study) was justifiable as subjects were 
obtained from the same pool of Ss and recruited in the same way . 
To this extent their allocation to each experiment is assumed to 
be random. 
B. Hypotheses 
On the basis of the previous analyses the following results were 
expected: 
1. Co-operation will be higher when communication is allowed 
between subjects; 
2. Co-operation will increase with the duration of the inter-
action. 
No particular effects were predicted with respect to the sex of the 
subject, the sex of the experimenter or to any inter-actions, 
although it was expected that the sex of the experimenter would 
influence the pattern of play. 
c. Procedure 
The raw scores (number of A choices per subject dyad in each block 
of 30 trials) were analysed by ANDVA for four fixed factors: 
Sex of Experimenter (2 conditions) x Communication Opportunity (2 
conditions) x Sex of Subject (2 conditions) over Trial Blocks (6 
conditions). The random factor (the Four Experimenters) was nested 
in the Sex of E factor. 
D. Results 
The overall means for each treatment condition are shown below in 
Table 2.:t,. Thefnsummary ANOVA table for the pooled data is presented 
in Appendix XV and the significant effects are expressed in graphical 
form in Figure 1~. 
Table 21. Total mean number of co-o erative choices as a 
function of each treatment condition ooled data Ex ts. 
2 - 4) 
1) Fixed factors 
Sex of 
Experimenter 
Communication 
Opportunity 
Pairing 
Males 
33.70 
0 
29.31 
MM 
39.31 
Females 
37.43 
31 
41.81 
FF 
31.82 
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Trial Blocks 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
27.79 35.06 35.15 37.43 38.46 39.49 
2) Random factor 
Experimenters Expt. 2 Expt. 3 Expt. 48. Expt. 4.b 
31.03 34.52 32.88 43.~3 
The analysis of the pooled data (N = 160) supporbthe main expectation 
that, overall, communication opportunity and the duration of the inter-
action will elicit significantly higher levels of co•operative responses 
from subjects (Figures 17a and b). Co-operation also increases with 
time when subjects are allowed to talk after Trial 31 (Figure 17c). 
However, neither the main effect due to trial blocks nor the inter-
action effect were found over all the three experiments analysed 
separately. 
There was a tendency (p = 0.08) for the sex of the dyad to influence 
the level of co-operation and men were found to be significantly 
more co-operative than women as the duration of the inter-action 
increased.(Figure 17d). There was also some support for Skotko et 
al's (1974) suggestion that females are less co-operative in the 
presence of male experimenters as a significant three-way inter-
action showed that females were increasingly less co-operative over 
time in1 the presence of male experimenters (Figure 17e). However, 
FIGURE 17, GRAPHS TO SHOW SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS: POOLED DATA (Expts. 2-4) 
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FIGURE 17 CONIINUEO 
d) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of the sex of the dyad and the 
duration of the interaction, 
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FIGURE 17 CONTINUED 
f) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of the experimenter. 
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FIGURE 18, MEAN NUMBER OF COOPERATIVE CHOICES AS A FUNCTION OF THE SEX OF E AND THE 
DURATION OF THE INTERACTION (Expts. 2-4) 
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Skotko was able to demonstrate a Sex of S/Sex of E inter-action 
in a game of only 50 trials which, incident~lly, did not include 
an incentive. Again, none of these results was demonstrated in 
any of the three experiments analysed separately. 
The bulk of the literature concerning sex differences and 
communication availability of P.o. has used a single experimenter 
design. In view of this, it was interesting to note that the 
experimenters themselves had a significant effect on the level of 
co-operation (Figure 17f) with the female Experimenter in ~~t. 4 
eliciting the highest levels of co-operation from all subjects. 
There was also a tendency (p = 0.08) for the level of co-operation 
over time to'tbe influenced by the sex of the experimenter, with 
female Es eliciting higher levels over all treatments as the game 
progressed (Figure 18). 
E. Discussion of results and further analysis 
Such findings, above, go part of the way to explaining the 
anomalies in the literature concerning sex differences and 
communication availability on choices in P.o. It seems that ~ 
P.o. design similar to this study higher levels of co-operation are 
more likely if communication opportunities are made available some 
time after game-playing experience• and as the game progresses. 
It also seems that if sex differences are demonstrated men are more 
likely to be more co-operative than women, an effect which increases 
over time. This difference may be increased by females becoming 
relatively less co-operative than males over time in the presence 
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of a male experimenter. Yet only some or none of these effects 
may be demonstrated in a single E design, and it was shown that 
the experimenter himself (herself) may elicit significantly 
different levels of co-operation from both male and female subjects. 
Any theory which attempts to account for the differential 
sensitivity of male and female subjects to the sex of the 
experimenter (with or without a time factor) must also be able to 
account for the differential sensitivity of ~ subjects to un-
intentional differences in the behaviour of the experimenter, 
whether those behaviours are sex-typed or not. Skotko et al's 
study did not attempt to specify which attributes of E (other than 
gender) differentially affect subjects and this would seem a fruitful 
· area for further research. 
Skotko et al's design differs in several important respects from the 
present design and it is possible that their findings are an arti-
fact of that design. In their study the primary test of their 
hypothesis was based on the total percentage of 11 competing 11 
responses and only included 50 trials. The instructions (which 
simply described the available options and did not include a goal 
of any kind) were read by naive E's to the subjects who were told 
how many trials were to be played. 
No verbal communication was allowed between subjects and no verbal 
feedback of pay-offs was given, as the panel for each subject was 
activated by lights which indicated the respective pay-offs. The 
matrix was similar to that of the present design but incorporated a 
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"temptation" value (see Figure 2) of 5 instead of 4. Subjects 
played only for points whereas in the present study subjects were 
offered £1 for every 300 points accumulated. It ~ill be remembered 
that in the present design the introduction of a financial incentive 
increased the amount of co-operation elicited but did so for both 
men and women. 
Many of the findings in the present study have been influenced by 
the duration of the inter-action. In order to clarify the differences 
in results over 50 trials the pooled data abovewerere-analysed 
follo~ing Skotko et al (1974). The percentages of B responses per 
subject dyad over 50 trials (no communication condition only) were 
analysed by a mixed model ANOVA for sex of E (2 conditions) x sex 
of S (2 conditions) with a random experimenter factor nested within 
the sex of E. The raw data~e presented in Appendix XVl and the 
mean scores are tabulated below in Table 22. 
choices over 50 trials 
Sex of E Experiment Pairing Mean 
MM FF Total 
Male Expt. 3 63.0. 62.4 62.7 
Expt. 4 47.8 59.2 53.5 
Female Expt. 2 72.2 60.8 66.5 
Expt. 4 43.8 59.8 51.8 
Mean Total 56.7 60~5 
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Examination of the mean scores does not suggest any differences 
in 8 choices due to either the sex of the dyad or the experimenter, 
although there appears to be differences between the experimenters. 
The analysis of variance summary (Table 23) confirms this and 
indicates a tendency (p = 0.06) for different experimenters to 
elicit different levels of 8 choices, even over 50 trials. 
Experimenter 2 ~heauthor) elicited the highest levels of B choices 
and the female experimenter in Expt. 4 elicited the lowest levels. 
The Tukey test (Appendix lVe) confirmed that experimenter 2 elicited 
significantly higher levels of 8 choices than the other female 
experimenter ( o( = 0. 05), but there were no differences", due to 
factors associated with the other experimenters. These findings are 
consistent with the analysis of the number of co-operative choices 
over 180 trials for all treatment groups (see figure 17f). How-
ever, they differ from Skotko et al's results.which demonstrated 
both overall sex differences and a sex of E x sex of S inter-
action with females showing greater ndefection" under a male E 
(p< 0.025). In the present study where the data (180 trials) 
from three experiments were pooled both the overall sex differences. 
and the sex of E x sex of S inter-action were only exhibited as the 
game progressed (Figure 1~ d and e). However, these effects are 
weak and may not be demonstbat~d in single E designs as we have 
seen. There remains the possibility that there are cultural 
differences between American and British male and female students 
and these difference~, if any, are explored in the following 
Chapter. 
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e 
2 
E 50 trials 
Source- df sum of squarss mean square T p 
Between dyads i 
Sex of E (A) 1 . ll.03 11.03 0.01 0.88 
; 
Sex of s (B) 1 148.23 148.23 0.27 0.66 
: 
AB 1 24.03 ' 24.03 0.04 0.83 
: ! 
Random ! 
' 
' i i ; 
E's/Sex (C), I of E 2 1503.65 751.83 3.04 0.06 
l ; : 
BC 2 1118.45 559.22 : 2.26 0.12 
' 
Error 32 7920.00 : 247.50 
: 
7.13 Conclusions 
The author agrees with Skotko et al's conclusion that previously 
reported sex differences in P.D. response styles "are not solely a 
function of the Ss nor of the Ss' inter-action considered in 
isolation" (p. 712). They concluded that a balanced sex of E design 
was necessary in any studies investigating subject sex differences. 
However, there still remains the problem that any theory postulating 
a differential sensitivity of male and female subjects to personal 
characteristics of the experimenter must also take into acount the 
fact that different experimenters in this study (regardless of sex) 
elicited different levels of co-operation from their subjects. 
This suggests that all subjects, regardless of sex, respond to 
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the personal 'style' of the E and subject and experimenter factors 
(and opportunities for communication) may interact in a variety of 
ways, as yet unspecified, accounting for the anomalous results 
from single E designs presented here. How, then, would subjects 
choose in the absence of the experimenter? This aspect is 
investigated in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER EIGHT : CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE LEVELS 
OF CD~DPERATION IN THE ABSENCE OF THE EXPERIMENTER. 
B.l Introduction 
There has~been a tendency to assume that sex differences on 
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Prisoner's Dilemma are universal even though they have not always 
been demonstrated. It seems that sex differences may be obtained 
with British ~tudents but only if suffici~ntly large numbers of 
subjects are used over many trials in a multiple E design (see 
Chapter Seven). It is true that Mack (1975) found sex differences 
on P.o. with a British student population but his subjects played 
against a programmed 'other' and in isolation from the experimenter. 
Thus, generalisations to dyadic inter-actions (or triadic as they 
are more usually) should be made with caution. 
A plausible explanation for differences between the findings from 
the designs presented here and the Hottes and Kahn (1974) study 
is that sex differences in co-operative responses are primarily 
an American phenomenon. A similar, but weaker, tendency is 
exhibited in British students but this may be masked by the 
effects due to the inter-action with the experimenter (regardless 
of sex). 
The above hypotheses were investigated by two further studies in 
the present series: 
i) a replication of Experiment 2, using American students 
as subjects (single E design - the author as E); 
ii) a replication of Experiment 2, with E (the author) 
absent from the room during the subjects' inter-action. 
8.2 Experiment 5 : Cultural differences 
i) Aims of the investigation 
The investigation is designed to establish the nature of sex 
differences in the co-operative behaviour of American students 
under two conditions of communication opportunity. 
The data will also be compared with that from Experiment 2 in 
order to investigate cultural differences in the level of co-
operation on Prisoner's Dilemma. 
ii) Hypotheses 
161. 
Several hypotheses were formulated based not only on the Hottes 
and Kahn American study but also on the results of Experiment 2 of 
this series which employed the author as E. 
In the study using American subjects it is expected that: 
1. Male subjects will be more co-operative than females. 
2. Communication opportunity will elicit higher levels of co-
operation from all subjects regardless of sex. 
3. Male subjects will be more co-operative than females when limited 
communication opportunities are made available. 
4. Co-operation will increase with the duration of the inter-
action. 
5. American dyads will play differently to British dyads. 
No other inter-action effects were specified. 
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iii) Method 
a) Subiects and treatment conditions 
For this study all the American students then studying at Durham 
University were contacted by letter. In a~l, there were about 45 
students and, of these, 32 agreed to take part and kept the 
appointment to do so. Due to the small number of subjects available 
and the need to make comparisons with earlier experiments in the 
series the author was retained as the sole experimenter. 
All the subjects were under 30 years and were unknown to the 
experimenter. Unfortunately some of the students were on an exchange 
programme and had been on an introductory course together. Thus, 
although self-described 'friends' were not paired together, some Ss 
knew their partners by name. Fortunately, as it was the beginning 
of the academic year, (1976/77), most subjects were unknown to each 
other. Subjects had been informed that they might earn £1 during 
the course of the experiment and all subjects were naive as to the 
nature of the task. 
Eight male pairs (MM) and eight female pairs (FF) of volunteer 
American students were randomly assigned to one of the two 
communication conditions, 0 (none allowed) and 31 (verbal 
communication allowed for three minutes after the 31st trial). The 
only restriction on random allocation was that there should be equal 
numbers of dyads in each of the four treatments above. 
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b) Procedure and instructions 
Subjects were seated on either side of a partition which restricted 
non-verbal communication, extraneous to the task, to a minimum. 
As has been the case in earlier experiments both subjects could see, 
and be seen by, the experimenter (Figure 5). Each subject was 
provided with a pen and record sheet which contained spaces for 
300 responses (Appendix 1). Subjects' choices were indicated by 
pressing A or 8 buttons which were relayed to the experimenter's 
panel (Figure 6) and E stated the choices and respective pay-offs 
after each trial. Subjects recorded their own gains on the sheet 
provided. 
Instructions were the same as those for Experiment 2 which 
employed a financial incentive and were taped by the author in an 
attempt to standardise presentation. Following the presentation 
of instructions the experimenter checked that subjects understood 
the matrix (Figure 4) and any queries were answered in as standard 
a manner as possible. 
Subject dyads played 180 iterations of the game but were not told 
beforehand how many trials were to take place. The post-
experimental questionnaire (Appendix 11) was completed by Ss prior 
to counting their final score and to being debriefed. Subjects 
were later sent details of the results. 
The number of A choices per subject dyad were analysed by ANOVA 
and the data were also compared with that from Experiment 2 which 
employed a Briti~h student population. 
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iv) Analysis of results 
A. Co•operation 
Co-operation was defined as the number of A choices per subject 
dyad and these were divided up, for the purpose of analysis, into 
6 trial block~ of thirty trials each. Raw scores are presented in 
Appendix XVll. The mean scores for each treatment are shown below 
in Table 24and expressed as percentages in graphical form in Figure 
19. 
Table 24. Mean Co-operation Scores (Expt. 5) 
a) Mean number of co~operative choices per trial block as a 
function of the sex of the dyad and the communication 
opportunity 
Pairing Communication Trial Blocks 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 5 
MM 0 45.75 48.50 47.00 46.00 49.00 
31 40.25 49.00 58.00 56.75 55.50 
FF 0 17.00 15.75 28.75 22.50 23.50 
31 18.25 20.25 22.00 22.25 26.25 
b) Total mean number of co-operative choices as a function 
of each treatment condition 
Pairing 
Communication 
Opportunity 
Trial Blocks 
MM 
50.02 
0 
35.02 
1 
30.31 
FF 
22.27 
31 
37.27 
2 3 4 5 
33.38 38.94 36.88 38.56 
6 
50.75 
53. 75. 
25.75 
' 
25.00 
6 
38.81 
FIGURE 19, PERCENTAGE OF COOPERATIVE CHOICES OVER TRI,\L .BLOCKS FOR EACH SUBJECT 
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The distribution of scores in Figure 19 shows that in the 
traditional multi-play P.O. condition (where no verbal 
communication was permitted) males initially co-operated 76 per 
cent of the time, a level which had increased to 85 per cent by 
trial block 6. When the same experiment was run using a British 
subject population (Expt. 2) males initially co-operated only 33 
per cent of the time and co-operation only rose to just above 50 
per cent by the final trial block. British males in condition 31 
increased their co-operative responses from trial blockc2 onwards 
following the three minute communication period and eventually 
co•operated at similar levels to the American males in the present 
experiment. American females in condition 0 began co-operating 
at the 28 per cent level, compared to 35 per cent for British 
females. These levels had reached 43 per cent and 46 per cent 
respectively by trial block 6. When allowed to talk after trial 
31 the level of co-operation rose to only 42 per cent for American 
women on the final trial block compared to 57 per cent for 
British women. 
Examination of the mean scores for the American students, presented 
in Table24 suggests that there may be a main effect on co-operative 
responses due to both the sex of the dyad and the duration of the 
inter-action. A three-way analysis of variance was computed on 
the data for Sex (2 conditions) x Communication (2 conditions) x 
Trial Blocks (6 conditions). The summary table is presented in 
Table 25and the significant effects are expressed graphically 
in Figure 20. 
Source 
Between Dyads 
Sex ( 81) 
Communication 
812 
Error 812 
Within Dyads 
Trial Blocks 
WlBl 
WlB2 
W1Bl2 
Error WlB12 
Table 25_ •. Analysis of variance summary for 
numbs~ of co-operative choices for Sex (2 
conditions) x Communication (2 conditions) 
over Trial Blocks (6 conditions)(Expt. 5) 
df sum of squares mean square 
1 18481.50 18481.50 
( 82) 1 121.50 121.50 
1 108.38 108.38 
12 14114.92 1176.24 
(Wl) 5 1007.71 201.54 
5 70.00 14.00 
5 140.50 28.10 
5 417.38 83.48 
60 4806.08 80.10 
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F p 
15.71 0.002 
0.10 0.75 
0.09 0.76 
'2.52 0~04 
0.17 0.97 
0.35 0.88 
1.04 0.40 
r-
FIGURE 20. GRAPHS TO SHOW SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS (Expt. 5) 
a) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of the sex of the dyad. 
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It can be seen that there are, indeed, two significant main 
effects when Experiment 2 was replicated with an American 
subject population. Figure 20 shows that American males were 
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more than twice as co-operative as American females (p = 0.002) 
and that co-operative levels, overall, increase with the duration 
of the inter-action (p = 0.04). No main or inter-action effects 
due to the communication opportunity were observed. 
These findings demonstrate sex differences in co-operation 
consistent with Hottes and Kahn's (1974) study which employed 
American subjects. Thus, when Experiment 2 was replicated with 
an American subject population a main sex effect was observed in 
a single E design, an effect which had been elusive in the previous 
single E designs. However, no inter-action effects were 
demonstrated. 
The communication data were examined for differences associated with 
the sex of the dyad. 
B. Communication Data 
All four male dyads permitted verbal communication after the 31st 
trial made use of the opportunity, talking together throughout most 
of the three minutes. Three of the four pairs directly mentioned 
a 'play A' stra~egy (none mentioned an imitative strategy) whilst 
the fourth pair had tacitly reached such an agreement prior to 
the break. However, of the female dyads only two pairs spoke, one 
of whom simply said, 11 Don 1 t know what to say ••• um ••• ," followed by 
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silence. The other pair agreed to choose A and then talked 
about topics of mutual interest; this pair had the highest total 
co-operation score of all the American females in this treatment. 
It will be remembered that the Hottes and Kahn study noted that 
six out of ten males directly mentioned either a 'play A' or an 
imitative strategy whilst only one out of ten females did so. 
The above data support the notion that American men make better 
use of communication opportunities than do American women and are 
more attentive to strategic considerations. Certainly it was E's 
impression that the American men were very much more relaxed and 
friendly towards each other in the experimental setting than were 
both American women and British Ss of both sexes. They also had 
no qualms about discussing the task and several said E could 
11 throw out the results if they're not what she wants." 
However, the fact that American men made better use of communication 
opportunities than women was largely irrelevant in the context of 
the present experimental design. Men were extremely co-operative 
anyway and the communication opportunity simply served to slightly 
enhance this tendency so that pairs co-operated at the 90 per cent 
level or above. females were relatively non-co-operative ( ~ 50 
per cent) and the opportunity to verbally communicate about 
strategies or, indeed, social considerations was only taken 
advantage of by one dyad who managed to do both. 
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The questionnaire data was examined for insights into subjects• 
choices which might be associated with the sex of the dyad. 
c. The post-experimental questionnaire 
Responses to the five forced-choice questions were analysed for 
differences due to the sex of the respondent. The Mann-Whitney U 
test was employed with o( =0.05 for a 2-tailed test (n1,h2 = 16). 
Responses to the open-ended questions are discussed in Chapter 
Nine. Raw scores are presented in Appendix Vlll and the results 
of the analysis are summarised below in Table 26. 
Table 26. Summary of que~tionnaire data for Qs. 1-5 
(Expt. 5) 
Question ....... -·.: 
' 
; .Distribution of scores 
(See Appendix 11) 1 2 3 4 5 Q 
1 M 1 3 0 2 7 3 
F 1 2 0 2 7 4 
2 M 2 1 3 2 7 1 
F 2 0 2 6 5 1 
3 M 6 1 l 2 3 3 
F 5 2 3 1 3 2 
4 M 0 0 3 3 7 3 
F 0 1 3 5 4 3 
5 M 1 1 0 1 6 7 
F 0 3 3 6 1 3 
Mean 
4.25 
4.50 
3.88 
3.94 
3.25 
3.06 
4.63 
4.31 
4.94 
3.86 
u 
116.0 
126.0 
123.0 
108.5 
69.0 
p 
-~----~ 
) p.05 
)0.05 
) 0.05 
> 0.05 
< 0.05 
Thus, American men rated themselves as trying to give their 
partner the same as he gave them more often than did American 
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women (Q.5). This is direct evidence that men attempted to imitate 
each other more than did women and is associated with high levels 
of co-operation in this experiment. This finding is consistent with 
Hottes and Kahn's suggestion that imitation indicates attention to 
strategic elements of the task. Hottes and Kahn (1974) only noted 
significant differences in response to Q.3 ("How much did the 
communication between the two of you influence the choices you 
made?") but no such effect was found here. 
o. The effects due to cultural differences 
The data from the present experiment were compared with that from 
Experiment 2 as both were single E designs having the author as 
experimenter. The reader is referred to Chapter Six for the analysis 
of results from Experiment 2. As the procedure and design for each 
experiment were identical allowing direct comparisons to be made 
the analysis of variance for the pooled data included a fourth fixed 
factor of "culture11 , of which. there are. 2 conditions (British and 
American populations). 
In ideal circumstances, however, a British group of subjects should 
have been tested at the same time. The mean scores and ANOVA 
summary table are presented in Appendix XVlll. The significant 
main and inter-action effects are expressed in graphical form in 
Figure 21 in order to help clarify the discussion. 
FIGURE 21. GRAPHS TO SHOW SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS: POOLED DATA (Expt. 2 and Expt. 5) 
a) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of the sex of the dyad. 
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FIGURE 21 CONTINUED 
c) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of the sex and culture of 
the dyad. 
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d) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of the duration of the interaction. 
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e) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of the communication opportunity 
and the duration of the interaction. 
60 
50 P< 0,05 
c 
0 31 .... 40 ...., 
~ 0 Q) 
c. 30 
0 
0 
u 
c 20 
ClJ 
Q) 
:;:: 
10 
Trial Blocks 
2 3 4 5 6 
174. 
FIGURE 21 CONTINUED 
f) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of the sex of the dyad, the 
communication opportunity and the duration of the interaction. 
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The analysis indicated several significant main and inter-action 
effects which were to be expected from the pooled data. Men, 
overall, were found to be more co-operative than women, an effect 
which increased over time when communication was allowed (Figures 
a and f). Communication opportunity, overall, was also found to 
elicit more co-operative responses than no communication opportunity 
(Figure b) and more co-operative responses were made overall as 
the game progressed (Figure d). More co-operative responses were 
made by subjects over time when communication was allowed (Figure 
e). 
However, more importantly for the purposes of the present 
discussion, there was an inter-action effect between the sex and 
the culture of the dyad (Figure c). American men had the highest 
mean co-operation level (X = 50.02) and American women had the 
lowest level (X= 22.27). British men and women came somewhere 
in between ~;f~M) = 35.~3; X (FF) = 26.92; The Tukey test was 
employed to see which of the mean scores are significantly 
different from each other (see Appendix lV for computations). 
American men were found to be significantly more co-operative 
( o( = 0.05) than any of the other three groups and British men 
were found to be more co-operative than American women but not 
British women. 
V) Summary 
The hypothesis that American men would be more co-operative than 
American women was supported with American men b~ing more than 
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twice as co-operative. No main effect due to the communication 
opportunity was observed, nor did American men co-operate more 
than women when communication was allowed. Although it seemed 
that the men made-better use of the communication time (i.e. 
attending to strategic considerations) this had little effect as 
co-operation was high for this group even in the no communication 
condition. 
The hypothesis that co-operation would increase with time when 
American Ss play P.D. was confirmed, as was the expectation. that 
cultural differences would have an effect. However, cultural 
differences interacted with the sex of the players. American men 
were significantly more co-operative than American women and both 
the British groups; British men were only more co-operative than 
American women. 
Here, then, is a possible explanation for the discrepancies between 
the present study and the most often reported findings in the 
American literature. All other things being equal (i.e. the 
design and procedure for the game, including the identity of the 
Experimenter in a single E design) it seems that the co-operative 
behaviour of men and women is not a universal phenomenon. As 
suggested earlier, the marked sex differences are more likely to be 
an American phenomenon with similar but weaker tendencies exhibited 
in British subjects in multiple E designs. 
Of course, it is quite likely that the American subject 
population studying in England is not a random selection of 
American students. In addition, the £1 incentive does not have 
the same value as for British students. This was a difficulty 
which could not be resolved in the present study. One other 
discrepancy still remains, however. Skotko et al 1 s (1974) 
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study suggests that sex differences - even with American subjects 
- are not likely to 1"be exhibited in the presence of a female E 
(i.e. sex differences are due to female Ss becoming less co-
operative in the presence of a male E). A confounding variable 
is that the E in the present study was English and there is no 
reason to0assume that the behaviour of Es is universal either. 
However, the author believes that the significant main effect due 
to the sex of the dyad noted in Experiment 5 is further evidence 
for the importance of the personal style of E (rather than the 
sex of E) in the elicitation of sex differences. The reader is 
referred to Chapter Seven for a discussion of this topic. 
It was also suggested earlier in this chapter that the weaker 
propensities of British male and female students to co-operate at 
different levels on P.O. may be masked by effects due to the inter-
action with the experimenter. This aspect was investigated in 
the following experiment in which the experimenter (the author) 
was not present in the room during the subjects' inter-action. 
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8.3 · Experiment 6 : Absent experimenter 
i) Aims of the investigation 
The investigation is designed to establish the nature of sex 
differences in the co-operative behaviour of British students 
under two conditions of communication opportunity in the absence 
of a third person, the experimenter. The data will also be 
compared with that from Experiment 2 in order to investigate the 
influence of the experimenter on the level of co-operation on 
Prisoner's Dilemma. 
ii) Hypotheses 
Several hypotheses were formulated based on the findings from 
the previous experiments in the series. 
In the absence of the experimenter during the inter-action: 
1. Male ~ubjects will be more co-operative than female subjects. 
2. Communication opportunity will elicit higher levels of co-
operation from all subjects regardless of sex. 
3. Men will be more co-operative than females when limited 
communication,opportunities are made available.. 
4. Co-operation will increase with the duration of th~ inter-
action. 
5. Subject dyads Will play differently according to whether E is 
present or absent during play. 
No other inter-action effects were specified. 
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iii) Method 
a) Subjects and Treatment Conditions 
The same matrix was employed as for the previous experiments (see 
Figure 4) and the British subjects were recruited from the same 
pool of students either by letter or by advertisement. All 
subjects were under the age of 25 years and were unknown both to 
the experimenter and to the other member of the dyad. As has 
been the case in earlier experiments they were recruited on the 
understanding that they might be able to earn £1 during the course 
of the experiment. 
Forty-four of the students contacted kept their appointments but, 
of these, the results from four pairs of subjects had to be 
discarded due to the failure of the experimental equipment. Thus, 
36 students who were naive as to the nature of the task were 
randomly assigned to the treatment groups such that there were 
five like-sexed pairs (MM and FF) in communicat~on condition 0 and 
four like-sexed (MM and FF) in communication condition 31. 
b) Procedure and Inst,I'_uc,t_ions 
In order to run this experiment it was necessary to modify the 
apparatus so that pay-offs could be indicated directly to the 
subjects without the intervention of the experimenter. All other 
attributes of the design and procedure remained the same. 
Subjects were met by the experimenter and ~sated on either side 
of the partition as shown in Figure 22. Each subject was 
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provided with a pen and record sheet containing spaces for 300 
responses (see Appendix 1). Each subject indicated his/her 
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choice by pressing either the A or 8 button. When both had made 
their choices the corresponding pay-off .box lit up both the 
subjects' panels giving feedback without requiring the experimenter 
to be present. Unknown to the subjects their choices were also 
relayed to the experim~ter 1 s panel (Figure 6) in the adjoining 
room where E was able to record their choices. A hidden 
microphone was also present in the subjects' room so that E could 
record any strategic discussions and check that subjects did not 
talk to each other except when it was permitted. The experimenter 
was able to press a buzzer which indicated to Ss when communication 
opportunity was available. The modified instructions were pre-
recorded. E, having instructed Ss to listen carefully to the tape, 
switched on the tape recorder before leaving the room. Thus, the 
minimum of E i=! S inter-action occured as subjects were not 
permitted to ask questions. 
The instructions were similar to previous instructions in the 
present series and were only modified to explain the procedure 
and to include practice trials. The instructions are presented in Appendix XX. 
However, several practice runs with postgraduate psychology 
students indicated that subjects co~ldnot be relied upon to only 
press their button once before the pay-off box lit up. Un-
certainties arose, such as whether they had pressed the button 
properly, especially if their partner was taking a long time to 
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choose and the pay-off box had not been activated. A few 
subjects also kept their fingers on the same button for some 
time, especially in AA or 88 runs. Such behaviour had the effect 
of causing anomalies in the system, (e.g. two panels lighting 
up) and subject 1 was therefore instructed by E to activate the 
re-set switch to his left (see Figure 22) when this occurred. 
In fact, because of problems with theequipmentor of general 
uncertainty one or two subjects did check with their partner 
that they were doing the right thing. However, except for the 
four discarded results none of these Ss talked after the fifth 
trial (except when it was permitted) and none discussed strategies 
or attempted to befriend the other. Thus, from E1 s point of view, 
all the Ss that took part in the study were trustworthy in the 
unsupervised situation and the d~taweretherefore retained for 
analysis. 
Subjects were fully de-briefed at the end of the session after 
completing the post-experimental questionnaire (Appendix 11) 
and were sent details of the results when they were available. 
iv Analysis of Results 
A. Co-operation 
~he gross index of co-operation was again defined as the number 
of A choices made per subject dyad. Scores were divided up in-
to 6 blocks of 30 trials each; mean scores are shown below in 
Table 27. Raw scores are presented in Appendix XVll and Figure 
23 expresses the mean per cent levels of co-operation in graphical 
form. 
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Table 27. Mean co-operation scores (Expt. 6) 
a) Mean number of co-operative choices per trial block as a 
function of the sex of the dyad and communication opportunity 
Communication Trial Blocks 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 5 
MM 0 21.40 12.20 15.60 26.80 32.80 
! 
31 30.75 29.75 30.50 . 25.25 . 25.00 
' : 
FF 0 
; 27.00 22.20 23.20 22.60 23.8d 
I 
' 
31 22.75 40.00 40.00 38.25 43.75 
b) Total mean number of co-operative choices as a function of each 
treatment condition 
Pairing 
Communication 
Opportunity 
Trial Blocks 
~1M 
25.44 
0 
23.37 
1 
25.33 
FF 
29.93 
31 
33.08 
2 3. 4 .. 5 
' 
25.06 . 26.44 27.83 31.00 
6 
30.20 
28.50 
22.60 
42.50 
6 
30.44 
FIGURE 23. PERCENTAGE OF COOPERATIVE CHOICES OVER TRIAL BLOCKS FOR EACH SUBJECT 
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It can be seen that males in the no talking condition initially 
declined in the level of co-operative responding on trial block 2 
but had 'recovered' by trial block 4 to above theinitiallevel. 
Females in the no talking condition never regained the initial 
level after a decline on trial block 2. However, males in 
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condition 31 actually declined in co-operative responding over time, 
in contrast to the results from Experiment 2 when E was included in 
the inter-action. Females, on the other hand, increased their level 
of co-operation reaching 71 per cent by trial block 6. 
Examination of the overall means in table 27b suggests that there 
are no main effects due to the sex of the dyad or the duration of 
the inter-action but that there may be differences due to the 
availability of communication. In fact, this is not confirmed by 
statisical analysis as can be seen by the ANOVA summary in table 
28. No main or inter-action effects were observed and hypotheses 
1 - 4 outlined above were not supported by the data. 
The communication and questionnaire data were examined for 
insights into how subjects made their choices in the absence of 
the experimenter. 
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Source df sum of squares mean square F p 
Between d~ads 
' 
Sex (81) 1 542.26 542.26 • 0.45 > 0.05 
Communication ( 82) 1 2517.69 2517.69 2.09 > 0.05 
812 1: 562.22 562.22 0.47 7 0.05 
Error 812 14 
' 
16883.70 1205.98; 
Within dyads i 
Trial Blocks (Wl) 5: 586.96 ; 117.39' 0.10 ~ 0.05 
WlBl 5 360.96 ' 72.19: 0.61 '7 0.05 
WlB2 5. 769.19 : 153.84 1.31 ) 0.05 
i 
WlB12 5 1350.09 270.02 i 2.29 ')0.05 
Error W1Bl2 : 70 8238.01 117.69' 
I 
: 
' 
B. Communication data 
Although the experimenter was not present in the room there was, 
unknown to the subjects,a hidden microphone so that E could hear 
what was being said in the next room. This was in order to che,ck. that 
the correct procedure was being observed and to record any strategic 
discussions made during the communication opportunity. All the 
subjects were informed of this after the experiment and it was 
explained that if they had been told prior to the inter-action their 
subsequent behaviour might have been different. Subjects were asked 
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if their data could be used in the analysis and fortunately no one 
objected (or they were too reserved or polite to refuse). 
All ef the four male dyads permitted to talk made use of the 
opportunity but only one pair'made an agreement to press A. Another 
pair discussed the outcomes in general terms but not the advantages 
of these outcomes, hence their discussion could hardly be called 
strategic, although it was task-ori~nted. A third pair simply 
checked with each other that the sounding of the buzzer meant they 
could talk and then said nothing. A member of the fourth pair said, 
11 The longer you ~Jai t, the less time you have to get points 11 and the 
pair resumed making their choices (without further talking) before 
the buzzer sounded again. 
Of the female dyads, three of the four pairs spoke to one another 
and two ·of these agreed to press A together. The third pair talked 
about the method ~f recording scores and when the buzzer would sound 
again. This pair said afterwards that they thought it would be 
cheating to discuss strategies. 
The above is evidence that tbe strategic nature of the task may be 
p~rceived just as well by females as males when E is not present. 
Although there were no statistically significant differences Figure 
23 demonstrates that females co-operated at a higher 1evelwhen 
communication was allowed, reaching 71 per cent by trial block 6 
compared with only 48 per cent for males. Whether larger numbers of 
subjects would show these trends, which are the reverse of those in 
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Experiment 2, to be significant remains a matter for speculation. 
c. The post-experimental questionnaire 
Responses to the five forced-choice questions were analysed, as in 
previous experiments, for differences due to the sex of the respondent. 
The Mann-Whitney U test was employed with o{ = 0.05 for a 2-tailed 
test (n1 = 17, n2 = 18). Responses to the open-ended questions were 
difficult to categorise and are discussed in Chapter Nine, although they 
were extremely useful in making sense of the outcome of each inter-
action. Raw scores are presented in Appendix Vlll and the results of 
the analysis are summarised below in Table 29. Unfortunately, one of 
the male S 1 s responses had to be discarded as the questionnaire, had not 
been completed as instructed. 
Question 
(See Appendix 
1 
2 
3 
' 
4 
5 
Table 29. Summary of questionnaire data for Qs 1-5 
(Expt. 6) 
Distribution of sco.res .Mean u 
11) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I 
M 1 2 0 i 7 6 4.71 136.0 
F 2 1 0 3 7 5 4.50 
I 
M 3 3 3 5 3 0 3.19 78.0 
F 0 2 1 6 7 T 4.33 
-M 3' I 0 2 7 4 4.24 126.,5 
F 6 4 '1 p 1 6 3.22 
M- 2 2 2 2 .3 6 4.18 150.0 
F 1 4 0 3 4 6 '4.28 
fl'j 1 2 3 2 3 6 4.29 101.0 
F 7 3 0 1 3 4 3.11 
p 
> 0.05 
< 0.05 
> 0.05 
)0.05 
)0.05 
A sex difference was found in response to Q.2 which asks, "How 
much do you think you would like your partner personally?" 
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Females indicated more strongly than men that they thought they would 
like their partner. Whether such a response stems from th~ insecurity 
of "being in the same boat" in the absence of the experimenter is 
unclear. Such insecurity might consolidate females' desire for 
social inter-action but not necessarily exclude a desire for strategic 
inter-action (as evidenced by the communication data). 
One possibility is that females usually respond more to~the presence 
of the experimenter (the authority figure) than to their partner, 
but are able to respond more to each other in the absence of E. 
Such an explanation would be able to account for sex differences in 
response to both male E's and the personal styles of all E's, in 
terms of the amount of authority they may be invested with (whether 
sex-typed or not). In the absence of E the females' level of co-
operation was slightly (but not significantly) higher than the males' 
and increased when the social situation was expanded to include 
communication opportunities. American men, it will be remembered, 
were not at all intimidated by the presence of E and several even 
said that E could discard the results if they were not what was 
required. This group was also the most co-operative in experiments 
employing the author as experimenter. To observe the effects 
associated with the ~xperimenter's presence during the inter-action 
the data from Experiments 2 and6' were pooled and analysed together. 
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D. The effects due to the presence of the experimenter 
The data from Experiment 6 were compared with that from Experiment 
2 as both were single E designs having the author as experimenter. 
The procedure and design for each experiment were as similar as 
possible but allowed for either the presence of absence of the 
experimenter in the inter-action. In ideal circumstances the data 
should have been collected at the same time with subjects being 
allocated to the treatments at random. However, due to the 
difficulty of obtaining subjects Expt. 2 was used as a baseline with 
the assumption that subjects were drawn from the same pool and 
allocated at random. 
The analysis of variance thus included a fourth fixed factor of 
"presence of the experimenter" of which there are two conditions 
(present and absent). The mean scores are presented in Appendix.· 
XlX, as is the ANDVA summary table. The significant main and inter-
action effects from the pooled data are expressed in graphical form 
in Figure 24 to help clarify the discussion. 
As would be expected from the separate analyses the pooled data 
yielded several significant main and inter-action effects. 
Communication opportunity was found to elicit higher levels of co-
operation from all subject dyads than no communication and co-
operative responses also increased as the game progressed (Figures 
24a and c respectively). As expected, co-operative responses 
increased more over time when limited communication was permitted 
(Figure 24d). 
FIGURE 24. GRAPHS TO SHOW SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS: POOLED DATA [Expt. 2 end Expt. 6) 
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FIGURE 24 CONTINUED 
b) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of the sex of the dyad, the 
communication opportunity and the presence of the experimenter. 
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interaction. 
c 
0 
.,.., 
...., 
~ 
OJ 
c. 
0 
0 
u 
c 20 OJ 
OJ 
:;::: 
10 
Trial Blocks 
2 3 6 
193. 
FIGURE 24 CONTINUED 
d) Mean number of cooperative choices as a function of communication opportunity 
and the duration of the interaction. 
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More pertinent, perhaps, to the present discussion was that although 
there was no main effect due to the presence or absence of E the~e 
was a significant inter-action between the sex of the dyad, the 
communication opportunity and the presence of the experimenter 
(figure 24b). The Tukey test was employed to see where the 
significant differences lay (Appendix iV). It was found that the 
high level of co-operation (X = 49.57) elicited from males when 
allowed to talk in the presence of the experimenter was significantly 
different from that elicited in all other treatments with the 
exception of females allowed to talk in the absence of the 
~perimenter. A four-way inter-action was also noted (Figure24e) 
which suggests thatt~ level of co-operation elicited from men who 
were allowed to talk in the presence of the experimenter increases 
more over time than for the futher treatments(except women allowed to 
talk in the absence of ~). 
-v) Summary 
No main or inter-action effects were observed in the amount of co-
operation when the experimenter was absent from the room during the 
inter-action. The hypothesis that subject dyads will.play 
differently according to whether E is present or absent during play 
is partially supported by a significant three way inter-action 
between the sex of the dyad, the communication opportunity and the 
presence of the experimenter. Men allowed to talk in the presence of 
E co-operated far more than any other treatment group with the 
exception of women allowed to communicate when E was absent from the 
room during play. 
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It was shown in Chapter Seven that several or none of the main or ~ 
inter-action effects could be significant in single E designs with a 
British subject population. It was only when an American subject 
population was used that a main effect due to the sex of the dyad 
was noted. 
However, when E (the author) was absent from the room during dyadic 
inter-actions. with Briti'sh subjects none of the significant main and 
inter-action effects observed when E was present were demonstrated. 
The results from these experiments are summarised below in Table 30. 
All of these experiments have had the author as experimenter. 
5 and 6 
Expt. 2 Expt. 5 Expt. 6 
Source E present' E present ; E absent 
UK subjects USA subject~ UK subjects 
Between dyads 
Sex 2.40 15.71 ·X· ' 0.45 
I 
Communication 7.88 * 0.10 I 2.09 I 
Sex x Communication 6.96 ·)(- 0.09 
; 0.47 
Within dyads 
Trial Blocks 5.38 * 2.52 * 0.10 
Blocks x Sex 1.17 0.17 0.61 
Blocks x Communication 2.72 -l< 0.35 1.31 
Blocks x Sex x 
Communication 2.28 -*• 1.04 2.29 
-)(· p ~ 0.05 
197. 
The author is not aware of any American research on dyadic inter-
actions which has both a similar design and procedure to the 
present series and investigates the influence of the experimenter. 
Certifunly the above data from a British subject population (with a 
British E) suggests that far from masking the weak tendencies to 
exhibit sex differences in co-operative behaviour on P.o. the 
presence of the experimenter (and, hence, the inter-action with E) 
actually serves to elict them. The pooled data from Experiments 2 
and 6 (Figure 24b) suggests that male pairs actually co-operate 
more in the presence of E (or this particular E, the author) than 
in the absence of E - but only when limited communication opportunity 
(i.e. more information) is made available. This level of co-
operation was no different to that observed by females allowed to 
talk in the absence of E,however. 
8.4 Conclusions 
The above data supports Skotko et al's (1974) hypothesis that sex 
differences in P.O. response styles are not simply a function of the 
Ss or of their inter-action. However, it goes beyond their general 
conclusion that females may respond more to the 'personal' 
characteristics of the other subject and the experimenter (although 
they did suggest that the effect may be shared in some circumstances 
by males). 
It was shown in Chapter Seven that subjects respond differently with 
different experimenters and Experiment 6 demonstrated that significant 
effects are probably due to the inter-action with E. When the 
experimenter did not intrude on the subjects' inter-action no 
significant effects in response styles on P.o. attributable to 
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the sex of the dyad, the communication opportunity or the duration 
of the inter-action were observed. Whether this would be the case 
with an American subject population remains a matter for speculation. 
However, to conclude (as did Hottes and Kahn, 1974) that men are 
success oriented and play opportunistically on P.o. whilst women 
play defensively would be an over-simplification of the issues 
involved. 
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CHAPTER NINE THE POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
All subjects who played the P.O. game were asked to fill in a 
questionnaire (see Appendix 11) in order to pro0ide insight into 
how Ss determined their choices in the game. The analyses of the 
five forced-choice questions for differences due to the sex of the 
respondent havebeen presented in the preceding chapters. The 
results from Experiments 1 - 6 are summarised in Table 31 below. 
Expt. 
Q M 
1 F 
2 IVJ 
F 
3 M 
F 
4 M 
F 
5 M 
F 
Table 31. Summary of quesionnaire data for 
Qs 1 - 5 (E~pts. 1 - 6) 
1 2 3 4a 4b 
! 
4.83 5.15 5.15 5.17 5.20 
i 
5.15 4.40 5.10 4.47; 5.42 
I 
4.00 3.75 4.20. 4.06. 3.67 
4.23 3.90 4.25 3.58; 4.11, 
3.13 4.60 
* 
4.25 4.39. 4.40 
2.43 3.15 4.10 3.26 4.21 
4.63 4.45 4.80 3.94 4.00 
4.40 4.00 4.30 3. 74 4.42 
3.88 4.30 ·X. 4.05 5.11 * 3.87 
3.83 3.20 4.25 3.63 4.95 
5 
4.25 
4.50 
3.88 
3.94 
3.25 
3.06 
4.63 
4.31 
4.94 
* 
3.86 
Thus, no convincing trends were revealed that could be attributed to 
the sex of the ~espondent. British men indicated that verbal 
communication opportunity influenced the choices they made more than 
·X- p ::S, 0.05 
6 
4. 71 
4.50 
j 
3.19 * 
4.33 
4.24 
3.22 
4.18 
4.28 
4.29 
3.11 
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did women in Experiment 2 but not in any of the other single E 
designs. British men also indicated they attempted to imitate 
their partners more than women did, but only in Experiments 2 and 
4~tas did American men in Exper~ment 5. However, in the sixth 
experiment of the series when the experimenter was absent from 
the room during the subjects' inter-action, women indicated they 
felt they would like their partner more than men did although they 
were not significantly more co-operative. 
The responses to the open-ended questi~ns (Qs. 6 - 10) were found 
to be extremely useful in understanding the outcome of specific 
inter-actions but, like Hottes and Kahn (1974),the author found 
them difficult to categorise. Ambiguous, contradictory and some-
times confusing answers were often given either in response to one 
or to several questions. Following Hottes and Kahn (op.cit.) 
the responses were categorised for strategic intentions as follows:-
maximise gain; 
defensive/random; 
both or other. 
Hottes and Kahn only categorised responses to two questions : "Did 
you use a strategy?" and "How did you determine your choices? 11 
However, in the present study, subjects often gave responses which 
were not further elaborated (e.g. "Yes"). Thus, the responses to 
all five of the open-ended questions were trichotomized as above 
according to the overall impression. The raw data are presented by 
sex in Table 32. 
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Table 32. Res onses 
uestionnaire Qs. 6 
Experiment Sex of Strategv 
s Maximise qain Defensive~random Both or other 
1 M 13 9 18 
(nl,n2 40) F 8 12 20 
i 
2 M 9 0 11 
' 
(nl,n2 = 20) F 4 3 13 
3 IVJ ' 5 2 13 
(nl, n2 = 20) F 7 2 11 
i 
4a 
f'lale E M 2 2. 16 
(n1, n2 = 20) F 8' ' 3 9 I 
4b 
Female E M 6 1 13 
' 
(nl,n2 = 20) F 6 0 14 
5 M 5 0 11 
(nl n2 = 16) F 4 3 9 
' 
6 M 7 1 10 
(nl,n2 = 18) F 5 6 7 
However, the author found that the questions were too open-ended 
and often not specific enough to enable allocations to these 
categories to be made with much degree of confidence. For this reason 
no statistical analysis was attempted. However, had such an analysis 
been made it would also have been necessary for the categorisations 
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to be checked by an independent person. 
In general, where Ss said they wanted to get the highest score 
possible this was scored as a desire to maximise gain whereas a 
desire to maximise joint gain was categorised as 'both or other'. 
This, of course, was not always clear from subjects' responses as, 
for example, several said they wanted to get the highest possible 
score but added that they did not want to get more than their 
partner. Other Ss, having misunderstood the instructions to imply 
that they should g~t more than their partner~ w~re content to press 
B after one AB outcome which put them four points ahead. Infueir 
own eyes they had maximised their gain yet the questions were not 
sufficiently directed to discover whether B was a defensive move or 
a move to maintain the gain over their partner, Several Ss said they 
wanted to win but it was unclear what strategy, if any, had been 
adopted as this is not much different from saying they did not wish 
to lose. In the main, responses which were categorised as 
defensive or random were much less ambiguous as these subjects were 
generally closed to alternative possibilities and were difficult to 
enlighten even during de-briefing. 
In their 1974 study, Hottes and Kahn found that men were more likely 
than women to state that they attempted to maximise their gain. 
Women, on the other hand, were more likely than men to state that 
they chose out of boredom or in a random or defensive manner (p< 0.0 1). 
They suggested that their findin.gs were consistent with Horner 1 s 
(1968) thesis thatr women are more likely than men ·to avoid failure 
rather than seek success. Further evidence in support of this was 
provided by the fact that women also made more non-co-operative 
choices, the rational choice in a game theoretical sense which 
minimises loss if one is uncertain what the other will do. 
In the present series of experiments Hottes and Kahn's findings 
were largely unsupported. for example, in the first experiment 
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the number of men and women choosing defensively were 9 : 12 
respectively, compared to 1 : 11 in the Hottes and Kahn study. When 
a financial incentive was introduced (Expt. 2) the ratio was 0 : 3 
even though men played more co-operatively than women when verbal 
communication was allowed. At first glance, the data for 'maximise 
gain' are consistent with this increase in co-operation as 9 men 
indicated they employed this strategy compared to only 4 women. 
But in Experiment 4a only 2 men compared to 8 women indicated they 
attempted to maximise gain, y~t women were not more co-operative. 
The pooled scores for Experiments 2, 3,4a and 4b revealed that 22 
men and 25 women attempted to maximise gain and 5 men and 8 women 
chose out of boredom or defensively or at random. In fact, the 
pooled data for co-operative choices indicated that women were more 
non-co-operative over time, but the questionnnaire data has not 
been particularly illuminating with regard to comparisons between 
groups. Even the data for the American subjects (Expt. 5) did not 
concur with the data from the Hottes and Kahn study (0 men and 3 
women indicated they played defensively or randomly or chose from 
boredom) even though significant sex differences were observed in 
the levels of co-operation. When the experimenter was absent 
(Expt. 6) 1 man and 6 women indicated they chose defensively or at 
random, yet no sex differences emerged in the pattern of play. 
Subjects in general reported they had been very bored when the 
experimenter was not present in the room. As one female S wrote 
in response to Q.6711 Kept pushing button 1 8 1 for 'BORING'." 
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The author .indicated earlier that the responses to the open-ended 
questions were often difficult to categorise although they were 
helpful in understanding specific inter-actions. One difficulty with 
all questionnaire data is the perceived social desirability of a 
response. 
An example of this may be the following 
Q. How concerned were you with your partner's score? Did you have 
a preference for the outcome of the game? 
A. I wanted to earn £1 but I thoughtthe way we scored was best for 
mutual benefit, as my partner deserves the £1 as much as me. 
It is difficult to know whether S was genuinely concerned with 
equity or whether he wished to be perceived as being so. 
Many subjects were content to describe ~they did, but not wh~ 
they did it. The following responses were frequently given to the 
que,stion "How .d~d you determine your choices?" , : "By what went 
previously!'; "I knew what my partner would choose and chose 
accordingly 11 ; "Tried to break the B chain"; "By the payout board"; 
"Break the bank in the long run"; "Sequence of A's followed by one 811 • 
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Several subjects produced confusing responses even when~they attempted 
to give reasons for their choices. For example: 
Q. "Did you use a strategy in this experiment'? If so, what was it711 
A. "Since ifwe both pushed A we wouldn't get a very high result, 
I tried using a pattern so partner could pick it up and also push 
A so we could both get 3 inste~d of 1. Clearly we both could 
have pushed B all the time but that would result in a low score 11 • 
Q. "How did you determine your choices?" 
A. "By pressing A twice she transferred to A so giving me a couple 
of 4 : 0 scores." OR 
A. 11 I used mostly 8 because I was certain of getting points, but 
sometimes A because I felt the experiment was loaded against 
subject 1 11 • 
Q. 11 How concerned were you with your partner's score? Did you have 
a preference for the outcome of the game7 11 
A. "Very - it was the only way either of us could get anything, 
rather than each cut our own throats in a fight - it was surely 
better for only me to commit suicide so that the other person 
could gain" (i.e. he pressed A to his partner's B). 
There was slight evidence that American females were less aware of 
possible strategies than American males as their questionnaire 
responses were often very confused. One female said she chose 
randomly and then added : 11 no real concern over outcome pointwise, 
but interest in individual pairs -why combination of 2 A's didn't 
arise as often as 2 81 s 11 • Another said : "At first I thought we 
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were both trying to get as many points as possible but then it got 
tiring trying to outwit her, so since we both seemed content to get 
three points, I just kept pressing 811 • (She actually pressed A.) 
On the Whole, the responses of the American women proved the most 
difficult to categorise although the men found the task just as 
boring as the women did - one respondent said he wanted to "just get 
it over with before left hand fell off". Yet, although they were 
bored, American men managed to sustain a high level of mutual 
co-operation. 
There was some evidence that subjects with a competitive orientation 
saw little point in changing their strategy. Such responses were 
"Obviously I tried to win", or 11 I tried to beat her, else there 
wouldn't have been much point doing it. Just pressing A or 8 could 
be done without thinking by a trained animal. If you've got to think, 
might as well try to score". 
In order to specify more precisely which factors in the experimental 
situation influence the subjects choices, far more directed questions 
covering a wider range are r,equired (including the influence of the 
experimenter and the demand characteristics of the experimental 
situation). What was evident to the author in examining the 
questionnaire responses was the large variation in subjects' responses. 
One subject said he determined his choices by telepathy whilst another 
said that "the influence and the noise of his 1 81 button was 
appreciated though not used all the time". In fact, both A and 8 
buttons squeaked slightly if pressure was applied and impartial 
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observers were unable to tell the difference. Pilisuk et al 
(1976) believe that a significant degree of illicit signalling may 
occur within the laboratory setting and several subjects reported 
that they had used 'squeaks' or pauses as possible signals and 
had attempted to look for consistencies. Others felt that by both 
pressing A all the time it would be "cheating", or as one subject 
put it, "not giving what was expected in the experiment". Another 
subject said he was not interested in getting the money but wanted 
to see if his partner would respond to his "generosity". 
On the whole, one was left with the distinct impression that subjects 
had not been playing the same game at all! The utilities of the 
matrix cannot be assumed to be the utilities of the subjects. It is 
hard to disagree with Shaw and Thorslund (1975) that "whether or not 
certain variables affect measures of central tendency, they may have 
large and psychologically meaningful effects on variance" (p.l21). 
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CHAPTER TEN DISCUSSION 
This study has attempted to investigate the effects of restricted 
verbal communication opportunity and the sex of the subject on co-
operative responses of British dyads in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. 
The main findings that have emerged from this study are summarised 
below and discussed in the context of other recent studies of P.o. 
10.1 The effects of verbal communication opportunities 
It will be remembered that the traditional P.o. game does not 
permit any form of communication between the players who are assumed 
to have full information with which to make a rational decision. 
However, even though agreements may be made during communication 
opportunity they are not enforceable and the P.O. game would still be 
non-co-operative in the theoretical sense. A new dilemma simply 
arises as it is in the individual's interest to break the pact 
regardless of what the other does. It was noted that the generalis-
ability of results from P.O. studies has been reduced by inconsistent 
definitions of the independent variable and, in addition, many of 
the messages between subjects have been incomplete. 
The first experiment of the series employed four levels of verbal 
communication opportunity where non-verbal communication between dyads 
was restricted by a partition. Subjects made more co-operative 
choices when communication was allowed throughout the inter-action 
than when no communication was allowed or when limited communication 
was allowed before trial 1 or after trial 31. Wichman's (1972) study 
also confirmed that the more freely subjects can communicate the more 
likely they are to achieve the goal of mutual co-operation. 
Restricting the communication opportunity merely serves to increase 
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uncertainty and Nemeth (1970) argues that in such a 'mechanical' 
inter-action the norm of reciprocity may not occur. Subjects need 
to clarify possible motives underlying the selection of choices 
and Deutsch (1958) argues that subjects who have a competitive 
orientation have little commitment either to what they communicate 
or to trust their partner's response. 
However, when a financial incentive was introduced into the second 
experiment of the series, even limited communication opportunity 
after trial 31 elicited higher levels of co-operation from all 
subjects regardless of sex, an effect which increased over time. 
Men were more co-operative than women in this condition and this 
effect also increased over trial blocks. The view proposed in Chapter 
Six, that high levels of co-operation are due entirely to the presence 
of a financial incentive, was found to be too simplistic an 
explanation, since the results of Experiment 2 were not capable of 
replication by other experimenters. For, although limited 
communication elicited increased co-operation for all Ss in 
Experiment 3, no inter-action effects with the sex of S or time were 
demonstrated. In a balanced sex of E design (Expt. 4) a main 
communication effect was demonstrated which increased over time. 
No effects due to the availability of limited communication were noted 
when Experiment 2 was replicated using American subjects (Expt. 5) or 
when E was absent from the room during the subjects' inter-action 
(Expt. 6). Thus both the cultural background of the subject and 
the experimenter himself (herself) seem to influence the effects of 
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communication opportunity and the presence of a financial incentive 
is only one means of altering the meaning of the experimental 
situation. However, when the data from Experiments 2 - 4 were 
pooled in a multiple E design a significant main effect due to the 
communication availability after trial 31 was again noted, an 
effect which inter-acted with the duration of the inter-action. 
Thus, although even limited communication opportunity is mmre likely 
to elicit increased levels of co-operation with British subjects, 
and to do so more as the inter-action progresses, thfu effect has 
only been demonstrated in the presence of the experimenter. The 
effects of the communication availability are therefore probably 
dependent on the nature of the subjects' inter-action with the 
experimenter. 
Although communication availability may decrease uncertainty the conflict 
·inherent in the game or may not be ameliorated. The experimenter himself 
(herself) is a salient figure in determining the psychological 
environment in which the subjects' strategic inter-action occurs. 
10.2 The effects due to the sex of the dyad 
The sex variable has also been a popular area for study using 
experimental game methodology. However, as in the case of the 
communication variable, investigators have adopted a variety of 
procedures and employed games which differ structurally and 
conceptually. Hence, generalisations across situations should only 
be attempted with caution for whilst some researchers report sex 
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differences others do not. 
The most often published finding on P.O. is that males are more co-
operative than females, suggested by Bedell'and Sistrunk (1973) to 
be due to a differential sensitivity to the demand characteristics 
of the experiment. It will be remembered that Skotko et al (1974) 
extended this idea to include the sex of.the experimenter as they 
demonstrated that the extreme non-co-operation of female dyads only 
occurred in the presence of a ~ experimenter. 
The first experiment of the present series found no differences 
which could~be attributed to the sex of the dyad. Although these 
results did not concur with Hottes and Kahn's (1974) study on which 
the experiment was based, the experimenter in this instance was 
female. This factor supported the thesis put forward by Skotko et 
al (1974). However, when a financial incentive was introduced into 
the design (Expt. 2) men were more co-operative than women when 
allowed limited verbal communication after trial 31, an effect which 
increased with the duration of the inter-action, even though the 
experimenter was female. 
Initially it seemed that the presencecif both a financial incentive 
and restricted communication opportunity would explain the 
discrepant findings of Experiment 2 and the Skotko et al (1974) 
study. Again, such a view was found to be too ·simplistic for when 
Experiment 2 was replicated no main or inter-action effects due to 
the sex of the subject were noted (Expts. 3 and 4) nor were any 
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effects demonstrated when E was absent from the room during the 
subjects' inter-action (Expt. 6). American subjects on the other 
hand,in a single E design, performed more in accordance with the 
published literature (with the exception of the Skotko et al (1974) 
study). Males were more than twice as co-operative as females, even 
though the experimenter was female (and British). 
When the data from Experiments 2 - 4 were pooled in a multiple E 
desig~ female subjects were found to be less co-operative over trial 
blocks than males and were more likely to be so in the presence of 
a male experimenter. However, different experimenters were found to 
elicit different levels of co-operative responses from Ss regardless 
of sex and Rone of the above effects can be predicted in a single 
E design with any degree of confidence - at least with British 
subjects. It was suggested that, as for the communication variable, 
any differences due to the sex variable are probably elicited by 
aspects of the subjects' inter-action with the experimenter in 
multi-play P.o. 
Psychologically, the pool of subjects taking part in Experiments 2, 
3 and 4 were not in the same experiment at all and the experimenter 
himself (herself) serves to define the experimental context and the 
appropriateness of responses. It was noted that any theory which 
attempts to account for the differential sensitivity of males and 
females to experimental demand characteristics in multiple E designs 
must also be able to account for the differential sensitivity of all 
subjects in single E designs. As yet, no theory is able to do this 
adequately. 
10.3 Subjects' definition of 'the game being played' 
The findings from the present study strongly indicate that the 
subjects, regardless of sex, took part in psychologically 
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different experiments, although Expts. 2 - 4 were based on the same 
design. The formal theory is based on the assumption that both 
parties know each other's utility functions, preferences and 
attitude towards risk taking and that these are constant through-
out the inter-action. Howard (1976) has argued that what is 
required is a theory that can explain both the rational and the 
apparently irrational choices. 
Shaw and Thorslund (1975) noted that the traditional P.O. game 
is insensitive to the changeable dynamic aspects of inter-
personal conflicts. They found, fur example, that variable rewards 
and large rewards both alleviate boredom but that variable rewards 
do not increase individual differences as much as large rewards 
do. In the latter case some subjects become more co-operative 
whilst others become less so. Mess~, Dawson and Lane (1973) 
suggested that some subjects actually react negatively in high-
reward P.O. and perceive that they are being over-paid. Equity 
theory (e.g. Adams, 1965) predicts that subjects would alleviate 
such feelings by a strategy of mutual non-co-operation which would 
have the effect of minimising their earnings. Mess~ et al, in 
support of this, found that Ss who worked l~ hours on a task 
prior to playing P.O. were more co-operative on a hi~h-reward 
P.O. than on a low-reward P.O. The o~posite was found for Ss who 
only played the game, however, and this supports the idea that 
subjects have an internal standard of what constitutes 'fair 
I 
pay' for participation. Subjects in the present series of 
experiments may have thought the task of achieving 300 points was 
quite difficult and, therefore, the payment of £1 was fair. When 
offered a financial incentive (Expt. 2) they were more than twice 
as co-operative as in the no incentive condition (Expt. 1). 
Braver and Rohrer (1975) also found high levels of co-operation 
when Ss were told their partner had previously 1) played in a 
mutually co-operative game or 2) been an exploited martyr or 3) 
responded defensively in the face of his partner's continued 
competitive choices. Walster et al (1973) had earlier postulated 
that in situatio1of perceived unfairness or injustice an equity 
norm operates to restore positive outcomes to the recipients. 
Braver and Rohrer interpreted the behaviour of their subjects as 
being motivated by such an equity norm, especially in view of the 
high levels of co-operation noted when Ss were told that their 
partner had been an exploited martyr. This is consistent with 
Braver and Barnett (1974) who suggested that the perceived goal of 
the other strongly influences Ss' degree of co-operation. 
Kuhlman and Marshello (1975) noted that subjects adopt strategies 
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that effectively maximise the type of reward which is psychologically 
meaningful to them. They used four decomposed games where the 
subject has a set of n alternatives (inthfu. case, 3). Each 
alternative specifies the outcome both to S and to their partner. 
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Their subjects were assessed as having co-operative, competitive 
or individualistic orientations on the basis of their choices 
across the four games. So-called co-operative subjects co-operated 
with both a tit-for-tat and a lDD% programmed co-operation strategy 
but 'defected' with a lDD% programmed 'defection' strategy. 
Individualistically oriented Ss 'defected' against both lDD% co-
operation and defection strategies but co-operated with a tit-for-
tat strategy. Competitive subjects, however, 'defected' against 
all three strategies of the 'other player'. Kuhlman and Marshello 
found no differences in the numbers of men and women in any of the 
motivational categories and suggest, therefore, that there are no 
intrinsic differences between the sexes. This is consistent with 
the idea that the demand characteristics of the experiment, which 
include the experimenter, serve to define the appropriateness of 
responses, some of which may be sex-typed. 
Kelley and Stahelski (1970) looked at the effects of subjects' 
beliefs about their partner's intentions on P.O. They put forward 
the idea that the attribution of a co-operative or competitive 
orientation ori the part of the other player will be influenced by 
the Ss 1 owri iritenti,ons. In their 1 triangle hypothesis 1 Kelley and Stahelski 
argue that basically co-operative people are able to perceive 
others as co-operative, competitive or a mixture of both, whereas 
competitive Ss attribute only competitive intentions. Such a 
restricted view usually leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy as the 
partner is forced into the position of having to also compete 
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(unless he is willing to be a martyr). Many of the responses to 
the questionnnaire in this study indicated that competitive 
subjects do not appreciate how their own behaviour influences 
others. Eiser (1978) suggests that this perceptual difference may 
affect the kind of information such subjects look for in an unfamiliar 
strategic environment. In support of this, Eiser and Tajfel (1972) 
found that competitive subjects were less interested than co-
operative Ss in infering reasons for their partner's behaviour and 
more interested in controlling the outcomes. 
However, the structure of the game being played may be significant 
in this context. Miller and Holmes (1975), amongst others, have 
argued against a type of personality disposition affecting choices 
on P.o. They noie that on P.O. the meaning of the so-called 
'competitive' move is not always clear and whilst they were able to 
confirm the triangle hypothesis as occurring in traditional P.O. 
they could not do so on an expanded version which included both a 
'defensive' and a competitive move. 
The symbolic inter-actionists' view is that subjects will behave in 
socially defined situptions in such a way as to create favourable 
r 't t d 'd t't' 1 sx ua e 1 en 1 1es. The goal structure of P.O. is ambiguous and 
players may attempt to define moves in such a way that they may be 
seen to be either 'good players' or 'good persons. Ale~ander and 
Weil (1969) manipulated both the goal-ambiguity and the 
dispositional inferences implied by different choices. They found 
that the meaning of the moves in play changed greatly according to 
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the treatment and varied within treatments •. Regardless of the 
external experimental controls subjects put themselves in psycho-
logically different experimental conditions by their subjective 
decisions about the goal of the game. Alexander and WeLl( concluded 
that individuals are concerned about being good subjects and felt 
that subj sets 1 concerns about the formation of a situated identi ty:c· 
in the course of an experiment may be more pervasive in experimental 
social psychology in general than has previously been realised. 
strategies are likely to be chosen according to both the goals of 
S and the expectations of the other's behaviour. Harsanyi (1962) 
pointed out that stereotypic expectations of utilities are more 
likely between members of the same group or culture. However, we 
have seen from the present study that the presence of the experimenter 
serves in part to define the meaning of the situation and, hence, 
the appropriateness of responses. The experimenter has effectively 
changed the dyad into a triad and various factors may be responsible 
for affecting the performance of certain responses including sex-
role stereotypes. As Fraser (1978) points out in a discussion of 
group processes, "Two's a dyad, three's a small group" (p.l76). 
Ruble and Higgins (1976) argue that socialisation, institutional 
barriers and the immediate social situation all help to maintain 
the sex-role status quo. They support Lewin's (1935) suggestion 
that feelings of group membership may be influenced by social 
contexts - such as the sex composition of a group - which affect 
behaviour within that context. Hoffman and Maier (1961), for 
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example, found that women did better on a problem solving task in 
a mixed-sex group than in all female groups. Aries (1976) found 
that men were more able to talk about themselves and their feelings 
in mixed-sex groups but were more concerned with competition and 
status in an all male group. Female groups, on the other hand, 
tended to have a more personal orient.ation and allowed men to dominate 
in a mixed-sex group. The results from the sin~le E designs 
presented in the present study suggest that the general behaviour of 
the experimenter, regardless of sex, affects the performance of the 
sex-role stereotype under certain circumstances (e.g. when the 
author is E) whereas in a multiple E design female subjects were 
more likely to be less co-operative than men in the presence of a 
male E. 
10.4 Conclusions 
Subjects in general have different expectations, both of 'the game 
being played' and how their behaviour will be interpreted by E who 
is a participant - observer. Platt (1973) argues that the traditional 
P.O. paradigm creates a "social trap" where subjects have no guide-
lines for evaluating their behaviour and no ways of discovering the 
intentions of the other person. The rquasi-economic 1 pay-offs 
also have symbolic values which are unlikely to be psychologically 
equivalent (Eiser, 1978). Subjects often choose outcomes which will 
suffice, rather than choose the 'best' outcome as prescribed by the 
theory, as moral issues are often raised. 
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It remains to be convincingly explained why choosing the minimax 
strategy, o, is sex-typed. However, it seems that the presence of 
a male experimenter is more likely to enhance the salience of sex 
roles but a female E may produce the same effect. Colman {1982) 
has suggested that some experimenters induce a stronger feeling of 
revaluation apprehension' in female than in male Ss. Females may tend 
to choose 0 more frequently in order not to 1 lose 1 and thus appear 
more foolish than their partner. Rapoport and Chammah (1969) have 
also found a marked sex difference on Chicken with females choosing 
D more frequently than men. Hottes and Kahn {1974) argued that 
females respond defensively to the demand characteristics of the 
P.O. game and choose D - yet C is the gautious choice in:~Chicken. 
Colman {1982) argues that a 0 choice in both games ensures that the 
subject will not receive the 11 sucker 1 s 11 pay-off and suggests that 
women are more anxious than men to avoid appearing more foolish than 
their partners in certain circumstances. Not only is such a theory 
capable of empirical testing, it may also explain the variation in 
levels of co-operation elicited from subjects by different 
experimenters. It would remain to be discovered what attributes of 
E affected the 'evaluation apprehension' of subjects overall. 
The influence of the experimenter in determining subjective 
utilities (in terms of goals and expectations) would seem to be 
crucial and the context in which behaviour is evaluated can no longer 
be ignored by theory. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN : OVERVIEL1J 
This Chapter looks at the historical development of the experi-
mental gaming tradition in the absence of adequate theory. The 
gen~ralizability of findings to real life situations is discussed 
and current theoretical developments in social psychology are 
examined. The limitations of experimental games as models of 
social inter-action are noted but it is argued that gaming is 
only one of several methods available to aid in the understanding 
of human conflict. 
11.1 Historical perspe~tiv~ 
All the early research on co-operation and competition neglected 
220. 
the study of social inter-action. In addition, many of the investi-
gations had inadequate operational definitions and were conceptually 
weak. As noted earlier in Chapter One, the realisation that co-
operative and competitive interests could be linked followed the 
publication of 'Theory of Games and Economic Oehavior' by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944. Game matrices were felt by many 
researchers to precisely define an inter-dependent reward structure. 
The 11 mixed-motive 11 nature of conflict, so described by Schelling 
(1960), has had both methodological and theoretical impact. 
Deutsch (1980) has referied to conflict as a situation which 
11 exists whenever incom.P..~.~J:Ele activities occur" (p.lD) and Pruitt 
and Kimmel (1977) point and that not only do these games provide 
behavioural measures they also "permit conflict without tears 11 
(p.366). 
During the last 25 years Deutsch (1980) maintains that research has 
conceotratedon bargaining and negotiation behaviour in three main 
areas in order to answer the questions: 
1) under what conditions will players arrive at a mutually 
satisfactory outcome which will maximise joint pay-offs? 
221. 
2) under what conditions can one player bargain in order to do 
better than the other? 
3) what are the cognitive and normative factors involved in 
reaching a stable and 11 just 11 agreement'? 
In general Deutsch would argue that co-operative behaviour both 
elicits and is elicited by perceived similarities of the players, 
a readiness to be helpful and trusting and friendly behaviour, where-
as competitive behaviour induces and is induced by threats, 
deception, rigidity and so on. Various strategies are suggested 
for winning conflicts or increasing one's bargaining power, but they 
are complex and no systematic theory of social influence has been 
developed. However, the areas researched include 'ignorance', 
'toughness', 'belligerence' and 'bargaining power' and Deutsch 
argues that there is some support for surprising tactics in this 
area. It was seen in Chapter Nine that many researchers have 
begun to look at the determinants of an agreement between conflicting 
parties but Deut~ch (1980) points out that the principle of equity 
is only one of the many principles of 'distributive justice', and 
other moral issues may~be raised. 
Deutsch believes that in the last fifty years significant progress 
has been made both methodologically and empirically. The develop-
ment of experimental gaming and simulations has provided other areas 
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of social science with research tools •. In additiqn, many 
'common-sense' beliefs about bargaining have only turned out to be 
1 half truths' and we now understand more about conciliation, 
escalation and so on. However, Deutsch believes that this level 
of awareness does not begin to match the urgent social need for 
the .understanding, and management of conflict situations. The 
research tradition has also tended to neglect theorizing but, as 
many writers have pointed out, this is characteristic of much of 
experimental social psychology in general. 
11.2 Game theory 
Game theory assumes people are rational decision makers. It is a 
cognitive approach which provides guidelines for rational d~cisions 
making. It had been hoped that the theory would help to solve 
conflicts in real life but it was soon observed that much of 
human behaviour may not be guided solely by the principles of 
rationality. In game theoretic terms a solution is a statement of 
how people should play if the principles of rationality (guided 
by preferred outcomes) are followed. However, psychological 
variables such as motivation, morality, altruism and so on are not 
accounted for in the theory. Billig (1976) points out that these 
~e not necessarily mutually exclusive ~ith the assumption of 
rationality as it may simply be that people's utilities are 
difficult to calculate - they may still base their choices on the 
principle of maximising gains. Billig notes that a crucial 
difficulty is the measurement of rewards as one ends up with a 
223. 
circular statement where rewards are estimated according to 'what-
ever people do'. It was shown in Chapter One how subjects often 
make mutually disadvantageous choices by choosing the strictly 
dominating ~ational' strategy, D. 
Howard (1971, 1974) has attempted to extend the mathematical 
framework in the development of metag~mes. Many theorists now 
believe that metagame theory provides a rational solution to P.O. 
and other mixed-motive games but others disagree. The player 
chooses from a set of metastrategies which are conditi.onal on the 
expected choices of the other player. Rapoport (1976b). believes 
this is an 'escape from paradox' - the rational choices are 
prescribed in unambiguous form and the paradox appears to be 
resolved. However, the theory does not help a player choose a 
strategy if he does not know what the other will do. Nevertheless 
this may well be one area of theoretical development. 
Billig (1976) comments that there has been little attempt to 
improve the basic analysis of such games so that the 'solution' 
can prescribe mutual co-operation. He argues that,"The social 
world is not a neutral mathematical universe. The failure of Game 
Theoretic strategies to arrive at a common-sense solution to the 
prisoner's dilemma situation in a controlled laboratory situation 
is ample probf of that" (p. 197). We have seen that the same 
choices on a game matrix can have quite different subjective 
meanings and the matrix utilities cannot be assumed to be the 
players' utilities. Contingent and sudden shifts in strategy 
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both affect the play of the Other as, even in the absence of verbal 
communication opportunities, subjects interpret the meaning of the 
situation. The psychological importance of strategies needs to be 
determined. 
11.3 Generalizability of gaming situations 
The P.O. situation may well be typical of many everyday inter-
action sequences. Hamburger (1979) shows how may urgent economic 
and social problems can be usefully analysed as 'dilemma games'. 
Schelling (1960), in particular , has been influential in applying 
the conceptual framework of game b,heory to the analysis of inter-
national, political, social and economic situations. Coalition-
formation and voting have also attracted game-theoretic analysts 
and the games tend to reflect the increased complexity of such 
events. 
However, the case for the generalizability of gaming situations to 
real-life events has been the subject ofcriticismin recent years, 
especially since the formal theory "does not offer an adequate 
account even of behaviour in the games themselves" (p. 153; Eiser, 
1978). Rapoport (1968) considers that the ''laboratory phase ought 
to be considered as the incubation period of a ~cience" (p. 469), 
giving the opportunity for theory building which may (or may not) 
apply to real life. The question of the relevance to real life 
conflicts should, he believes, be postponed until after an intensive 
study of such games in their own right. Rapoport and Chammah (1965a) 
argue that simply because of its triviality P.O. may tap 'psycho-
logical propensities' better than a real life situation as the 
subjects are uncertain of the focus of the study. They argue 
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that as it is more difficult to present a front under such 
circumstances well-established habits are likely to be elicited. 
Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) argue that the reverse is more likely to 
be the case. They suggest that the findings on P.O. reflect 
behaviour in an unfamiliar strategic environment whose limitations 
actually encourage Ss to innovate rather than rehearse well-formed 
habits. 
Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) refer to experimental games as a research 
tradition which has been both loved and hated. Eiser (1978) 
likens Rapoport's approach to that of a gold prospector panning 
for gold in the same place without success for most of his life 
claiming he prospects there for the scenery! 
Wrightsman et al (1972) stated that they were unaware of any 
studies which compared the amount of co-operation elicited in a 
laboratory task with co-operation in real-life tasks. At that 
time only a few studies had looked at choices on matrix games 
and more life-like tasks even within a laboratory setting. 
Orwant and Drwant (1970) found that interpreted versions of P.O. 
matrices elicited significantly more co-operation than abstract 
versions. However, one of the difficulties with such studies is that 
pay-offs in the interpreted versions are unlikely to be isomorphic with 
the numberical pay-offs of the abstract versions and there is a large 
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body of literature to show that subjects are extremely sensitive 
to changes within the reward structure. Sermat (1970) concluded 
that if evidence of the ecological validity of laboratory game 
behaviour can not be presented then "the theoretical contribution 
of game research may have to be stated in,o.ther terms than its 
relevance to inter-personal behaviour in real-life situationstt 
(p. 108). 
Eiser and Bhavnani (1974) introduced contextual variations in the 
Ss' perceptions of the context of the game, viz., no further infor-
mation; a simulation of economio bargaining, a simulation of 
international negotiations; a study of friendly or unfriendly 
interactions. The frequency of C choices in both the !economic' 
and no information conditions was similar to that usually reported 
in the literature. However, there were significantly higher levels 
of co-operative choices made in :,the 1 inter-personal' and 1 inter-
national' conditions. Eiser and 1:3havnani concluded that extra-
polations to real life situations "must depend for their validity 
at least partly on wh~ther the subjects themselves interpret the 
game as symbolic of the situations in questionn (p. 97). 
Hamburger (1979) argues that the application of game analysis at 
least provides insight into social behaviour in real world events. 
However, he adds one or two notes of caution to looking at 
inter-active situations as games to see how they may be played. 
One common error is to treat a variable sum game as if it were a 
pure conflict game (this, he notes, often happens'in real-life 
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inter-actions). Another difficulty is working out who the players 
are in the inter-action - there may be many nations against others 
or within-nation manoevering involved. Players may make mistakes 
by over-looking alternatives or by confusing alternatives and their 
utilities may change during the inter-action althou~h the theory 
assumes that utilities are constant. Hamburger also considers 
that the theory may have tm be revised to include these psycho-
logical variables, even in laboratory dyadic inter-actions. 
-Colman (1979) has been able to lo~k at the behaviour or subjects 
in abstract andlife-like tasks which possessed strategically 
identical structures. Colman's hypothes.is, that life-like 
simulations would elicit even fewer C choices than abstract 
versions, was confirmed using both Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma 
games. Colman noted that the frequency of C choices was often 
determined by 'strategically irrelevant psychological factors' and 
suggested that the ecological validity of abstract games must 
depend in part on the psychological features of the real-life 
interactions to which the experiments are generalised. 
The relevance of interpersonal studies to the study of inter-
~roup relations also needs to be investigated; many researchers 
assume an interpersonal model is valid as a model for ~roader 
inter-group processes. However Billig (1976) points out that a 
strong element of reductionism is involved in the analysis of the 
social context of decision making, studies of interpersonal 
bargaining and simulated conflict. This reductionist tendency, 
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argues Billig, has prevented both a wider social analysis and 
attempts to investigate the 'ideological roots of rationality'. 
11.4 Current trends in social psychology 
nFacts 11 in social psychology may be produced only by the methods 
designed to produce them, argues Armistead (1974a)~~·In the 1970's 
it was becoming more accepted that 11 subjects 11 are constrained by 
the experimental situation with the experimenter determining the 
content of the session. Mixon (1974) has pointed out that an 
experiment is a 'situation of almost unrivalled compliance'. 
Armistead asks, 11 Can we accept that the social psychologist is not 
creating reality, rather than discovering it'?" (p. 18) and, 11 In 
general, can you quantify the nature of a person's experience, his 
interpretation of his surroundings, the meaning of his statements, 
the nature of his emotions? 11 (p. 19). For example, important 
questions about the nature and meaning of conflict phenomena may 
be ignored when variationsin conflict behaviourare studied. 
Armistead argues that social psychologists often construct a social 
reality out of what is available and there is a tendency to assume 
that the investigations are value free rather than acknowledging 
the effects that values have on research. 
Ring (1967) has criticised the social psychologists' 'fun and 
games' attitude to experimentation and Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) 
point out that~"Researchers often seem to start with the experi-
mental games and ask questions secondarily about what to study" 
( p. 369). They add that the sex variable is an example of this 
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and it may seem that the present study is no exception. However, 
although the convenient research design is no doubt one of the 
reasons why experimental games have generated so much empirical 
research, replications have been rare. This may partly explain 
why the issue of "meaning" in experimental conflict was able to be 
shelved for so long. 
The reductionist approach of the §~baviourist tradition tended to 
focus on regularities of behaviour and to make generalizations that 
could be quantified. Armistead (1974b) believes that a person's 
experience of a situation is an important topic in its own right 
in the study of social behaviour. We have seen from the present 
study that apparently similar behaviour has quite different 
meanings for different players in different circumstances. 
Armistead argues for the use of "primary" data - people's own 
accounts of their experiences through more or less structured 
methods. Introspection, diaries, interviews and discussions may 
all play a part. Armstead (1974b) argues that what people say 
about their experiences is a public event i.e. it is repeatable arid 
is amenable to assessment by observers in the same way as 'reaction 
times and ticks on questionnnaires'. Although such accounts will 
be more ambigubus Armistead, and others, argue that the dimension 
of meaning can no longer be ignored. 
However, safeguards are suggested in devising generalizations from 
experimental data. Toch (1972) and others explored the experience 
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of violent men by 'stepping into their shoes' and attempting to 
reconstruct their (unique) perspectives. Interviewers were peers 
rather than social scientists and they were also involved in the 
analysis of the data as they were familiar with the context of the 
behaviour. Inthe final analysis, Tach's summaries were discussed 
together by a group of people in otder to begin constructing a 
typology and to attempt to make valid and acceptable generalizations 
and explanations. 
Most critics of contemporary social psychological research would 
agree with Heritage's (1974) assertion regarding the context of 
an individual's actions. He argues that researchers may not 
substitute the experimenter's view of the situation however 
irrational the subjects construction might appear to be. The 
history of an individual's social milieu and his personal develop-
ment within this milieu is part of the explanation of social action, 
(Harr;, 1974). In his article 'Blueprint for a new science' he 
introduces the concept of ethogeny - the study of human lives as 
~hey are really lived. Harrfi distinguishes three patterns 
of social action~ 1) formal episodes where the individual is a 
free agent deliberately following known rules; 2) biological 
episodes where the individual is a spectator of physiological 
mechanisms; 3) enigmatic episodes. These refer to most human 
experiences in that we do not understand the origins of the 
episodes or how they are produced and a psychological pompq~sht is 
necessary. Harre argues that scenarios replicating reality can be 
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constructed which introduce the dimension of social meaning and 
which can aid the .understanding of the nature of the episode 
in question. 
In much the same vein, Mixon (1974) has observed that the 
naturalistic experiment is also limited in the study of social 
rules and roles. However, he argues that role-playing is a very 
flexible technique that can be used in any rule-context to under-
stand social episodes. He considers that social psychologists 
have been too concerned with making general observations about 
groups of people based on average scores. Such data a~e invariably 
affected by extreme scores and overgeneralizations, which would 
not be tolerated if they were the observations of a 11 bigoted 11 lay-
man, are likely to occur. 
There is, of course, also the danger of 'throwing the baby out with 
the bath water' and perhaps what many are arguing for is simply 
a broader basis for the study of social inter-action. The area of 
mixed-motive conflict has been method-bound in the absence of a 
comprehensive and adequate theory. But it has not been alone in 
this. Mixon (1974) argues that laboratory methods favoured by 
social:psychologists in general simply provide people with only one 
role,that of experimental subject within a single rule-context 
(the psychological experiment). We have seen from the present series 
oF experiments that there are large individual differences in 
people's behaviour even in such a restricted social situation as 
the P.O. game. Such individual differences within a group are as 
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psychologicallly meaningful as the group differences. A laboratory 
experiment is, after all, a special type of social situation where 
the experimenter is invested with a considerable amount of authority 
and where the person playing the role of experimental subject does 
what he believes is appropriate in that context. 
11.5 Conclusions 
Billig (1976) points out that even though experimental situations 
are contrived and controlled the subjects are not. The experi-
mental situation is itself social and operates according to a rule 
structure. There has been a shift in empha~isaway from collecting 
quantitative data in studies of experimental conflict to under-
standing why people behave as they do in such situations. Thus, 
there is now more interest in Prisoner's Dilemma as an experimental 
situation per se. However, it is important to remember that a 
conventional experiment is only of limited use and should not dictate 
the kinds of questions posed. 
Deutsch (1980) points out that the reliance on experimental games 
in:the study of conflict has led to~the neglect of processes 
involved in the development of inter- and intra-group conflict. 
However, he notes that these limitations can be supplemented by 
other procedures and he includes field ~tudiesin this. 
Pruitt and~Kimmel (1977) believe, as does the author,that there 
is continuity between what occurs in the laboratory and in real 
life. They suggest that measures of goals and expectations should 
be routinely introduced into future P.O. designs which should 
attempt to investigate how people collect information about 
their partner's intentions and expectations. Certainly,studying 
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how participant.-observers (e.g. experimenters) influence subjects' 
interpretations of the P.O. situation is worthy of further investi-
gation · as so much of social behaviour depends on how people believe 
their actions will be interpreted and evaluated by others. 
Rosenthal (1966) has documented evidence of investigator bias, but 
the author is unaware of any research other than that of Skotko et 
al (1974) which has attempted to look at the influence of E in 
choices on P.o. 
In any event, we can no longer assume that P.o. research undertaken 
in the U.S.A. is necessarily applicable here and there is a need 
for replications to be carried out as a matter of routine. A more 
rigorous use of control groups would obviously be necessary in any 
further study. The large variation between dyad scores in any 
treatment group (also noted by Gibbs, 1972) suggests that each 
inter-action is worth studying in its own right, perhaps under 
certain circumstances using the systematic observation and analysis 
techniques currently gaining favour in the Behavioural Sciences. 
Mixon (1974) argues strongly in favour of role-play for use in the 
systematic exploration of social episodes, for example. In any 
event, conclusions emanating from the laboratory require 
verification in a variety of naturalistic settings. 
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The laboratory situation is not necessarily invalid if the relevant 
variables and demand characteristics have been properly understood. 
This has clearly not been the case in the history of experimental 
games and, as Eiser (1980) comments: 11 Almost in spite of itself, 
gaming research has provided evidence of the ability and apparent 
need of individuals to invest novel situations with evaluative 
meaning, even where researchers have attempted to remove all such 
meaning from the experimental context. Gaming research was founded 
on the assumption that co-operative and competitive behaviour is 
under the control bf outcome contingencies. Yet, paradoxically, 
it is the gaming literature itself that provides the most direct 
evidence of the inadequacy of any analysis based purely upon a 
definition of pay-off structure, without consideration of hmw that 
structure, and more general features of the experimental situation, 
are interpreted by the subjects themselves 11 (p. 197). 
Alexander and Weil recommended as early as 1969 that attention 
should be focused both on the meanings that subjects attach to the 
situations they confront and to the dispositional characteristics 
implied by their actions within that context. They concluded, 0 If 
we pursue the questions of situational meaning and situated 
identity we may discover that people inside and outside the 
laboratory are responding primarily to the meanings they believe 
others will attach to their behaviours" (p. 141). 
Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) argue that theory building rather than 
theory testing must now take priority in the field of strategic 
235. 
inter-action. For some years researchers have been demonstrating 
that subjects do not always behave 'rationally' in the game 
theoretic sense yet they have not revised the concept of rationality. 
The context in which behaviour occurs can no longer be ignored by 
the theory. The present study indicated that even in an artificial 
laboratory environment subjects define. the situation for them-
selves within that context. The presence of observers also helps 
to define the psychological environment in which the strategic 
inter-action occurs. Information about subjective utilities and 
how players believe their behaviour will be evaluated is necessary 
in order to develop an adequate theory to explain the inter-action 
between the social structures and the cognitive processes of 
participants. What is required is a coherent theory capable of 
explaining interpersonal behaviour in a variety of settings of which 
the laboratory environment is just one. 
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Appendix 1 
f-1ECORD SHEET 
Name 
1. 
+ 
Appendix 11 
Post-Experimental Questionnair_e_ 
• • • • o • • • • • • o • • • • • o • • • • o o o • o o • o o o • • o e o • 
How much did your partner's choices affect the choices 
you made? 
258. 
2. How much do you think you would like your partner personally? 
+ 
3. How much did the communication between the two of you 
influence the choices you made? 
+ 
4. How much influence did you have over the points your partner 
made? 
+ 
5. How much mr how often did you try to give your partner what 
he gave you? 
+ 
6. Did you use a strategy in this experiment? If so, what was it? 
7. What expectations did you have of your partner's strategy? 
B. Did your partner use a strategy in this experiment? If so, 
what was it? Did it confirm or deny your ~xpectations? 
9. How did you determine your choices? 
10. How concerned were you with your partner's score? Did you 
have a preference for the·outcome of the game? 
259. 
Appendix Ill 
Co-operation Raw Scores (Expt. 1J 
-· 
Trial Block 
Pairing Communication 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Opportunity 
--
20 24 11 8 5 5 
10 7 5 14 45 25 
0 18 7 0 0 0 0 
27 8 16 10 17 11 
21 13 7 4 3 2 
32 32 39 27 33 32 
10 1 2 1 0 0 
1 15 14 6 11 8 5 
28 22 26 16 26 18 
39 38 41 26 7 7 
!VIf~ 
1 54 60 60 60 60 
15 8 9 7 3 18 
31 14 13 5 8 8 6 
15 17 15 17 12 13 
7 0 0 0 0 0 
19 16 28 42 26 25 
24 6 5 4 4 4 
T 37 8 4 48 60 60 
24 60 60 60 60 60 
60 60 60 60 60 60 
- --
260. 
Trial Block 
Pairing Communication 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Opportunity 
18 16 4 9 12 8 
26 13 19 9 10 ll 
0 23 24 25 17 15 15 
24 24 27 20 16 16 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
19 12 13 21 24 18 
17 20 19 22 16 22 
1 20 22 29 20 ll 12 
12 37 24 21 11 20 
26 21 14 14 17 6 
FF 
19 20 9 3 3 0 
20 8 6 2 6 12 
31 18 l 0 0 0 18 
18 l 0 0 0 0 
27 23 17 10 22 13 
-
' 
11 4 13 7 6 7 
28 19 21 21 21 18 
T 24 17 21 18 15 12 
25 23 11 13 10 39 
27 24 22 59 60 60 
261. 
Trial Block 
Pairing Communication 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Opportunity 
19 1 0 0 0 0 
20 17 7 15 9 9 
0 13 26 5 23 9 7 
22 9 6 5 4 3 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
~~ 0 0 6 53 40 
21 13 17 10 12 4 
1 25 17. 11 6'. l 0 
16 23 17 20 11 25 
9 16 1 5 22 18 
IVJr--
12 1 0 2 3 0 
26 9 4 0 6 17 
31 34 38 25 23 10 27 
16 3 25 10 3 2 
16 57 57 L~3 44 52 
54 1-f-2 51 60 60 60 
28 25 32 18 12 23 
T 4 0 0 0 0 0 
56 56 56 60 60 60 
41 60 60 60 60 60 
a. 
HSD 
b. ~-l 
H S D ·:::::t::=. 
Appendix IV 
Co_me_utations !~.E.. :th.e_ .J.u.key Tes..l 
The effects of communication opportunity 
(.1... = 0.05) 
Communication treatment 
T 
1 
31 
0 
f~eans 
32.42 
17.17 
1t~.96 
10.86 
qr [o( , nr' df] ~~~..E. 
3.63 ~ 
8.68 
The effects of sex of dyad on 'imitation' 
( d.. = 0.05) 
Sex_~ad 
f~F 
r~r~ 
FF 
3.31 fl~ 
20 
means 
0.81 
o. 77 
0.71 
262. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
~· 
Communication 
·~14.35 
Expt .• 2. 
Financial 
Incentiv~ 
0 
HSD .=a:: ~~. 62 
~- 9.24 
263. 
Communication over trial blocks ( J... - 0.05) 
Trial Blocks 
Incentive over trial blocks ( d... = 0.05) 
1 
17.20 
22.55 
Trial Blocks 
2 3 4 
14.05 11.75 9.9 
29.45 29.45 33.95 
11.85 
34.45 
6 
11.65 
36.35 
,;..P~o~o;;;;.1e;;;..d;;;.....;d;;.;;a;;.;;t;.;;:a"---"---E=·~. 2 - 4 The effects of the experimenter on 
per cent l3 choices (ol..~o.o5) 
DiE..t· 
2 
3 
4a 
4b 
HSD ~ 3.85 
~ 13.54 
Means 
---
66.5 
62.7 
53.5 
51.8 
1247.5 
.j~ 
f. Poo~ Expts. 2 and 5 
g. 
Treatment 
USA x f'~M 
UK x ~1~1 
UK x FF 
USA x FF 
HSD ~ 3.63 /87.38 
...; -8.89 
~11.38 
Pooled data Expts. 2 and 6 
Treatment 
MIVJ X 31 X [2 
FF x 31 X [6 
r•lM X 31 X E6 
FF X 31 X E2 
FF X 0 X E2 
FF X 0 X E 6 
Mr1 X 0 X E 6 
r~r~1 x 0 X E2 
HSD ·-"- 4. 36 104.44 
4.71 
~ 20.53 
50.02 
35.13 
26.92 
22.92 
264. 
(using harmonic mean~) 
mean 
49.57 
37.88 
28.29 
27.37 
26.47 
23.57 
23.17 
20.70 
"'--(using harmonic mean n) 
265. 
Appendix V 
Communication Data 
a. ~t._1 
Mf·1 £§irs, treat.m.~nt 1 
Four of the five dyads made use of the opportunity to communicate, 
although only briefly. None mentioned strategy although E's 
impression was that the verbal interaction, when it occured, was 
more friendly than for the female dyads in the same condition. 
MM pairs 2 treatment 31 
Again four of the five dyads made use of this opportunity to verbally 
communicate, and all discussed possible strategies (lending support 
to the notion that some subjects may have a better understanding of 
the task at this stage). Only one pair thought that a 'play A' 
strategy was best for both whilst another pair thought that a 'play 
B' strategy was best. No dyads suggested imitation as a strategy. 
Total co-operation was highest in the pair who agreed to press A 
(295/360) and almost non-existent (7/360) in the pakwho did not 
make use of the opportunity to talk, supporting the 'common sense' 
view that !!!_;~jn~ of communication opportunities facilitates co-
operative behaviour. 
MM pairs, treatment T 
All five dyads made use of the opportunity to communicate, with four 
pairs directly mentioning a 'play A' joint strategy, although several 
pairs lapsed into long silences. Two pairs agreed to press A almost 
immediately, having the highest co-operation scores (360/360) and 
(324/360), another pair agreed to press A half-way through the 
game (217/360) and the fourth pair agreed to press A but both 
266. 
defected on the next trial and did not resume negotiations (156/ 
360). The fifth pair spoke briefly, lapsing into silence with-
out mentioning any strategy, and had the lowest amount of co-
operation in any dyad in this condition (47/360). Again, this 
supports the notion that it is how the opportunities to 
communicate are used that is important. 
FF pairs, treatment 1 
Only two of the five dyads engaged in verbal communication and 
neither of these mentioned strategy·directly, although one subject 
suggested the task was a game which could be worked out mathematically. 
In both cases the conversations were brief. 
FF pairs, treatment 31 . 
Only one pair spoke and then briefly, without mentioning possible 
strategies. Three of the other four pairs laughed with embarrassment 
and said nothing. These pairs of females did not utilise the 
communication opportunity either in a social sense or in the context 
of the task. 
FF pairs, treatment T 
Two of the five dyads spoke and then only briefly. Only one of these 
mentioned strategy at all, and although they agreed to press A they 
did not keep to the agreement or resume the diac~ssion although they 
had opportunities to do so. Again the opportunities to communicate 
were not utilised effectively, even in a social sense. 
267. 
MF pairs, treatment 1 
Four of the five pairs spoke, with the males in all cases 
initiating the conversation. However, none mentioned strategy 
(either imitative or co-operative). Total co-operative choices 
tended to be higher where a 'friendly chat' occurred throughout 
the three minutes (112/360 and 103/360) and lowest (60/360) when 
silence occurred. 
MF pairs, treatment 31 
All of the dyads spoke in this condition with females initiating 
the conversation in four of the cases. Four of the pairs discussed 
strategy, one pair agreed to press A, another pair agreed to 
alternate (imitate?) between A and B and two pairs agreed to press 
B. Not surprisingly, perhaps, co-operation was highest in the 
pair who agreed to press A. Of the four females who discussed 
strategy, one said the task depended on competition (and then 
agreed to press A), two suggested pressing 8 in case the men got 
bored with pressing A (?) and one could not decide on the 'best' 
choice. Such findings lend tentative support to the idea that 
females are not as perceptive to the strategic elements of the 
situation. Of the four males, however, one suggested pressing A, 
two acquiesced to the female suggestion to press B (although they 
felt that A was the best 'solution') and one could_not decide. 
This is consistent with the notion that men are 'pulled down' in 
mixed-sex dyads. 
260. 
MF pairs, treatment T 
However, rather surprisingly perhaps, only three of the five pairs 
who were unrestricted in the amount of communication allowed 
actually took advantage of this at ~ point in the session. Of 
these, two females and one male initiated the conversations, but 
males in all cases suggested the 'play A' strategy which was agreed 
to by the females, although we cannot be certain that females did 
not think of this option for themselves but waited for the male to 
'take the lead'. 
b. Expt. 2 
MM pairs 
Four of the five pairs in treatment 31 made use of the opportunity 
to talk to their partners. All of these four pairs mentioned 
pressing A as possibly being the best joint strategy, although one 
pair did not reach the agreement before play was resumed. Two of 
the pairs wondered whether it was allowed to discuss strategies or 
if it was •against the rules" - they were not, of course, given 
any feedback by E. Both members of the pair that remained silent 
agreed afterwards that they thought they could not talk about the 
experiment and there was therefore no point in talking. The 
total co-operation (195/360) was substantially lower than in the 
other subject pairings. 
FF pairs 
As with the male dyads four of the five pairs allowed to talk after 
trial 31 actually did so. H~wever, they did not use the time in 
the same way as the MM pairs. Only two of the dyads mentioned 
pressing A and, of these, one pair queried whether they could 
talk about the task and could not reach an agreement and the 
other pair decided it was more fun not to both press A but 
instead to "try not to press B together"! Such a decision 
269. 
might well rest on the attractiveness of the financial alternative 
as an alternative to having fun with the game. However, Hottes 
and Kahn (1974) found that even a personally relevant 1carrot 1 
(a course credit) did not influence women to be co-operative. 
The three remaining pairs, including the pair who remained silent, 
reported that they thought they could not talk about the task. 
c. Expt. 4 
a) Male E 
MM pairs 
All five pairs made use of the opportunity to communicate. Three 
of the pairs mentioned pressing A and, of these, two pairs made 
an agreement to both press A (total co-operation = 343 & 321) 
whilst one pair did not resolve the dilemma (total co-operation = 
249). A fourth pair talked about tutorials and said the task was 
"not exactly taxing". Discussion afterwards revealed that they 
had held an implicit assumption before the 31st trial that mutual 
AA was the best choice for both (total co-operation = 358). 
Total co-operation was lowest (130) in the fifth pair who had no 
such assumptions and used the three minutes to talk about 
lectures. 
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F'F pairs 
All five pairs made use of the opportunity to communicate, 
although two pairs said very little. Of these, one pair simply 
said, 11Hellon and another pair agreed that it was "tricky when 
you can't see who you·' re talking to 11 • Total co-operation for 
these pairs was 103 and 19 respectively. A third pair talked 
about the accumulating scores with one saying she did not see the 
point of it and the other suggesting that it was something to do 
with risk. This was followed by silence; total co-operation was 
136 in this pair. The remaining two pairs talked about pressing 
A, with one pair making a firm agreement to do so (total co-
oerpation = 321). The other pair made no such joint decision, but 
agreed that the task was not competitive (total co-operation = 331). 
b) Female E 
MM pairs 
Four of the five pairs spoke, all of whom mentioned pressing A as 
a possible strategy. Three of these pairs made an agreement to 
press A, having total co-operation scores of 3161 351 and 312. The 
fourth pair did not made an agreement as one S said he did not trust 
the other to press A (total co-operation= 221). The fifth pair 
who sat in silence had a slightly higher level of co-operation 
(267) than the pair who stated that they did not trust each other. 
This suggests that it is necessary to specify the content of any 
communication that S's engage in rather than assume that it will 
be used to their advantage~ 
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FF pairs 
Only three of the five pairs in treatment 31 actually spoke to 
each other, all of whom mentioned pressing A. Two of these 
pairs made an agreement to press A (total co-operation = 329 and 
323) although the highest number of co-operative choices (358) 
was made by a pair who did not talk at all as they had made an 
implicit agreement to press A before the 31st trial. Again the 
Quality of the communication seems to be important as in the case 
of the third pair who talked to each other one S reported feeling 
"antagonistic" towards her partner. The other subject had 
suggested pressing A, but S was not convinced. The other subject 
said it should be obvious and S did not like "her attitude". 
However, this pair co-operated more than the fifth pair who did not 
make use of the communication opportunity and had no implicit 
assumptions about the nature of the task. 
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Appendix· Vl 
Imitation Scores Proportions (Expt. 1) 
Pairing Communication Trial Block 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0.517 0.633 o.8oo 0.867 0.900 0.933 
0.517 o.soo 0.550 o. 717 0.600 0.667 
0 0.552 0.767 ' 1. 000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.741 0.767 0.833 0.867 0.667 0.700 
0.534 0.667 0.667 0.767 0.900 0.833 
0.582 0.600 0.517 0.483 0.617 0.583 
0.655 0.967 0.950 0.950 1.000 1.000 
1 0.621 0.633 0.800 0.767 0.767 0.867 
0.534 0.483 0.567 0.667 0.583 0.617 
0.672 0.467 0.633 0.550 0.750 0.817 
MM 
0.638 0.767 o. 750 0.767 0.900 0.783 
0.983 0.967 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
31 0.776 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0 .• 655 0.683 0.833 0.733 0.767 o.8oo 
0.569 0.567 0.567 0.500 0.633 0.677 
0.603 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
T 0.724 o. 750 0.850 0.967 1.000 1.000 
0.431 o.8oo 0.867 0.867 0.900 0.867 
0.638 0.667 0.617 0.650 0.400 0.350 
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Pairing Communication Trial Block 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 5 6 
9.&69 0.717 0.633 0.583 0.717 0.733 
0.552 0.717 0.533 0.667 0.717 0.700 
0 0.534 0.650 0.517 o. 717 0.717 0.617 
0.638 o. 750 0.867 0.700 0.717 0.750 
0.914 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.707 0.583 0.633 0.583 0.667 0.667 
0.552 0.700 0.567 0.550 0.700 0.650 
1 0.569 0.550 0.633 0.433 0.633 0.583 
0.569 0.667 0.617 0.600 0.600 0.717 
0.517 0.567 0.683 0.617 0.500 o.soo 
FF 
o. 569 0.533 0.767 0.900 0.900 1.000 
0.603 0.783 0.883 0.917 0.867 0.783 
31 0.741 0.967 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.417 
0.707 0.967 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.534 0.600 0.683 0.800 0.617 0.717 
0.724 0.850 0.783 0.750 0.833 0.833 
0.414 0.550 0.533 0.533 0.517 0.583 
T 0.483 0.500 0.633 0.617 0.633 0.617 
0.655 0.800 0.833 0.850 0.883 0.783 
0.431 0.383 0.617 0.967 1.000 1.000, 
274. 
Pairing . Communication Trial Block 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0.638 0.967 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.552 0.567 0.750 0.500 0.700 0.767 
0 0.690 0.500 0.833 0.700 0.833 0.800 
0.621 0.733 0.767 0.867 0.867 0.900 
0.966 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.500 0.667 0.700 0.683 0.717 0.733 
0.707 0.733 0.967 0.967 0.667 0.867 
1 0.862 1.000 1.000 0.867 0.783 0.550 
0.603 0.583 0.667 0.817 0.967 1.000 
0.690 0.817 0.700 0.400 . 0.783 0.917 
Mf 
0.534 0.767 0.867 1.000 o.817 0.817 
0.655 0.967 1.000 0.933 0.967 1.000 
31 0~534 0.500 0.617 0.617 0.683 0.383 
0.603 0.883 0.817 0.717 0.917 0.950 
0.517 0.917 0.900 0.567 0.617 0.767 
0.897 1 •. ooo 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.897 0.933 0.933 1.000 1.000 1.000 
T 0.879 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.931 a. 750 0.817 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.552 0.483 0.617 0.667 0.767 0.483 
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Appendix Vll 
Imitation and Co-operation : Raw Scores 
a. Expt. 1 
Pairing 
MF MM FF 
Block Coop. Imit. Coop. Imit. Coop. I mit 
1 19 0.638 20 0.534 18 0.638 
20 0.552 10 0.741 26 0.534 
13 0.690 18 0,552 23 0.552 
22 0.621 27 0.517 24 0.569 
1 0.966 21 0.517 3 0.914 
4 0.862 32 0.552 19 0.569 
21 0.690 10 0.655 17 0.569 
25 0.603 15 0.621 20 0.552 
16 0.500 28 0.534 12 0.707 
9 o.?o? 39 0.672 26 0.517 
12 0,655 1 0.983 19 0.569 
26 0.534 15 0,638 20 0.603 
34 0,534 14 0.655 18 0.741 
16 0.603 15 0.569 18 0.707 
16 0.517 7 o. 776 27 0,534 
54 0.931 19 0.638 11 0.724 
28 0.552 24 0.431 28 0.414 
4 0.879 37 0,724 24 0.483 
56 0.897 24 0.603 25 0.655 
41 0.897 60 1.000 27 0.431 
2 1 0.967 24 0.667 16 0.750 
17 0.567 7 0.767 13 0.650 
26 0.500 7 0,767 24 o. 717 9 0.733 8 0,800 24 0.717 0 1.000 13 0.633 0 1.000 0 1.000 32 0.600 12 0.667 13 0.817 1 0,967 20 0.550 17 0.583 14 0,633 22 0.700 23 0.667 22 0,483 37 0.583 16 0.733 38 0,467 31 0.567 1 0.967 54 0.967 20 0.533 9 Oe767 8 0.767 8 0.783 38 0.500 13 0.683 1 0.967 3 0.883 17 0.567 1 0.967 57 0.917 0 1.000 23 0.600 42 0.750 16 0.667 4 0.850 25 0.483 6 0,800 . 19 0.550 0 1.000 8 0.750 17 0.500 56 0.933 60 1.000 23 o.aoo 60 1.000 60 1.ooo 24 0.383 
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Pairing 
MF M FF 
Block Coop. Imit. Coop. Imit. Coop. Imit. 
' 
3 0 1.000 11 0.667' 4 0.867 
7 0.750 5 0.833 19 0.517 
5 0.833 0 1.000 25 0.533 
6 0.767 16 0.550 27 0.633 
0 1.000 7 0.800 0 1.000 
0 1.000 39 0.517 13 0.617 
17 0.700 2 0.950 19 0.633 
11 0.667 6 0.800 29 0.567 
17 0.700 26 0.567 24 0.633 
l 0.9_67 41 0.633 14 0.683 
0 1.000 60 1.000 9 0.767 
4 0.867 9 0.750 6 0.883 
25 0.617 5 0.833 0 1.000 
25 0.817 15 0.567 0 1.000 
57 0.900 0 1.000 17 0.683 
51 0.817 28 0.617 13 0.783 
32 0.617 5 0.867 21 0.533 
0 1.000 4 0.850 21 0.633 
56 0.933 60 1.000 11 0.83:3 
60 1.000 60 1.000 22 0.617 
4 0 1.000 8 0.767 9 0.700 
15 0.500 14 0.867 9 o. 717 
23 0.700 0 1.000 17 0.667 
5 0.867 10 o. 717 20 0.583 
0 1.000 4 0.867 0 1.000 
6 0.867 27 0.483 21 0.600 
10 0.400 l 0.950 22 0.433 
6 0.817 11 0.767 20 0.550 
20 0.683 16 0.667 21 0.583 
5 0.967 26 0.550 14 0.617 
2 0.933 60 1.000 3 0.900 
0 1.000 7 0.767 2 0.917 
23 0.617 8 o. 733 0 1.ooo 
10 0.717 17 o.soo 0 1.000 
43 0.567 0 1.000 10 o.soo 
60 1.000 42 0.650 7 0.750 
18 0.667 4 0.867 21 0.533 
0 1.000 48 0.967 18 0.617 
60 1.000 60 l.OOO 13 0.850 
60 1.000 60 1.000 59 0.967 
277. 
Pairing 
Mf MM ff 
Block Coop, Imit. Coop. Imit, Coop. I mit, 
5 0 1,000 5 0,900 12 0,717 
9 0,700 45 0,667 10 0.717 
9 0.833 0 1.000 15 o. 717 
4 0.867 17 0,600 16 0.717 
0 1.000 3 0,900 0 1.000 
53 0,783 33 0,617 24 0,600 
12 0.783 0 1.000 16 0.633 
1 0,967 8 0,767 11 0,700 
11 0.717 26 0,583 11 0.667 
22 0.667 7 0.750 17 0,500 
3 0.967 60 1.000 3 0,900 
6 0,817 3 0,900 6 0,867 
10 0.683 8 0.767 0 1.ooo 
3 0.917 12 0.633 0 1.000 
44 0.617 0 1,000 22 0,617 
60 1.000 26 0,400 6. 0,833 
12 0,767 4 o. 900 ~ 21 0.517 
0 1.000 60 1.000 15 0.633 
60 1.000 60 1.000 . 10 0.883 
60 1.000 60 1,000 60 1.ooo 
6 0 1,000 5 0.833 . 8 0.750 
9 0.767 25 0,700 ll 0.617 
7 0,800 0 1,000 15 0,700 
3 0,900 11 0,667 16 0,733 
0 1.000 2 0,933 0 1.00Q 
40 0,550 32 0,583 18 0.717 
4 0.917 0 1.000 22 0,583 
0 1.000 5 0,867 12 0,650 
25 0.733 18 0,617 20 0,667 
18 0.867 7 0.817 6 0.800 
0 1.ooo 60 1.ooo 0 1.000 
17 0,817 18 0.783 12 0.783 
27 0,383 6 0,800 18 0.417 
2 0,950 13 0,667 0 1.000 
52 0.767 0 1.ooo 13 o. 717 
60 1.000 25 0,350 7 0,833 
23 0.483 4 0,867 18 0.583 
0 1.000 60 1,000 12 0.617 
60 1.ooo 60 1.000 39 0.783 60 1.000 60 1.000 60 1,000 
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b. Expt. 2 
Pairing 
filM FF 
Block Coop. !mit. Coop. !mit 
1 20 0.552 28 0.483 
15 0,603 25 0.534 
24 0.534 14 0.638 
19 0.500 31 0.603 
20 0.466 25 0.569 
18 0.603 23 0.603 
28 0.569 22 0.569 
34 0.569 29 0.586 
23 0.638 13 0.690 
23 0.517 17 0.552 i 
2 25 0.167 31 0.750 
10 0.667 17 0.633 
21 0.600 21 0.683 
15 0.667 42 0.717 
1 0.967 12 0.600 
58 0.967 28 0.617 
21 0.500 23 0.533 
60 0.967 58 0.967 
59 0.950 7 o. 750 
59 0.983 21 0.517 
3 28 o.o67 38 0.783 
10 0.700 17 0.633 
23 0.683 15 0.583 
9 0.683 25 0.517 
19 0.567 21 0.483 
60 1.000 17 0.567 
31 0.700 17 0.650 
60 1.000 60 1.000 
60 1.000 0 1.000 
60 1.000 19 0.467 
279, 
Pairing 
MM FF 
Block Coop. Imit. Coop. Imit. 
4 28 0.067 48 0.767 
23 0.700 15 0.533 
19 0.617 22 0.767 
12 0.633 41 0.800 
9 0.733 27 0.417 
60 1.000 20 0.583 
52 0.867 36 0.633 
I 60 1.000 60 1.000 I 
60 1.000 9 0.733 
60 1.000 18 0.433 
5 28 0.067 46 0.867 
60 1.000 14 0.583 
14 0.617 26 0.700 
8 0.750 36 0.700 
7 0.900 20 0.517 
60 1.000 16 0.617 
39 0.483 50 0.817 
59 0.967 60 1.000 
60 1.000 7 0.767 
60 1.000 19 0.433 
6 28 0.067 42 0.867 
60 1.000 16 0.583 
11 0.733 21 0.767 
8 0.767 40 0.817 
47 0.800 18 0.550 
60 1.ooo 16 0.533 
24 0.567 60 1.000 
59 0.967 60 1.000 
60 1.000 14 0.533 
60 1.000 22 0.433 
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Appendix Vll1 
Questionnaire data : raw scores 
a. Expt. 1 
Q1. MM FF Q2. MM FF 
4 6 2 6 
4 6 6 5 
6 5 2 4 
4 5 5 5 2 5 4 5 
4 6 4 5 4 5 4 2 2 4 4 5 5 4 2 4 2 5 4 5 5 5 4 3 5 4 3 5 6 5 5 4 5 5 5 2 5 4 5 5 4 6 4 5 6 6 4 5 4 5 4 3 5 5 4 5 6 6 2 5 1 6 5 5 6 5 5 4 5 6 3 4 5 6 5 5 4 6 3 2 4 6 2 4 5 6 5 5 5 4 5 5 6 5 4 4 6 4 4 4 6 6 4 5 6 6 4 5 6 6 4 5 6 6 3 2 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 3 5 6 5 5 6 5 1 4 5 1 5 1 6 4 5 4 
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Q3. MM fF Q4. MM Ff 
4 1 4 1 
5 1 5 4 
2 1 5 5 
3 5 3 5 
2 5 6 5 
1 2 2 5 
2 5 5 3 
5 3 5 3 
3 4 5 5 
1 1' 6 2 
1 3 6 4 
1 1 6 4 
4 4 5 4 
3 1 5 4 
1 1 2 2 
3 1 6 5 
3 3 4 5 
2 2 2 5 
1 5 5 4 
3 6 6 5 
1 1 1 5 
1 1 6 5 
2 3 4 4 
4 2 5 6 
1 1 5 6 
4 2 5 5 
3 1 4 6 
3 1 5 4 
6 1 6 4 
5 4 3 5 
6 5 6 5 
6 1 5 5 
5 1 6 5 
4 1 3 5 
6 6 5 4 
6 1 5 5 
5 1 5 5 
5 1 5 2 
1 6 4 6 
1 2 4 4 
282. 
b. Exet. 2 
Q5. MM FF Q1. MM. FF. 
5 5 6 4 5 3 3 1 5 4 6 1 4 2 6 2 4 5 6 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 2 .2 5 4 5 3 6 5 2 5 5 5 4 6 4 5 6 2 6 6 2 4 6 5 1 1 4 5 1 3 6 6 2 2 4 5 3 4 6 3 2 2 4 5 1 4 5 6 4 6 6 5 4 6 
4 4 
2 3 Q2. 5 5 2 5 4 4 4 5 1 2 3 3 5 4 6 6 3 4 5 4 2 2 6 4 3 4 4 5 5 3 6 5 3 1 6 6 5 3 5 2 5 5 4 6 5 5 5 2 5 6 6 4 4 3 5 3 4 5 2 4 3 5 5 1 4 4 5 4 4 5 
3 4 
2 4 
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Q3. Mf~ FF Q5. MM FF 
6 4 4 4 
1 1 3 1 
6 1 6 1 
6 1 6 2 
6 6 5 4 
6 6 6 6 
5 1 4 5 
6 1 5 4 
6 3 6 4 
6 2 6 3 
6 6 5 6 
5 4 5 1 
1 5 3 1 
1 3 6 4 
6 6 1 2 
5 4 4 4 
2 3 4 2 
5 2 4 4 
1 2 1 1 
6 2 2 5 
c. EX£!t• 3 
Q4. 2 5 Q1. MM FF 
6 2 
5 2 5 5 
5 4 3 6 
6 4 5 5 
2 1 3 6 
6 6 6 5 
2 5 5 5 
5 5 6 5 
5 2 5 5 
6 5 6 5 
1 5 5 6 
3 4 4 6 
3 3 6 5 
5 4 6 6 
5 5 6 6 
6 6 6 5 
6 2 5 6 
5 5 6 5 
5 5 3 1 
6 4 
6 5 
Q2. MM FFF Q4. MM FF 
4 4 6 2 
2 4 2 6 
4 3 5 5 
4 4 5 6 
2 3 6 4 
4 3 6 3 5 6 6 5 
5 3 6 3 
4 5 3 5 5 5 6 6 
2 4 5 5 
4 5 6 2 
6 5 5 6 
6 5 5 6 
4 6 4 3 
4 4 6 2 5 5 6 2 5 2 5 6 
6 5 1 4 
3 4 2 5 
Q3. 5 6 Q5. 4 6 
3 5 1 1 
4 1 6 2 5 2 1 6 
4 5 5 1 5 3 1 5 
6 4 5 5 
4 5 6 2 
2 5 3 5 
5 4 6 5 
3 5 3 6 
1 6 2 5 
6 1 6 6 
6 5 6 6 
6 6 6 5 
6 6 6 5 
6 1 5 4 
6 3 6 1 
1 5 1 3 
1 4 2 6 
205. 
d. Expt. 4 
a) Male E. 
Ql. MM FF Q3. MM FF 
5 6 1 6 
5 5 3 1 
4 5 4 2 
6 6 3 6 
5 5 4 6 
6 5 6 1 
6 5 6 4 
6 1 5 4 
5 5 5 2 
6 3 6 1 
6 6 6 1 
6 2 6 1 
6 5 5 6 
5 4 5 6 
1 5 1 1 
6 4 1 1 
3 6 6 6 
6 2 6 2 
5 5 
Q2. 4 4 Q4. 1 1 
5 3 5 3 
4 4 6 6 
5 2 6 5 
5 4 3 4 
5 5 5 6 
5 2 1 5 
5 2 6 1 
4 4 4 2 
5 4 5 3 
4 3 2 1 
4 4 4 5 
5 6 3 5 
2 3 2 2 
3 3 5 5 
1 4 2 6 
2 3 5 2 
5 3 6 6 
5 3 
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Q5. MM FF Q2. MM FF 
5 6 4 2 
6 3 4 6 
2 5 5 5 
6 6 2 5 
6 5 3 3 
5 3 2 5 
5 3 5 3 
5 2 2 4 
5 4 5 3 
6 4 4 4 
6 2 4 2 
6 1 3 6 
5 6 3 4 
2 3 4 3 
6 3 5 5 
6 1 4 
6 6 6 
4 4 5 
2 3 
b) Female E 
Ql. MM FF 
4 6 Q3. 5 6 
4 6 3 6 
4 6 5 6 
5 6 1 4 
5 5 5 1 
5 6 5 4 
5 5 5 2 
6 6 6 6 
6 6 6 6 
6 4 6 6 
6 6 6 6 
5 5 1 3 
6 6 5 4 
6 5 6 4 
5 2 1 4 
6 6 
5 4 
6 1 
6 1 
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e. Expt. 5 
Q4. MM FF Q1. MM FF 
6 4 5 6 
5 6 5 1 
6 6 1 5 
5 2 2 2 
5 5 5 5 
1 4 5 6 
6 4 4 2 
1 5 4 5 
4 2 6 5 
4 6 2 4 
3 1 2 6 
3 6 6 6 
4 2 6 4 
3 5 5 5 
4 6 5 5 
5 5 5 
5 
5 
5 
Q5. 3 5 Q2. 5 4 
4 6 3 5 
3 6 5 5 
1 3 5 5 
4 5 3 5 
3 5 6 4 
6 5 1 4 
1 6 1 3 
6 6 5 4 
5 4 5 4 
6 5 4. 5 
5 4 5 6 
6 5 3 4 
4 3 2 3 
1 3 5 1 
6 4 1 
6 
5 
6 
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Q3. MM FF Q5. MM FF 
6 1 4 3 
4 3 2 4 
1 5 1 4 
1 3 5 3 
2 5 5 5 
1 6 6 6 
1 1 6 2 
5 2 6 4 
1 3 6 3 
1 1 5 4 
3 6 5 6 
6 1 6 4 
5 5 6 6 
4 4 5 4 
5 2 5 2 
6 1 6 2 
f. Expt. 6 
Q4. 5 4 Ql. 5 1 
6 5 4 2 
5 5 6 5 
4 5 6 5 
5 6 5 4 
5 6 2 5 
4 3 5 6 
5 4 6 6 
5 2 5 5 
4 4 5 1 
5 5 1 5 
6 6 6 4 
3 4 5 5 
3 3 5 5 
6 3 6 6 
3 4 6 6 
2 4 
6 
289. 
Q2. MM FF Q4. MM FF 
3 3 5 4 
5 4 2 2 
3 4 6 6 
1 4 5 6 
2 6 2 5 
4 5 1, 6 
4 4 6 2 
4 5 5 5 
3 5 4 2 
5 2 6 5 
2 5 1 1 
4 5 6 4 
1 2 6 5 
4 6 4 6 
1 4 3 6 
2 5 3 6 
5 4 6 4 
5 2 
Q3. 5 1 Q5. 6 5 
6 2 6 1 
5 2 3 6 
5 5 6 6 
2 6 6 5 
1 6 2 6 
4 1 4 1 
4 1 6 6 
5 1 5 2 
6 3 4 1 
1 2 6 4 
5 1 5 1 
5 6 1 2 
5 6 3 1 
1 6 3 1 
6 6 5 5 
6 1 2 1 
2 2 
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Appendix il.X 
Co-operation raw scores (Expt. 2) 
Pairing Communication Trial Block 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 5 6 
20 25 28 28 28 28 
15 10 10 23 60 60 
0 24 21 23 19 14 ll 
19 15 9 12 8 8 
20 1 19 9 7 47 
MM 
18 58 60 60 60 60 
28 21 31 52 39 24 
31 34 60 60 60 59 59 
23 59 60 60 60 60 
23 59 60 60 60 60 
28 31 38 48 46 42 
25 17 17 15 14 16 
0 14 21 15 22 26 21 
31 42 25 41 36 40 
25 12 21 27 20 18 
FF 
23 28 17 20 16 16 
22 23 17 36 50 60 
31 29 58 60 60 60 60 
13 7 0 9 7 14 
17 21 19 18 19 22 
Incentive 
none 
(Expt. 1) 
financial 
(Expt. 2) 
291. 
Appendix X 
Pooled data for Expt. 1 and Expt. 2 
a) Mean number of co-operative choices per trial block 
as a function of the sex of the dyad, the communication 
opportunity and the incentive. 
Pairing Communication Trial Blocks 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 
MM 0 19.2 u.s 7.8 7.2 
31 10.4 18.4 17.8 18.4 
FF 0 18.8 15.4 13.0 11.0 
31 20.4 10.6 6.4 3.0 
MM 0 19.6 14.4 1?.8 18.2 
31 25.2 51.4 54.2 58.4 
FF 0 24.6 24.6 23.2 30.6 
31 20.8 27.4 22.6 28.6 
5 
14.0 
16.6 
10.6 
6.2 
23.4 
55.6 
28.4 
30.4 
6 
8.6 
19.4 
10.0 
8.6 
30.8 
52.6 
27.4 
34.4 
sis of variance summar for number of co-
o erative choices for Sex 2 levels) x Communication 
(2 levels) x Incentive (2 levels) over Trial Blocks 
(6 levels) 
Source df sum of squares mean square F 
Between d:tads 
Sex ( BJ:) 1 1815.00 1815.00 2.32 
Communication ( 82) 1 3572.82 3572.82 4.56 
812 1 5320.42 5320.42 6.79 
Incentive (B3) 1 20093.40 20093.40 25.65 
Bl3 1 437.40 437.40 0.56 
B23 1 3067.35 3067.35 3.92 
Bl23 1 1260.42 1260.42 1.61 
Error 8123 32 25067.93 783.37 
Within d:tads 
Trial Blocks (W1) 5 471.38 94.28 1.10 
W1B1 5 871.15 174.23 2.18 
W1B2 5 1021.73 204.35 2.56 
WlB12 5 1595.43 319.09 3.99 
WlB3 5 2689.85 537.97 6.72 
W1B13 5 109.95 21.99 0.27 
Wl823 5 431.40 86.28 1.08 
W1B123 5 193.03 38.61 0.48 
Error W1B123 160 12800.07 80.00 
292. 
p 
0.13 
0.04 
0.01 
0.00008 
0.53 
0.05 
0.21 
0.32 
0.06 
0.03 
0.002 
0.00005 
0.93 
0.37 
o. 79' 
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Appendix Xl 
Imitation : raw scores (Expt. 2) 
Pairing Communication Trial Block 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0.552 0.167 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 
0.534 0.600 0.683 0.617 0.617 0.733 
0 0.603 0.667 0.700 0.700 1.000 1.000 
0.500 0.667 0.683 0.633 0.750 0.767 
MM 0.466 0.967 0.567 0.733 0.900 o.soo 
0.569 o. 500 0.700 0.867 0.483 0.567 
0.603 0.967 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
31 0.569 0.967 1.000 1.000 0.967 0.967 
0.638 0.950 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.517 0.983 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.483 0.750 0.783 0.767 0.867 0.867 
0.534 0.633 0.633 0.533 0.583 o .. 583 
0 0.638 0.683 0.583 0.767 0.700 0.767 
0.603 0.717 0.517 0.800 0.700 0.817 
0.569 0.600 0.483 0.417 0.517 0.550 
FF 
0.603 0.617 0.567 0.583 0.617 0.533 
0.690 0.750 1.000 0.733 0.767 0.533 
31 0.569 0.533 0.650 0.633 0.817 1.000 
0.586 0.967 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.552 0.517 0.467 0.433 0.433 0.433 
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Appendix Xll 
Co-operation raw scores (Expt. 3) 
Pairing Communication Trial Block 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 5 6 
29 12 7 4 2 4 
22 15 3 13 56 52 
0 45 38 28 46 32 39 
5 1 38 60 60 60 
26 24 27 37 54 53 
MM 
41 58 60 60 60 60 
40 44 31 5 14 5 
31 25 58 60 60 60 60 
24 58 60 60 60 60 
35 38 25 36 55 60 
27 32 38 23 18 22 
22 10 2 2 0 0 
0 19 49 38 24 51 36 
27 17 8 38 60 60 
17 11 14 11 7 8 
FF 
29 23 11 13 9 6 
42 60 60 60 60 60 
31 57 60 60 60 60 60 
25 14 14 13 9 8 
16 59 60 60 60 60 
Sex of 
E 
F 
295. 
Appendix Xlll 
Pooled date for Expt. 2 and Expt. 3 
a) Mean number of co-operative choices per trial block 
as a function of the sex of the dyad, the communication 
opportunity and the sex of the experimenter 
Pairing Communication Trial Blocks 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 
MM 0 .19.6 14.4 17.8 18.2 
31 25.2 51.4 54.2 58.4 
(Expt.2) FF 0 24.6 24.6 23.2 30.6 
31 20.8 27.4 22.6 28.6 
MM 0 25.4 18.0 20.6 32.0 
M 31 33.0 51.2 47.0 44.2 
(Expt.3) FF 0 22.4 23.8 20.0 19.6 
31 33.8 43.2 41.0 41.2 
5 6 
23.4 30.8 
55.6 52.6 
28.4 27.4 
30.4 34.4 
40.8 41.6 
49.8 49.0 
27.2 25.2 
39.6 38.8 
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Source df sum of squares mean square F p 
Between d~ads 
Sex of S ( 81) 1 3204.70 3204.70 . 2.63 0.11 
Communication (82) 1 14554.84 14554.84 11.95 0.002 
812 1 2808.50 2808.50 2.31 0.14 
Sex of E (83) 1 731.50 731.50 0.60 0.55 
813 1 49.50 49.50 0.04 0.84 
823 1 28.70 28.70 0.02 0.87 
8123 1 3060.20 3060.20 2.51 0.12 
Error 8123 32 38977.93 1218.06 
Within d~ads 
Trial Blocks (Wl) 5 3891.72 778.34 5.56 0.0002 
Wl81 5 963.72 192.74 1.38 0.24 
WlB2 5 2100.19 420.04 2.10 0.01 
W1812 5 942.22 188.44 1.34 0.25 
W1B3 5 221.32 44.26 0.32 0.90 
W1B13 5 305.82 61.16 0.44 0.82 
W1823 5 495.22 99.04 o. 71 0.62 
W1Bl23 5 578.22 115.64 0.83 0.53 
Error 8123 160 22418.10 140.11 
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Appendix XlV 
Co-operation raw scores (Expt. 4) 
a) Male E. 
Pairing Communication Trial Block 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 5 6 
45 44 54 48 43 47 
32 39 30 37 23 29 
0 34 33 33 31 29 31 
31 9 3 45 60 60 
25 20 11 8 5 12 
MM 
31 24 14 17 20 24 
58 60 60 60 60 60 
31 43 60 60 60 60 60 
25 51 45 43 43 42 
23 58 60 60 60 60 
17 18 11 15 7 13 
22 48 33 41 37 40 
0 33 17 21 19 7 7 
26 20 18 14 16 16 
25 19 34 30 29 31 
FF 
26 20 23 21 26 20 
32 59 60 60 60 60 
31 23 24 22 14 11 9 
21 60 60 60 60 60 
15 4 0 0 0 0 
' 
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b) Female E 
Pairing Communication Trial Block 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 5 6 
41 31 31 32 32 34 
40 48 47 48 43 30 
0 14 18 34 24 37 29 
25 26 60 60 60 60 
50 60 60 60 60 60 
MM 
29 47 40 27 18 50 
13 59 60 60 60 60 
31 31 36 52 52 54 42 
51 60 60 60 60 60 
18 58 60 60 60 60 
26 40 31 29 26 60 
21 37 60 60 60 60 
0 24 13 15 56 48 44 
31 41 28 20 24 23 
21 21 49 60 60 60 
FF 
29 60 60 60 60 60 
25 29 23 26 17 28 
31 40 46 38 33 46 39 
25 58 60 60 60 60 
58 60 60 60 60 60 
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Appendix XV 
Analxsis of Pooled data for Expts. 2 - 4 
over Trial 
Source df sum of squares mean square F p 
Between d>;:ads 
Sex of E (A) 1 1665.08 1665.08 0.33 0.62 
n (B) 1 18750.00 18750.00 31.93 0.04 Comm • 
AB 1 192.53 192.53 0.33 0.62 
Sex of s (c) 1 6735.01 6735.01 12.99 o.o8 
AC 1 492.08 492.08 0.95 0.43 
BC 1 2066.70 2066.70 1.17 0,39 
ABC 1 710.53 710.53 0.40 0.59 
Within dJ::ads 
Trial Blocks (D) 5 7052.43 1410.49 15.84 0,0002 
AD 5 1203.68 240.74 2.70 o.o8 
BD 5 3184.40 636.88 7.23 0.004 
ABO 5 83.82 16.76 0.19 0.96 
CD 5 693.19 13B.64 3.91 0.03 
ACD 5 678.18 135.64 3.82 0.03 
BCD 5 819.70 163.94 2.24 0.13 
ABCD 5 621.82 124.36 1. 70 0.22 
Random factor 
E's/Sex of E (F) 2 9990.47 4995.23 4.22 0.02 
BF 2 1174.35 587.17 0.50 0.62 
CF 2 1036.57 518.28 0.44 0.65 
BCF 2 3529.62 1764.81 1.49 0.23 
DF 10 890.38 89.04 0.73 0,69 
BDF 10 880.40 88.04 0,72 0.70 
CDF 10 354.68 35.47 0,29 0.98 
BcDr-- 10 732.53 73.25 0.60 0.81 
G 64 75709.87 1182.97 
DG 320 38868.13 121.46 
Total 479 178116.10 
·-
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Appendix XV1 
"Comr2eti "li..C?.!l •• scores" _ : poo1~.d _data ( Expts. 2 -. ~ 
Sex of E IVJf·1 FF 
32 30 
31 21 
26 34 
15 27 ' 
M Expt. 4 17 31 
33 40 
31 28 
16 20 
25 33 
13 32 
5 35 
33 21 
42 36 
17 28 
F Expt. 4 21 22 
5 33 
32 26 
36 32 
11 34 
17 32 
3(]1. 
f-· 
Sex of E f~IVJ FF 
-
28 23 
33 32 
38 33 
35 24 
F Expt. 2 40 24 
37 35 
33 32 
43 38 
35 21 
39 42 
25 29 
50 22 
30 29 
39 36 
r1 Ex pt. 3 19 34 
31 32 
44 27 
33 29 
35 38 
9 36 
. 
···-·-
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Appendix XVll 
Co-qperation raw scores (Expt. 5 and Expt. 6) 
a) Expt. 5 
Pairing Communication Trial Block 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 5 6 
33 40 41 38 55 54 
37 40 37 28 31 33 
0 60 60 60 60 60 60 
53 54 50 58 50 56 
MM 
34 59 60 60 60 60 
38 57 55 47 42 37 
31 31 20 57 60 60 58 
58 60 60 60 60 60 
9 24 25 17 19 28 
17 13 19 12 10 15 
0 25 23 60 60 60 60 
17 3 11 1 5 0 
FF 
18 26 20 26 28 26 
7 10 8 2 0 0 
31 26 37 44 41 60 60 
22 8 16 20 17 14 
303. 
b) Expt. 6 
Pairing Communication Trial Block 
OJlQOrtunitv 1 2 3 4 5 6 
29 22 20 5 14 9 
22 12 14 11 19 9 
0 14 14 16 11 11 13 
22 6 8 49 60 60 
20 7 20 58 60 60 
MM 
24 17 13 17 7 14 
22 17 18 4 15 10 
31 36 27 31 20 18 30 
41 58 60 60 60 60 
19 14 17 11 19 14 
25 26 31 21 21 12 
0 28 19 16 33 33 42 
33 25 36 29 30 29 
30 27 16 19 16 16 
FF 
22 18 18 13 18 23 
22 58 60 60 60 60 
31 20 58 60 60 60 60 
27 26 22 20 37 27 
Culture 
of S 
UK 
(Expt.2) 
USA 
(Expt.5) 
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Appendix XVlll 
Pooled data for Expt. 2 and Expt. 5 
a) Mean number of co-operative choices per trial block as a 
function of the sex of the dyad~ the communication opportunity 
and the culture of the subject 
Pairing Comm n Tria Block • 
Opportuni t'x_: 1 2 3 4 5 
l'~fiJ 0 19.60 14.40 17.80 18.20 23.40 
31 25.20 51.40 54.20 58.40 55.60 
FF 0 24.60 24.60 23.20 30.60 28.40 
31 20.8P 27.40 22.60 28.60 30.40 
JYJr~ 0 45.75 48.50 47.00 46.00 49.00 
31 40.25 49.00 58.00 56.75 55.50 
FF 0 17.00 15.75 28.75 22.50 23.50 
31 18.25 20.25 22.00 22.25 26.25 
6 
30.80 
52.60 
27.40 
34.40 
50.75 
53.75 
25.75 
25.00 
b) Analysis of variance summary for number of 
co-opetative choices for Sex (2 levels) x 
Communication (2 levels) x Culture (2 levels) 
over Trial Blocks (6 levels) 
Source df sum of square's mean square 
Between dl:ads 
Sex (Bl) 1 15419.50 15419.50 
Communication (B2) 1 4638.86 4638.86 
Culture (B3) 1 1398.54 1398.54 
Bl2 1 4099.45 4099.45 
Bl3 1 5087.33 5087.33 
B23 1 2128.03 2128.03 
8123 1 1874.91 1874.91 
Error 8123 28 27600.10 985.72 
Within d:tads 
Trial Blocks (Wl) 5 3149.06 629.81 
WlBl 5 380.95 76.19 
Wl82 5 1122.33 224.47 
Wl83 5 356.63 71.33 
Wl812 5 1191.21 238.24 
Wl813 5 231.91 46.38 
Wl823 5 281.81 56.36 
Wl8123 5 283.52 56.70 
Error Wl8123 140 12232.80 87.38 
3[]5. 
F p 
15.64 L.o .o5 
4.71 ~ 0.05 
1.42 7 0.05 
4.16 70.05 
5.16 L.0.05 
2.16 7 0.05 
1.90 ') 0.05 
7.21 < 0.05 
0.87 ::>o.o5 
2.57 .( 0.05 
0.82 )'0.05 
2.73 < 0.05 
0.53 > 0.05 
0.65 ::> 0.05 
0.65 ) 0.05 
Presence 
of E 
present 
(Expt.2) 
absent 
(Expt.6) 
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Appendix XlX 
Pooled da.ta fo.r. Exet. 2 and Ex.e.t.6_. 
a) r~ean number of co-operative cho~_c§l~EEr trial block 
as a functiO.fJ..2.L_t~eX of th~. dyad, the, communicaq~ 
o_eeortunity__.§!.~d the .e.resence of .. E.. __ _ 
Pairing n Comm • Trial Blocks 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 
-
iVJM 0 19.60 14.40 1'7:.80 18.20 
31 25.20 51.40 54.20 58.40 
FF 0 24.60 24.60 23.20 30.60 
31 20.80 27.40 22.60 28.60 
Mr~ 0 21.40 12.20 15.60 26.80 
31 30.75 29.75 30.50 25.25 
FF 0 27.00 22.20 23.20 22.60 
31 22.75 40.00 40.00 38.25 
5 
23.40 
55.60 
28.40 
30.40 
32.80 
25.00 
23.80 
43.75 
6 
30.80 
52.60 
27.40 
34.40 
30.20 
28.50 
22.60 
42.50 
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Source df Sum of squares mean square F p 
Between d~ads 
Sex (81) 1 146.83 146.83 0.15 ) 0.05 
Communication (82) 1 8543.44 8543.44 8.44 (. 0.05 
Presence of E (83) 1 442.73 442.73 0.44 10.05 
812 1 1245.21 1245.21 1. 23 /0.05 
813 1 2462.96 2462.96 2.43 ')o .o5 
823 1 376.86 376.86 0.37 ., 0.05 
Ell23 1 4871.02 4871.02 4.81 L. 0.05 
Error 8123 30 30368.90 1012.30 
Within o~ads 
Trial Blocks (Wl) 5 2461.90 492.38 4.71 <0.05 
W1Bl 5 171.90 34.38 0.33 )0.05 
W1B2 5 1658.90 331.78 3.18 ('0.05 
Wl83 5 458.93 91.79 0.88 /0.05 
Wl812 5 867.07 173.41 1.66 70.05 
W1Bl3 5 719.83 143.97 1.38 ) 0.05 
W1823 5 344.84 68.97 0.66 I o.o5 
W18123 5 1557.75 311.55 2.98 ~ 0.05 
Error Wl8123 150 15665.30 104.44 
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Appendix XX 
Instnuctions 
a) Expt. 1. 
"You will be making choices which have certain pay-offs. You can 
not by yourself control the specific pay-ofif for a given trial. 
Rather, the outcome will depend on what your partner does as well 
as on what you do. 
Each of you has a pay-off sheet in fro~of you attached to the 
partition. The task is as follows. 
You are subjects 1 and 2 respectively, as shown by th~ number on 
the bottom of your record sheet. Eachif you can make one of two 
choices, either A or B, indicating your choice on the appropriate 
button in front of you. Any decision is final and you may not 
change your mind once you have indicated your choice by pressing 
the button. 
The pay-offs resulting from such a move are indicated on the card 
in front of you. If you both choose A each of you receives 3 
points. If subject 1 chooses A and subject 2 chooses B, 1 receives 
zero and 2 receives 4 points. However, if subject 2 chooses A and 
subject 1 chooses B, 2 receives zero and 1 receives 4 points. If 
you both choose B, each receives 1 point. 
The experimenter will read off, after each move, the number of 
points gained by each person. Each of you will record your own 
gains on the record sheet in front of you. You should try to get 
as many points for yourself as you can. The more points you 
accumulate the bet~er the result." 
In addition, the following instructions were played to the subjects 
if the degree of communication was to be restricted during the 
inter-action. 
"Please do not communicate with each other in any form whatsoever, 
unless otherwise informed by the experimenter. This includes 
sighing, laughing or any other form of communication. The 
experiment would be useless for our purposes if this is not 
observed". 
If verbal communication was to be allowed additional instructions 
were given orally as follows: 
1) Before trial 1 
11) After trial 31 
111) Throughout .. . 
"I have some preparation to do before we 
start. You can chat to each other for a 
few minutes, but not to me. Please remain 
seated". After 3 minutes, E requested 
subjects to "Press when you're ready." 
"We'll have a break now. You can chat to 
eachother for a few minutes, but not to 
me. Please remain seated." After 3 
minutes, E requested subjects to "Press when 
you're ready". 
"You can chat to each other during the course 
of the session, but not to me. Please remain 
seated". 
3i0. 
b) Expt. 2 
''You will be making choices which have certain pay-offs. You 
cannot by yours~lf control the specific pay-off for a given 
trial. Rather, the outcome will depend on what your partner does 
as well as on what you do. 
Each of you has a pay-off sheet in front of you attached to the 
partition. The task is as follows: 
You are subjects 1 and 2 respectively, as shown by the number on 
the bottom of your record sheet. Each of you can make one of two 
choices, either A or B, indicating your choice on the appropriate 
button in front of you. Any decision is final and you may not 
change your mind once you have indicated your choice by pressing 
the button. 
The pay-offs resulting from such a move are indicated on the card 
in front of you. If you both choose A each of you receives 3 
points. If subject 1 choose A and subject 2 chooses B, 1 receives 
zero and 2 receives 4 points. However, if subject 2 chooses A 
and subject 1 chooses B, 2 receives zero and 1 receives 4 points. 
If you both choose B each receives 1 point. 
The experimenter will read off, after each move, the number of 
points gained by each person. Each of you will record your own 
gains on the record sheet in front of you. For every 300 points 
you accumulate, you will receive £1 at the end of the experiment. 
Please do,,not communicate with each other in any form whatsoever, 
311. 
unless otherwi•e informed by the experimenter. This includes 
sighing, laughing or any other form of communication. The 
experiment would be useless for our purposes if this is not 
observed". 
c) Expt. 6 
"You will be making choices which have certain pay-offs. You 
cannot, by yourself, control the specific pay-off for a given 
trial. Rather, the outcome will depend on what your partner 
does as well as on what you do. 
Each of you has a pay-off board in front of you attached to the 
partition. The task is as follows. 
You are subjects 1 and 2 respectively, as shown by the number on 
the bottom of your record sheet. Each of you can make one of 
two choices, either A or B, indicating your choice on the 
appropriate button in~front of you. Any decision is final and 
you may not change your mind once you have indicated your choice 
by pressing the button. 
The pay-offs resulting from such a move are indicated on~the 
board in front of you. If you both coosa A each of you receives 
3 points. If subject 1 chooses A and subject 2 chooses B, 1 
receives 0 and 2 receives 4 points. However, if subject 2 chooses 
A and subject 1 chooses B, 2 receives 0 and 1 receives 4 points. 
If you both choose B each receives 1 point. 
J ' 
The pay-offs are determined by what you both ohooseso that the 
board will light up to indicate the choices you have both made. 
To see how this works have a practice run, observing the 
following procedure. First, both of you press the A button ••••• 
the board lights up and you both get 3 points. Now, subject 1 
press the A button and subject 2 press the 8 button •••••••••• 
subject 1 receives 0 and subject 2 receives ~ points. Now, 
subject 2 press the A button and subject 1 press the 8 button ••••• 
subject 2 receives 0 and subject 1 receives 4 points. Lastly, 
both of you press the 8 button •••• u• you both get 1 point. 
Always wait for the light to go off before making the next choice. 
Each of you will record your own gains on the record sheet in 
front of you. For every 300 points you accumulate you will 
receive £1 at the end of the experiment. 
Please do not communicate with each other in any form whatsoever 
unless indicated during the course of the experiment. This 
includes sighing, laughing or any other form of communication. 
The experiment would be useless for our purpose if this is not 
observed. However, if a buzzer sounds during the session you may 
have a short break. During this time you can chat to each other 
across the partition al~hough you must remain in your seats. You 
should resume the task when the buzzer sounds again. 
You may begin to make your choices now. 11 
